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In the late 1970s, China initiated a series of market-oriented reforms by 
dismantling the previous forms of economic management, which the state had used 
to control all of the industries and the price system to achieve its industrialization 
goals. Since the start of that transformation from a planned economy to one 
governed by market economics, the Chinese authorities have continually tried to 
facilitate market conditions and have them function properly; but, in all this time, 
the central state has never completely abandoned its monopoly in a range of 
industries such as petroleum, telecommunications, and electricity. Here a state 
monopoly in a given industry means that the industry is monopolized by the Chinese 
government through its central state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
While the number of private companies in China has grown substantially over 
the years, state control has not declined much in certain industries following these 
market-oriented reforms. A number of market economy countries also continued to 
maintain state monopolies, which are created, promoted, and sustained by the 
political authorities in various industries for the sake of public interest or greater 
economy of scale. With the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1970s, however, decreasing 
faith in the ability of public authorities to manage these industries has largely 
yielded to market ideologies and solutions. Neoliberal discourse claims that only 
guaranteed private property rights provide the necessary foundation for a market 
economy to function properly. Consequently, while many Western countries have 
gone on to privatize industries once monopolized by the state, in China, 
state-monopolized industries in several sectors have only become more formidable, 
especially over the past decade. These industries are exempt even from regulation by 
the Anti-Monopoly Law enacted in 2008, which was designed to restrain 
monopolistic behavior and protect market competition. According to the 
Anti-Monopoly Law, it identifies categories of industries protected by other laws, 
such as the Tobacco Monopoly Law, in order to preserve their state monopoly status, 
and those that support national security and constitute the core industries of the 
nation’s economy but do not fall under its cover.
1
 While it does not clearly specify 
what industries are included in the latter, telecommunications, electricity, petroleum, 
aviation, and defense are generally regarded within this category. Though not 
legislatively protected by law in order to block the entry of non-state capital into the 
market, the central authorities use other means for keeping the central SOEs 




Even more confusing than the noticeable presence of these monopolies is how 
fierce the competition is with regard to price, production differentiation, sales 
management, advertising, and so forth in these monopolized industries. Monopoly 
literatures generally argue that competition cannot live in government-run 
monopolies, and scholars criticize state monopolies for eradicating competition, 
violating the producer’s autonomy, and hurting consumer welfare. Nevertheless, far 
from being extinguished, observers have noted not only that a competitive aspect 
has been maintained, but on the contrary, has continued to grow and develop in 
some of the industries monopolized in China.
3
  
We may ask then why the usual binary opposition of competition versus 
monopoly does not apply to China’s state-monopolized industries? Or, to put it 
another way: what exactly is the nature of the industrial state monopoly in China?   
This thesis aims to explain the coexistence of state monopoly and 
competition and examines how competition has evolved within current 
                                                     
1 For the relevant regulations please see Articles 7, 15 and 28 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. 
2 Jiang Yang, “(Anti-) Monopoly in China” (paper presented at “Globalization and Public 
Sector Reforms in China and India” conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, September 
23-24, 2011); Hsin-Hsien Wang, “Shui tongzhi? Lun zhongguo de zhengce zhiding 
guocheng : yi fanlongduanfa weili” (Who governs? The dynamics of policy-making in 
China: The case of Antitrust Law), Mainland China Studies 53 No. 1 (2010): 54-5.  
3 For example, please see Eric Harwit, China’s Telecommunications Revolution (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); Zhi-hui Li, Development and Reform of China’s Banking 
System (Lorong Chuan, Singapore: Cengage Learning Asia Pte Limited, 2011); Sarah 
Eaton, “Political Economy of the Advancing State: The Case of China’s Airlines Reform,” 
The China Journal 69 (2013): 64-86; Shaofeng Chen , “State-Managed Marketization: A 
Revisit of the Role of the Chinese State in the Petroleum Industry,” The Copenhagen 
Journal of Asian Studies 30 No. 2 (2012): 29-60; Chunbo Ma and Lining He, “From State 
Monopoly to Renewable Portfolio: Restructuring China's Electric Utility,” Energy Policy 
36 No. 5 (2008): 1697-711; Peter Nolan, Jin Zhang, and Chunhang Liu, “The Global 
Business Revolution and Developing Countries,” in Integrating China: Towards the 
Coordinated Market Economy, ed. Peter Nolan (London, UK: Anthem Press, 2008), 19-42. 
state-monopoly sectors in China over the past three decades. Rather than an 
accidental phenomenon, I argue that the emergence of competition in a state 
monopoly resulted from a certain “governance pattern” that formed up 
incrementally and was strengthened by interactions between local governments and 
multiple players in the state monopoly. A range of interdependent players—such as 
suppliers of raw materials, manufacturers, and distributors—conducted exchanges 
within the governance pattern in order to allow economic activity to continue 
within the industries concerned. In this context, the governance pattern has also 
continually changed as the power-distributing arrangements between the central 
authorities, local governments, and central SOEs have been successively 
re-configured from the late 1970s onward.  
Accordingly, different types of competition have appeared at distinctive stages 
within that governance pattern. As a consequence, state monopoly in China has 
evolved into what I call a central (state)-led competitive monopoly where state 
control and competition continue to coexist, interact, and grow side by side, 
developing together within China’s economy. In other words, by looking more 
deeply into broad term of state monopoly, this thesis uncovers the different ways of 
organizing state-monopoly activities that have emerged through its engagement with 
the phenomenon of competition. The varieties of this organization have been 
generally ignored by researchers on monopoly subjects but nonetheless can 
exemplify the dynamics of state-market relationship vividly.  
1.1  Theoretical Contribution 
In the existing literature, many debates on monopoly and competition revolve 
around why and how to carry out anti-monopoly regulations. According to different 
understandings of the market process, ideas about monopoly and its relationship to 
competition vary. In reviewing the literature, we find that they all but invariably fall 
into a dichotomy between market and state so that they cannot provide a proper 
analytical framework for discussing the coexistence of state monopoly and 
competition within the specific context of China. On these grounds, the present 
research challenges existing monopoly and anti-monopoly studies while developing 
its own explanatory arguments to analyze the enigma presented by China’s 
state-monopoly sectors, particularly in the tobacco industry. 
1.1.1 Existing Literatures on Monopoly Studies  
A neoclassical theory of monopoly employs the model of “perfect competition” 
as the benchmark for making a comparison with a monopolistic situation. Under 
such perfect competition, there exist numerous buyers and sellers who enter the 
market without any barriers, and no companies are large enough to have the power 
to manipulate the prices of their homogeneous products. Resource allocation may 
thus be as efficient as possible, and all trades are mutually beneficial to sellers and 
buyers. By contrast, a monopolist is a firm which faces the entire demand for the 
products so that it is capable of influencing market prices by substantially affecting 
the market supply through its production decisions. As it could charge too much and 
produce too little output, the market could eventually fail and consumer welfare 
could be affected negatively. From the neoclassical perspective, therefore, “more 
competition” is a necessary situation in order to structurally approach perfect 
competition. Here, monopoly and competition constitute the two opposite extremes, 
where if one does not prevent the competition from being violated, then competitive 
markets could or will eventually deteriorate into a monopoly. Viewed in this light, 
anti-monopoly aims to maintain an ideal market environment for unhindered 
competition. The Sherman Antitrust Act passed by the US Congress in 1890 was just 
such a product of this perspective.
4
 
Criticism of perfect competition triggered other views of monopoly. One of 
the most serious problems involves the fundamentally static character of this model, 
which assumes that all the existing conditions would automatically result in 
equilibrium.
5
 Market competition, however, is a dynamic process in which 
opportunities for profit forever require discovery and exploitation in uncertain 
circumstances. Viewed in this light, while the abovementioned antitrust law is 
intended to promote competition, it might actually restrain the competitive market 
process by protecting the existing industrial structure.
6
 Joseph Schumpeter, for 
                                                     
4 Dominick T. Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly: Anatomy of a Policy Failure (Oakland, 
CA: Independent Institute, 1996), 5-7, 14-9; Richard B. McKenzie and Dwight R. Lee, In 
Defense of Monopoly (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 26; 
Stephen Wilks, In the Public Interest: Competition Policy and the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000), 23.  
5 Armentano, Antitrust and Monopoly, 22-8. 
6 Bruce Doern and Stephen Wilks, Comparative Competition Policy: National Institutions in 
a Global Market (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 10-2; Dominick T. 
Armentano, “A Critique of Neoclassical and Austrian Monopoly Theory,” in New 
example, contends that new firms, in seeking to earn monopolist profits, are 
constantly motivated to destroy the existing monopolies by creating new products, 
technologies, and organizational forms. This process is signalized by Schumpeter as 
the “creative destruction” energized by the prospect of monopoly. He further argues 
that what matters most are the waves of innovation that revolutionize “the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the 
new one. This process of creative destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.”
7
 
On this view, the giant monopolistic firms remain under “competitive pressure” 
from the outside in the sense that failure to continue to innovate could lead to a 
weakening of the barriers to entry. Schumpeter goes on to combine realism with a 
defense of “monopolistic practices,” which are viewed as logically consistent with 
competition.
8
 In this perspective, monopoly is seen as a “necessary evil” for 
economic growth so that the weaker anti-monopoly regulations being enforced are 
favored.   
The Chicago School, emerging from the 1970s, further maintains that 
monopoly is naturally fleeting and rapidly turns into competition so that it may 
actually be ignored.
9
 Moreover, this camp proposes different ideas with respect to 
competition. For example, in the 1980s Baumol advanced the “contestable market 
theory,” arguing that competition and efficiency do not require large numbers of 
producing firms, each of whom is small, independent in decision-making, and 
producing homogeneous products so unable to affect price as indicated in the model 
of perfect competition. Rather, a contestable market is one into which entry is 
                                                                                                                            
Directions in Austrian Economics , ed. Louis M. Spadaro (Kansas City, MO: Sheed, 
Andrews and McMeel, Inc., 1978), 95; Dominick T. Armentano, Antitrust: The Case for 
Repeal (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2007), 106. 
7 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, NY: Routledge, 
2006), 102-6. 
8 John Bellamy Foster, Robert W. McChesnay and R. Jamil Jonna, “Monopoly and 
Competition in Twenty-First Century Capitalism,” Monthly Review 62 No. 11 (2011), 
accessed March 25, 2014, 
http://monthlyreview.org/2011/04/01/monopoly-and-competition-in-twenty-first-century-ca
pitalism. 
9 I. Schmidt and J.B. Rittaler, A Critical Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis (New York, NY: Springer, 1989), 72; “Antitrust Policy,” accessed November 12, 
2013, 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd/Antitrust/antitrust_intl.encyclopedia.pdf; 
McKenzie and Lee, In Defense of Monopoly, 15; Doern and Wilks, Comparative 
Competition Policy, 12. 
absolutely free, and exit is absolutely costless. That is, contestable markets are 
characterized by “hit and run” competition—if a firm in a contestable market raises 
its prices much beyond the average price level of the market, potential rivals will 
enter the market; conversely, when the original firm responds by returning prices to 
levels consistent with normal profits, the new firms will exit. This argument thus 
rejects the neoclassical economic notion that competition exists when each business 
unit has no significant control over price, output, and investments largely determined 
by market forces beyond its control. Instead, competition here is used to refer to 
potential rivalry derived from an assumption of ultra-free entry and exit. Even a 
single-firm market might therefore show highly competitive behavior, so that 
antitrust actions are no longer necessary.
10
 This notion is clearly expressed by 
Robert Bork’s book The Antitrust Paradox, concluding that the law should never 
attack the monopolistic market structure, as it actually embodies the proper balance 
of forces for consumer welfare.
11
 
Though the views on monopoly and competition differ as stated above, they 
are all united in the belief that the state monopoly, which is established by the 
government for its own purposes, is the genuine source of “pernicious” monopoly 
power. More specifically, it is generally agreed that the state monopoly derives this 
power from a coercive entry barrier and must inevitably stifle competition. In 
addition, exchange under any state monopoly remains controlled by the political 
authority so that it cannot approximate that certain level of efficiency a free market 
can create.
12
 In function, this assessment insists that the free market is necessarily 
the dominant form for all economic activities. In the free market, each exchange is 
assumed to be undertaken as a voluntary agreement between two parties under the 
conditions of private ownership, and the emergent system of price results from a 
vast number of those voluntary transactions rather than of political decrees. From 
this perspective, the free market is represented as an apolitical realm vis-à-vis the 
state, whereas a state monopoly definitively distorts the market. 
                                                     
10 William Baumol, “Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure,” 
The American Economic Review 72 No. 1 (1982): 3-4; William Baumol, John Panzer, and 
Robert Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (New York, NY: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982), xix; Rudolph J.R. Peritz, Competition Policy in 
America: History, Rhetoric, Law (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 270. 
11 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1978), 164. 
12 Peritz, Competition Policy in America, 229-64; McKenzie and Lee, In Defense of 
Monopoly, 226; Armentano, “A Critique of Neoclassical,” 109-10; Armentano, Antitrust 
and Monopoly, 42-3, 271-8.  
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations first proposes this dichotomy between market 
and state, arguing that in a free market, in the process involving the exchange of 
goods or services each individual tries to maximize self-interest and that, as a result 
of this, resources are allocated in the most efficient way possible via competition. 
Guided by this “invisible hand,” the free market economic system does not require 
the state. The state is only required to secure property rights and contract freedom in 
order to maintain the spontaneous order of the market.
13
 From Smith’s original 
introduction, numerous criticisms of this dichotomy have arisen in different strands 
of literatures. 
The Debate on the Duality of State and Market 
For one, as a hegemonic discourse, the free market condenses heterogeneous 
economic activities into a single form of economic exchange. Lindberg, Campbell, 
and Hollingsworth study the dynamics of the U.S. economy from 1870 through the 
late-twentieth century and disclosed a typology of governance mechanism in the real 
world that includes markets, bureaucratic hierarchies, associations, and different 
types of network, which are individually characterized by certain terms of exchange 
between economic actors. These mechanisms variously combine in order to 
coordinate activities among different actors within an industry.
14
 Exploring the 
practices of transaction in Asia, Riggs also stresses the “heterogeneity” of economic 
exchanges and argues that a model featuring only one element in a heterogeneous 
mix cannot be seen as a suitable representation of the whole, no matter how 
important the element is.
15
 In a similar sense, Gibson-Graham proposes another 
typology of transaction, covering formal market, non-market, and alternative market 
exchange, where, in each category, there still exists a variety of socially, culturally, 
or governmentally constructed contexts for goods exchange. By presenting a 
diversity of economic exchange, she unfixes the conventional identity of the 
economy and disarms the “naturalized” free market.
16
 In sum, these works identify 
                                                     
13 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York, NY: Modern Library, 1977), 9, 682-90.  
14 Leon N. Lindberg, John L. Campbell, and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, “Economic 
Governance and the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy,” in 
Governance of the American Economy, ed. Leon N. Lindberg, John L. Campbell, and J. 
Rogers Hollingsworth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12-28. 
15 Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society 
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1964), 13. 
16 J.K. Gibson-Graham, A Postcapitalist Politics (Minneapolis, MI: The University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006), 60-2. 
a shift from the dominance of an ostensibly free market to one that focuses on the 




Further, any “ostensibly” free market also requires the state to exercise power 
aggressively. Decades ago, Polanyi questioned whether a free market, completely 
free of the “distortions” of state policy, even could exist. He unambiguously 
contended that the rise of the market economy went hand-in-hand with the 
emergence of the modern state and that the two developments were historically 
interconnected.
18
 His emphasis on the critical role of the state in the market has 
inspired generations of scholars. In Postindustrial Possibilities, Block argues that in 
order to capture a better understanding of postindustrial development, we should 
realize that no market is a “pure” market in the way that neoclassical economics 
assumes, because every economy is the result of a complex interaction of markets, 
state actions, and social regulations.
19
 Similarly, Fligstein proposes a 
political-cultural approach to explain market-building as part of state-building. 
Focused on more than only the property right, he points out that states try to stabilize 
markets by setting up a series of institutional conditions, including governance 
structures, conceptions of control, the rules of exchange, and so on.
20
 Based on 
comparative political economy studies, Soskice and Hall argue that the institutions 
developed by states are crucial for resolving “coordination” problems for firms in 
the spheres of industrial relations, vocational training, inter-firm relations, corporate 
governance, and so on.
21
 Rather than making rational choices in response to given 
signals, White argues that market actors are more interested in seeking to protect, 
consolidate, or extend their power within the market. From this point of view, he 
identifies four different types of power involved in market politics: the politics of 
state involvement, the politics of market organization, the politics of market 
                                                     
17 Tak-Wing Ngo, “Asia and the Historicity of the Market Economy,” Verge 1 No. 1 
(Forthcoming 2015).  
18 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1944). 
19 Fred Block, Postindustrial Possibilities: A Critique of Economic Discourse (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1990).   
20 Neil Fligstein, “Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions,” 
American Sociological Review 61 (1996): 657; Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). 
21 Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism,” in Varieties 
of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, ed. Peter A. Hall 
and David Soskice (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6-8. 
structure, and the politics of social embeddedness.
22
 In sum, the state actually plays 
an activist role in the real world rather than a minimalist one. Thus, a need for 
political analysis of the market has already been recognized, largely in existing 
literature regarding economic sociology and political economy.
23
   
Another great challenge to the dichotomy of market and state originates in the 
“developmental state literatures.” By investigating the economic growth of East Asia 
in the late twentieth century, strands of this literature note how state intervention can 
employ “market-conforming” methods to promote economic growth. In addition to 
acknowledging the need for state intervention, they further explore which capacities 
such developmental states have at their disposal for governing the markets more 
efficiently. Chalmers Johnson, who pioneered the concept of the developmental state, 
analyzed Japan’s development and concluded that the Japanese state has a small but 
professional bureaucracy with a high degree of prestige, legitimacy, and authority 
both for crafting state interventions into the economy and fostering productive ties 
with the private sectors.
24
 Like Johnson’s studies, many developmental state 
analyses are country-specific, e.g., Amsden’s Korea study and Wade in reference to 
Taiwan, and they tend to highlight an unusual degree of bureaucratic autonomy and 
cohesiveness as well as public-private cooperation (or state-business alliance) that 
together constitute the institutional foundation for effective state intervention in the 
form of industrial policy.
25
 Based on the rich literatures focused on East Asian 
development, Stubbs summarizes three key features of the developmental state: first, 
a cohesive set of state bureaucrats with a relatively autonomous capacity to 
implement a planned strategy for economic growth; second, relational aspects that 
emphasize the interaction between the elite bureaucracy and private business as a 
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“seamless web of influences”; and third, an ideational aspect with particular 
attention to nationalism, economic transformation, rapid industrialization, and so 
on.
26
 While a danger of the thesis of the developmental state is that it may have 
reduced the study of the Asian political economy to the study of economic growth,
27
 
this strand of literature demonstrates that states are capable of intervening in markets 
in a much deeper way to structure domestic industry and enhance a nation’s 
international competiveness in general.
28
 
While these challenges to a dualistic, mutual independence of market and state 
have been acknowledged and widely discussed, state monopoly through this dualist 
lens has rarely been challenged. On the contrary, since the 1970s across the Western 
industrialized countries, the position has been extensively employed to legitimize 
privatization of the public-utility sectors, which previously had held “exempt” status 
due to their nature of natural monopoly.
29
 However, given that the dichotomy 
between market and state is questionable, we must similarly reexamine the concept 
of state monopoly from an alternative perspective. In this context, this study offers a 
theoretical contribution by developing a new analysis to explain why state monopoly 
and competition may not only coexist but also complement one another. 
1.1.2 Existing Literatures on China’s Monopolized Industries 
Due to their obvious presence in China’s economic landscape and the growing 
disputes surrounding them, issues concerning state-monopolized industries have 
been given top priority in China’s political agenda in recent years. Some 
commentators hold that the record-breaking profitability of the central SOE in these 
industries during the past decade arises from a range of preferential subsidies or 
treatment granted exclusively by the central authorities.
30
 However, while many 
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common problems, such as repeated corruption scandals, have continued to plague 
the central SOEs of state monopolies and the call for privatization has gone on 
unabated, China’s state-monopolized industries have not been diminished 
dramatically: rather, their power on their respective industries has been reinforced, 
and their rapid expansion has even been used to symbolize “the rising of China,” 
especially after the global financial crisis in 2008. In this context, empirical studies 
on these state-monopolized sectors, e.g. petroleum, telecommunications, electricity, 




Some existing studies have recognized competition as arising within 
state-monopolized industries, and it is argued that the existence of an oligopolistic 
market is the root of that competition. In Harwit’s study on the telecommunications 
industry, the author maintains that fierce competition among China Telecom, China 
Unicom, and others accounts for the success to date of China’s telecommunications 
industry, given that this industry has progressed much faster than nearly any other 
such industrial sector in the world. By analyzing China’s telecommunications 
industry, he demonstrates that, even though all of the central SOEs are under the 
same government roof, its oligopolistic market structure can generate the dynamic 
required for stimulating both price competition and the desire to expand services 
quickly to meet the market demand.
32
 Promoted by industrial policy, the formation 
of oligopolies thus prompted competition to appear in this sector. Other studies also 
demonstrate that fierce competition exists in China’s banking, electricity, petroleum, 
and airline industries, where the central authorities have managed to shape highly 
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oligopolistic markets populated by giant central SOEs.
33
 Based on these findings, it 
is claimed that the heightened intensity of the competition between powerful 
oligopolistic SOEs further drives the state monopolies to increase their efficiency.
34
 
These studies appear to cast light on the question of why competition should 
occur in the state-monopoly sectors. They reveal that the state monopoly in China is 
a group of entities rather than a single-minded one. However, this observation is at 
best superficial. In fact, the existence of oligopolies does not necessarily guarantee 
greater competition. Collusion often takes place within the oligopolies, and their 
joint decisions can significantly impact the market as a whole and thus effectively 
inhibit competition.
35
 The cartel—which agrees to fix prices, marketing, and 
production among competing firms in order to increase the individual firms’ profits 
by reducing competition—provides the most explicit case of this, and it usually 
arises in an oligopolistic market structure. As Baran and Sweezy wrote in Monopoly 
Capital, one result of oligopolistic markets is a “powerful taboo” on price cutting; 
through tacit collusion, giant oligopolistic firms are price makers rather than price 
takers, and their collusive pricing strategies make the price system work upwards 
only. According to their observations, in the early twentieth century oligopolistic 
market structures were actually turned into “shared monopolies” as a result.
36
 This 
finding is also confirmed by John Kenneth Galbraith, who wrote in American 
Capitalism that “not only does oligopoly lead away from the world of 
competition … but it leads toward the world of monopoly.”
37
 Thus, while multiple 
players exist in an oligopolistic market, it does not automatically or naturally lead to 
the appearance of competition.  
In order to look a step beyond the nature of such oligopolistic structures, we 
must pose a new question: what “mechanism” enables oligopolies to engage in 
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competition rather than collusion, and how does or has this mechanism come about? 
Available empirical studies have actually remained unclear on this point. 
In addition, it should be noted that only after China entered the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) over a decade ago did the oligopolistic market structures take 
shape in the state-monopolized industries in any significant way. Prior to the 
creation of the oligopolies, competition had already appeared in some of these 
industries as indicated in the extant literatures. For example, Eaton’s study on 
China’s airline industry illustrates that before the formation of the “Big Three” 
state-owned carriers in the early 2000s, the intensified competition expressed by the 
price war among a large number of airlines during the 1990s caused a collapse in the 
industry’s revenue beginning in 1997. Under these circumstances, the central 
authorities began to restructure the industry around the “Big Three” oligopolies as 
the “national champions” before the heated competition could bankrupt much of the 
sector.
38
 A similar situation could also be found in China’s electricity industry. For 
example, Tsai’s study argues that without a functional regulatory regime, the reform 
of the electricity sector in the 1990s heralded increasing chaos in this industry. In the 
face of such predicaments, the oligopolies arose afterwards as a solution.
39
 The 
creation of oligopolies here was not, however, intended to introduce competition in 
the state-monopolized industries. In China’s context, there had already existed other 
kinds of industrial structures, governance patterns, and competition before the 
oligopolies took shape within these industries, and what the oligopolistic structures 
have brought in is actually another type of competition. Nonetheless, while the 
existing literatures demonstrate that the creation of the oligopolies was in response 
to industrial predicaments that had emerged previously, they do not systematically 
discuss how competition, including the mechanism of its formation and its type of 
operation, developed in the current state-monopolized sectors since the late 1970s. 
As a consequence, the oligopolistic structure turns out to be an “easy answer” when 
attempting to account for the birth of competition in the state monopolies. 
To use Pierson’s term, this easy answer actually only takes a “snapshot view” 
torn out of its temporal context. It ignores the profound temporal dimensions of real 
processes that can unfold over an extended period of time such that this snapshot not 
only fails to identify relevant and fundamental questions, e.g., those involving the 
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incentives of competition, but also end up inverting the causal relationships.
40
 
Therefore, unlike such an analysis based on this snapshot view, the present thesis 
reintroduces the temporal dimension and constructs a “moving picture” of the 
situation by exploring questions about how competition could appear from the outset 
and how it has evolved to the present day from the time of the market-oriented 
reform initiated more than three decades ago. 
1.2   The Approach of Historical Institutionalism 
Given its emphasis on the temporal dimension, this study adopts a historical 
institutionalist approach to address and explore the abovementioned questions. 
Different from other institutionalist approaches, historical institutionalism gives 
temporality prime importance for examining causal relationships. It does this by 
specifying sequences and systematically tracing transformations and processes on 
varying scales and timeframes so that a dynamic view emerges when examining the 
process from its institutional origins through its development.
41
 In this approach, 
institutions are broadly defined as the formal and informal procedures, routines, 
norms, and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of a political 
economy. Historical institutionalists focus on institutions that not only embody 
power relationships but that also shape interactions between individual actors in the 
system in order to develop explanatory arguments about important outcomes or 
puzzles in those institutions.
42
  
To contrast, rational choice institutionalism views institutions as coordinating 
mechanisms that sustain a particular equilibrium, while tending to assume that 
institutional effects are derived from design in a straightforward way. From this 
functionalist perspective, institutional creation is framed as highly intentional and 
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falling under the control of far-sighted creators who correctly perceive the effects of 
the institutions they establish and build them precisely in order to secure those 
effects. This point of view often seems to oversimplify institutional development so 
that it has difficulties answering both why institutional effects would deviate from 
the original design or change over time.
43
 
Operating on an inductive logic, historical institutionalism views institutions 
as a legacy of concrete historical processes and calls for more empirical 
investigations into how institutions arise and change over time. As Pierson puts it, 
historical institutionalism “stresses that many of the contemporary implications 
of … temporal processes are embedded in institutions, whether these be formal rules, 
policy structures, or social norms.”
44
 In other words, contrary to the assumption that 
the same operative forces generate the same result everywhere, historical 
institutionalism focuses on how the effects of such forces are mediated by the 
features of a given temporal context. From this perspective, institutions are seen as 
relatively persistent features of the historical landscape, so they cannot be 
understood in isolation from the political or social settings where they are 
embedded.
45
 Likewise, historical institutionalists often conduct meso- or 
macro-level analyses that discuss multiple institutions interacting with, operating 
within, and/or influenced by, broader contexts. Therefore, historical institutionalists 
tend to investigate the rise and decline of institutions, including probing the genesis, 
impact, and stability or instability of specific institutions along with broader 
institutional configurations. Sometimes their goal is to analyze the institutional 
arrangements themselves and at other times to use institutional configurations as 
variables to explain other outcomes.
46
 In the following, I summarize historical 
institutionalism’s main arguments for explaining institutional continuity and change, 
which will then be applied to analyze the establishment process for institutions. This 
will serve also to construct an analytical framework for subsequent chapters. 
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First, historical institutionalism uses the concept of “path dependence” to 
account for institutional continuity. The idea of path dependence, whereby the 
preceding steps of a particular direction induce further movement in the same 
direction, includes a self-reinforcing or positive feedback process. By this, the 
probability of future steps along the same path increases with each move down that 
path, and the cost of exiting from the existing arrangements rises greatly. As a result, 
the actors find it difficult to reverse an existing course.
47
 In this sense, historical 
institutionalists embrace a power-political view of institutions that emphasizes their 
distribution effects, and they explain institutional persistence in terms of increasing 
returns or a positive feedback of power. Thus, while path dependence can help us to 
understand the powerful, inertial stickiness that characterizes many aspects of 
political development, it also provides a useful corrective against the tendency to 
assume a functionalist explanation for important outcomes while paying attention to 
the temporal dimensions of political processes. In addition, the dynamics of 
increasing return highlights the issue of “timing and sequencing” in path-dependent 
processes, i.e., that the order of events may make a fundamental difference in 
outcomes. In this, earlier events matter much more than later ones and, hence, 
different sequences may produce different consequences. It entails also that even 
when policymakers set out to redesign institutions, they remain constrained in what 
they are able to conceive due to the previous embeddedness of circumstance. The 
issue of timing and sequence, then, becomes the critical aspect of institutional 
analysis, since when things happen within a sequence affects how they happen.
48
  
While path dependence helps us to understand the powerful inertia that leads 
to institutional continuity, it does not propose a story of inevitability whereby the 
past neatly or easily predicts the future.
49
 When it comes to explaining institutional 
change, historical institutionalists frequently call attention to “critical junctures,” 
those periods of contingency during which the usual constraints on action are eased 
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and significant change can occur in a distinctive way.
50
 Path dependence supplies an 
important causal mechanism for historical institutionalists, and critical junctures 
constitute the starting points for many path-dependent processes.
51
  
Analyses of critical junctures often connect to the notion about relative weight 
of agency versus structure in various phases. For example, Katznelson considers 
institutions as constraining in periods of stable politics, but he points out that critical 
junctures create opportunities for historic agents to alter the trajectory of 
development.
52
 Mahoney also emphasizes the importance of agency and meaningful 
choice: “In many cases, critical junctures are moments of relative structural 
indeterminism when willful actors shape outcomes in a more voluntaristic fashion 
than normal circumstances permit.”
53
 Soifer further proposes two 
conditions—permissive and productive—to explain the causal logic of critical 
junctures. The former represents the removal of structural constraints and makes 
change possible, while the latter acts within the context of the permissive condition 
to produce outcomes divergent from the past.
54
  In general, political science 
analyses of critical junctures often focus on decisions made by influential actors at 




When critical juncture is deployed to illustrate a discontinuous model of 
change whereby enduring historical pathways rapidly transform or get punctuated by 
moments of agency and choice, then a gradualist view that stresses how institutions 
change in subtle and slow ways begins to surface that supplements the accounts of 
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causal processes of institutional change found in historical institutionalist literature. 
This insight has grown out of debates about path dependence, and it suggests that a 
complete “lock-in” of path dependence is not a common phenomenon in actual 
circumstances, if institutions normally evolve in more incremental ways.
56
 In 
particular, given that institutions are conceived in this approach as distributional 
instruments laden with power implications, those that benefit from existing 
arrangements indeed have an objective preference for continuity, but ensuring such 
continuity requires the ongoing mobilization of political supports and active efforts 
to resolve institutional ambiguities, which often arise given that the operational rules 
can never be precise enough to cover the complexities of all possible situations in 
the real world. In this sense, institutional stability rests not only on the accumulation 
indicated by “path dependence” but also on this ongoing mobilization. However, 
once shifts in the balance of power occur, an existing stability may be broken and 
thus lead to change.  
Along with dramatic changes based on the exogenous conditions presented by 
a “critical juncture,” shifts also may derive from endogenous developments that 
often gradually unfold. Mahoney and Thelen argue that gradual institutional change 
often occurs when problems of rule interpretation and enforcement create space or 
cleavage for actors to implement existing rules in new ways. In this sense, the issue 
of compliance emerges as a crucial variable in accounting for change.
57
 Moreover, 
as Pierson and Skocpol emphasize in the “combined effects of institutions,” actors 
are usually embedded in a multiplicity of institutions, and there exist incongruities, 
interdependencies, or intersections between different institutional realms in a given 
temporal process that may generate complexity and have unintended consequences 
on the actors’ behavior. In other words, the interactions and conflicts among them 
may trigger the actors who play a role in the dominant power to take a strategy for 
incremental change.
58
 Therefore, interactions between the features of the political 
context and the properties of the institutions themselves usually constitute the 
determining factor for explaining incremental changes of this type.  
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In general, this argument for gradual change suggests that dynamic tensions 
and pressures for change are built-in and that this change would emerge in the gaps 
between the rules and their interpretation or enforcement.
59
 Incremental change may 
then develop into a “critical antecedent,” which plays a causal role in outcomes at 
“critical junctures.” As Slater and Simmons demonstrate in their study, such critical 
antecedents influence the value taken by the productive condition such that a 
divergence occurs during or at the critical juncture.
60
 
Thus, multistage causal processes exist from the starting point of path 
dependence to a given critical juncture. In this causal chain, critical antecedents 
based on incremental changes are often connected to the production condition of that 
critical juncture. Consequently, path dependence, critical juncture, and gradual 
change constitute the major types of causal mechanisms within historical 
institutionalism for explaining how institutions evolve and change (see Figure 1.1). 
In the chapters that follow, I apply these dynamic insights in order to develop 
explanatory arguments bearing on the single case study of this research, the tobacco 
industry. 
Figure 1.1 - Multi-Stage Causal Mechanisms of Institutional Development 
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[Path Dependence]                   [Incremental Change]              [Critical Juncture]  
(cleavage)
Characteristics of political context                                                      
Characteristics of institutions
Dominant change agent                                                                - Permission
condition
Change strategy                                  Critical Antecedent   - Production
condition
Source: Summarized by the author
1.3  The Tobacco Industry as a Case Study 
Following the approach of historical institutionalism, this thesis selects the 
tobacco industry as a single case study for delving into two main threads of analysis: 
1) How was the tobacco state monopoly established in the beginning? And 2) How 
have the industrial governance patterns been formed over a range of temporal phases? 
In fact, the two questions are closely related—the former is the foundation of the 
latter, and the latter will account for how competition could emerge and change in 
the tobacco state monopoly over the past decades by distinguishing its various 
phases of institutional configuration.  
Although competition also appears in other state-monopolized industries, the 
tobacco industry is an excellent case for studying the correlation between monopoly 
and competition because it has the most comprehensive and strictest central state 
control among all of the state-monopolized industries in China, being solely owned 
by the Chinese government and run by the China’s National Tobacco Corporation 
(CNTC). Further, its monopoly status is protected by the Tobacco Monopoly Law, 
which formally bars the entry of non-state capital across the entire production chain 
apart from that of farmers and retailers. In this regard, the extent of state regulation 
is higher than in other state-monopolized industries, such as telecommunications or 
electricity, where the government does not officially prohibit the entry of non-state 
capital with any laws or rules, while nevertheless employing other means to keep the 
central SOEs dominant. In addition, the reform of “separating government 
administration from enterprise business” (zhengqi fenkai 政企分开), which aims to 
distinguish the roles of the state and SOEs and pave the way for establishing another 
set of regulatory institutions,
61
 has not been initiated in the tobacco sector so far. 
Most other state-monopolized industries completed this separation during the 
1990s,
62
 though the regulatory institutions have not functioned properly since 
then.
63
 The tobacco sector, by contrast, has retained the structure of a 
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government-business synthesis since the early 1980s. In this regard, state control in 
the tobacco industry is indeed much more formidable than in other state-monopoly 
industries. What is more, as originally formulated by the China’s central authorities 
in the early 1980s, market should have been stifled from the outset in the tobacco 
state monopoly; however, the sharp contrast between the institutional design and the 
current reality of tobacco state monopoly came into existence from the outset. In the 
next section, I outline this gap between the monopolistic institutional prototype and 
the actual industry situation. 
1.3.1 The Contrast between the Institutional Prototype and Reality 
When China’s tobacco sector was designated a state monopoly, China’s 
National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC) was set up to represent the central state for 
managing the entire sector in 1982. As the monopolist, the CNTC was formulated to 
monopolize the production chain from agriculture (growing tobacco leaves), 
manufacture (producing cigarettes) to commerce (selling cigarettes); that is, only the 
CNTC would be allowed to buy tobacco leaves from peasants and to sell leaves to 
its affiliated cigarette factories. These state cigarette factories could only engage in 
cigarette manufacturing and would then sell all of their products back to the CNTC. 
The only cigarette wholesaler was the CNTC where all the state-licensed retailers 
procured cigarette products. This institutional design meant that China’s tobacco 
system was actually a monopoly-cum-monopsony arrangement (see Figure 1.2).
 64
 
By this, the CNTC carried out its monopoly and monopsony activities through its 
local agents, which were required to follow the production quantities and transaction 
prices specified by the state. The logic of this institutional design basically derived 
from the planned economy of Mao’s era, so that the tobacco industry would be 
called “the last brick of China’s planned economy wall” during the reform era. 
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arrangement.  
Figure 1.2 - The Production Chain under the Tobacco State Monopoly System 
 
Source: Supplied by the author 
Paradoxically, this monopoly-cum-monopsony arrangement has not eradicated 
competition in the trades between the cigarette manufacturers and wholesalers. 
Despite the fiat of monopolistic control, the CNTC’s local agents, including 
cigarette manufacturers and wholesalers, have turned out to be the “multiple players” 
in this industry. For example, there were 29 cigarette manufacturers and more than 
three hundred cigarette wholesalers in 2011.
65
 In addition, the prices of cigarette 
transaction between manufacturers and wholesalers have been driven by supply and 
demand in a market manner rather than as specified by the state. Therefore, I target 
this disparity via a historical institutionalist lens to investigate how the tobacco state 
monopoly deviated from its original design in the first place and how this disparity 
evolved out of the various processes involved. 
1.3.2  Existing Empirical Studies on China’s Tobacco Industry 
Given the extent of central state control in the tobacco industry, this sector 
provides an ideal case for studying the relationship between state monopoly and 
competition. However, while several studies of state-monopoly industries focus on 
telecommunication, electricity, petroleum, aviation, and so on,
66
 the tobacco 
industry has drawn little attention. This low degree of analysis may be partially due 
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to the fact that the fiscal significance of this sector for the Chinese government has 
been little noted. In fact, the Chinese government made this industry a state 
monopoly from the beginning precisely due to fiscal concerns, as detailed more in 
Chapter Two. On other hand, the industry has been kept low key because, with the 
largest smoking population and the highest death toll caused by tobacco-related 
diseases in the world, the international anti-smoking campaign has chosen China as 
its primary target.
67
 Though China already signed the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2003, aiming to reduce the 
production and consumption of tobacco products, it is actually reluctant to 
implement the tobacco control policy given that this industry has remained one of 
the most important sources of national fiscal revenues so far. In 1996, the tobacco 
income constituted 11.2 percent of national income, and even though this later 
dropped, it still maintained more than 7 percent of national revenue during the past 
years. (see Table 1.1). Given its financial significance, this sector has strategic value 
for the central authorities and does not constitute a sunset industry. However, only 
limited attention has gone into investigating this important industry so that little was 
known about its operation as compared with other state-monopolized industries. 
This provides another rationale for targeting at this industry in this study.  
Table 1.1 - The Ratio of Tobacco Income to National Revenue (1976–2007) 
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1065 13421.16 7.93 
Eighth five-year 2261 24256.08 9.32 
                                                     




1996 830 7408 11.2 
1997 900 8651.1 10.4 
1998 950 9876 9.6 
1999 989 11444.1 8.6 
2000 1050 13380.1 7.8 
2001 1150 16371 7.0 
2002 1400 18914 7.4 
2003 1600 21715.3 7.4 
2004 2100 25178 8.3 
2005 2400 31649.29 7.6 
2006 2900 39373.2 7.4 
2007 3880 51304.03 7.6 
2008 4499 61330.3 7.3 
2009 5131 68518.3 7.5 
2010 6046 83101.5 7.2 
2011 7530 103874.4 7.2 
Source: Adapted from “Zhuanmai zhidu xia woguo yancao chanye de gaige yu fazhan,” 
(The reform and development of China’s tobacco industry under the state monopoly system) 
by H. Wang, 2009, Shanghai Economic Review, 23; Zhongguo yancao nianjian 2008 (China 
tobacco yearbook 2008) (p. 223), by the State Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, 2008, Beijing: 
China Science & Technology Press; Zhongguo yancao nianjian 2009 (China tobacco 
yearbook 2009)(p. 197); Zhongguo yancao nianjian 2010 (China tobacco yearbook 2010) (p. 
175); Zhongguo yancao nianjian 2011-12 (China tobacco yearbook 2011-12) (p. 80); 
Zhongguo caizheng nianjian 2012 (China’s annual financial report 2012)(p. 458), by He 
Jieping, 2012, Beijing: China State Finance. 
In the few empirical studies of the tobacco industry, they concentrate almost 
exclusively on investigating the interplay of local government action in this sector. 
In Eng’s study, she illustrates by analyzing local governmental action why 
agglomeration—the concentration of tobacco economic activities—would take place 
in Yunnan Province and how it was advanced in the 1980s.
68
 Zhou’s paper discusses 
how local governmental competition affected enterprise behavior and market 
performance in the tobacco industry from 1980s to 1990s under fiscal 
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decentralization. By discussing the development of the tobacco industry, he argues 
that fiscal decentralization provides incentives for local governments to promote 
economic development but that the same motive to increase local tax can make local 
governments take protectionist measures too.
69
 Different from Eng’s and Zhou’s 
studies, Peng’s paper explores how local governments in Quizhou Province 
aggressively intervened in the peasants’ production of tobacco leaves during the 
1990s. Peng demonstrates that decentralization of a previously planned economy 
does not automatically equate to a retreat of the state.
70
 In general, these studies 
recognize the incentives for local governments to meddle in local tobacco business, 
but they all ignore a most fundamental issue: why were local governments able to 
get involved in the operation of this state-monopoly sector?  In general, these 
studies usually take the capacity of local governments’ intervention in local tobacco 
business for granted, even though this industry by design should be highly 
controlled and regulated by the central authorities. 
Junmin Wang’s State-Market Interactions in China’s Reform Era offers the 
most detailed and in-depth monograph on China’s tobacco industry so far. She 
proposes “market-building as state-building” as the framework to analyze how 
China’s tobacco industry was influenced by state and market in an iterative process 
once market-oriented reform was set into motion. Extending the research timeframe 
from the 1980s to the early 2000s, she discovers that the market dynamics created 
the driving force by which the state restructured itself to cope with emergent market 
competition, and that, in turn, the rebuilding of the state structures caused the 
specific institutional conditions that set new market circumstances into motion.
71
  
Though Wang presents a dynamic analysis of relationships between 
government and market by identifying the distinctive processes of state-market 
interactions in this industry, the study has two crucial disadvantages. First, without 
any analysis on the formation of the market, it seems to assume that a market would 
naturally emerge in this state-monopolized industry; however, how a market comes 
into being denotes precisely the onset of state-market interaction. Though Wang 
observes that “decentralized and dispersed state ownership” creates a market in the 
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tobacco sector,
72
 she does not explain why this kind of state ownership would 
appear, especially given that the market should have been stifled from the beginning 
under a central planned model according to the original institutional design. Second, 
while emphasizing state-building, Wang’s analysis neglects the power relationship 
between different levels of the state as well as the power dynamic between the 
vertical and horizontal bureaucratic domains.
73
 As a result, it oversimplifies the 
analysis on the mutual construction between state and market and fails to make clear 
how state control and competition would complement each other in the tobacco 
industry as currently. I address and fill in these disadvantages in the chapters that 
follow in order to further enrich the body of empirical studies on China’s tobacco 
industry. 
1.4 Research Methodology & Chapter Outline 
For this single case study, two major methods were adopted to obtain 
empirical data. First, I collected a plethora of documentation to map the picture of 
China’s tobacco industry policies, structures, and developmental histories since the 
1980s. The documentation include the yearbooks of the tobacco industry as edited 
by all levels of the State Tobacco Monopoly Bureau (STMB), the annuals of the 
tobacco enterprises, local chronicles, monographs regarding China’s tobacco 
development, and articles in a variety of journals and newspapers. Second, I 
collected ethnographic data from fieldwork conducted in China. From 2008 to 2011, 
I stayed in Yunnan (Kunming, Yuxi, Dali, Mile and Qujing), Guizhou (Guiyang and 
Zunyi), Liaoning (Fuxi), Zhejiang (Shaoxing), Beijing, and Shanghai to conduct 
in-depth interviews and make ethnographic observations. Over a period of august 
months, I interviewed 70 people, some of them multiple times (See Appendix B). 
Among those interviewed were tobacco farmers, local government cadres, tobacco 
corporation officials, cigarette enterprise employees (including some now retired), 
and researches who participated in the policymaking process in advisory capacities. 
These interviews allowed access to the actual actors involved in running the tobacco 
state monopoly in order to further validate the accuracy of the documentary data and 
to develop deeper insights into this industry. 
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Having presented the phenomena and problems to be explored in this chapter, 
along with the conceptual and research approach and methodology adopted for this 
research, in the next chapter, I discuss how the tobacco state monopoly was 
established in the early 1980s. By exploring this process, the leverage of local 
governments in the tobacco sector comes to light. Out of this finding, Chapter Three 
further articulates an analytical framework to discuss how three different governance 
patterns have developed via interactions between local governments and multiple 
players in the tobacco sector. Chapters Four through Chapter Six elaborate the 
details of those governance patterns along with their associated type of competition. 
These analyses disclose the thirty-year evolution of the tobacco state monopoly into 
a “state-led competitive monopoly.” In Chapter Seven, I extend the theoretical 
implications of this study to look at the crises that have been emerging recently in 




The Process of Building the Tobacco 
State Monopoly 
When the Chinese government decided to institute a tobacco state monopoly 
in the early 1980s, it aroused a great deal of controversy and skepticism since this 
proposed to restore a planned economy on the tobacco sector. This policy was seen 
as antithetical to the trend of SOE reform as well given the general advance of 
market-oriented reforms initiated in the late 1970s.  
This chapter first unravels why the Chinese government elected to establish a 
tobacco state monopoly at this particular juncture and how it formulated the 
institutional arrangements for this. Drawing from insights provided by path 
dependence—the notion that the order in which things happen affects how they 
happen—I further explore the question of how, in practical terms, a state monopoly 
on tobacco sector could be achieved when market-oriented reforms had already been 
set in motion. Through an analysis of this establishment process, not only will the 
gap between the original formulation of a state monopoly and the actual industry 
outcome become more evident, but also the leverage of local governments in this 
industry from the outset will become clear. From this context, we will see how local 
governments would go on to become crucial actors in shaping the operation of the 
tobacco state monopoly system. Their interaction with the agents responsible for 
implementing the tobacco state monopoly along the entire chain of production 
would ultimately determine the industrial governance pattern once the establishment 
process completed in the 1980s. 
2.1 The Background to Instituting the Tobacco Monopoly 
System 
The establishment of the tobacco state monopoly in the early 1980s 
represented an attempt by the Beijing government to regain its control over the 
industry. In fact, a similar attempt was made as early as 1964 when Beijing created 
the Chinese Tobacco Industrial Corporation as a national trust. Its task was to 
manage and organize the entire production of tobacco sector from a vertical 
perspective. However, the Corporation was abolished during the Cultural Revolution 
and its duties devolved to local authorities.
1
  
In this wave of devolution, a substantial number of SOEs were handed to local 
governments, but these SOEs had no power to determine capital investment, 
material procurement, or profit disposal, unlike SOEs in the post-Mao era. It was 
during this period, however, that many local cigarette factories began to mushroom 
in rural people’s communes and production brigades since state control here was not 
as strict as in urban regions. As a result, by 1977 there were, according to an 
investigation conducted by the Ministry of Light Industries in that year, over two 
hundred non-state planned cigarette factories in operation. With the growth of the 
non-planned cigarette factories, the factories that fell under the state plan were 
forced to reduce or even cease production because of the short supply of raw 
materials snatched up by the non-planned ones. Many state factories failed to reach 
production targets assigned under the national plan, which in turn affected the 
national fiscal revenue extracted from the tobacco industry. From the central 
authority’s point of view, the proliferation of local cigarette manufacturers 
fragmented the production linkage in this industry. In order to fix the mismatch 
between the supply of tobacco leaves and the production of cigarettes, the State 
Council began to order a clampdown on local non-planned factories in 1977.
2
 As 
such, while “the growing out of plan” indicated in Barry Naughton’s study had 
already occurred before the introduction of market-oriented reform, the central 
authorities had targeted this situation for elimination during this period of time.
3
  
But it was not long before China began experimenting with market-oriented 
reforms, and local governments were driven to operate their own cigarette factories 
once again under the measure of fiscal decentralization. In light of the low 
technology levels and available capital for this industry, the surge in local cigarette 
manufacturers—increasing by more than one hundred cigarette factories from 1977 
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to 1981—resulted in an extremely acute shortage of tobacco leaves.
 4
 Under these 
circumstances, the Ministry of Light Industry was required by the central state to 
urgently seek out a solution. In the wake of this, in 1981 the Ministry of Light 
Industry proposed to the State Council rebuilding a vertically integrated industrial 
system, akin to the Chinese Tobacco Industrial Corporation in the 1960s, in order to 
reorganize the entire production chain and place it under the state’s control.
5
 
In addition to consolidating the industrial production chain, the fiscal deficits 
the central state faced at that time also motivated it to set up a tobacco state 
monopoly system. These fiscal deficits arose from measures for granting further 
benefits to the agriculture sector and state-owned enterprises in the early stage of 
economic reform, which included raising the purchase prices of agricultural 
products, increasing profit sharing to SOEs, and so on.
6
 Accordingly, the 
consolidated government budget as a share of national income shrank from 41.5 
percent in 1978 to 33.1 percent in 1982. While a reduction in the size of the budget 
should have been expected, the rapidity of this decline seems to have caught 
officials by surprise.
7
 In view of worsening fiscal pressure, the harmful and 
addictive attributes of tobacco products ironically granted the Chinese government 
the legitimacy to levy higher taxes on them. The establishment of a tobacco state 
monopoly was seen as a reliable and rapid method for securing higher taxes and 
profits from this industry
8
. 
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Driven by the abovementioned concerns, the State Council finally decided in 
1982 to adopt the Ministry of Light Industry’s proposal to establish the China 
National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC), which would manage the running of the 
entire industry.
9
 In the following year, the Rules on the Tobacco Monopoly was 
promulgated, thus officially proclaiming the establishment of the tobacco state 
monopoly system. In order to quell doubts voiced by advocates of market-oriented 
reforms at that time, the State Council even published an article titled “It is 
Necessary to Build a Tobacco State Monopoly” in the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao
人民日报) soon after the announcement of the Rules. The article stressed that the 
tobacco state monopoly was the most efficient way to “ensure orderly production, 
raise product quality, improve market supply, and assure state fiscal revenue.”
10
 To 
sum up, initially triggered by a severe shortage of raw materials, the proposal to set 
up a tobacco state monopoly was finally implemented as a result of the fiscal 
pressures created under the market-oriented reforms.   
2.2  Formulating the Tobacco State Monopoly 
Given that the aim of establishing the tobacco state monopoly was to improve 
industrial production management as well as to create a secure mechanism of fiscal 
extraction, in this section I shall elaborate how the system was designed to achieve 
those goals. The main features of the system’s formulation will be set out as follows. 
2.2.1  A Complete Monopoly 
As stated in the Chapter One, the entire production chain—from tobacco 
growing to cigarette manufacturing and sales—were all placed under national 
control. In accordance with the Rules, only the CNTC could buy tobacco leaves 
from farmers and sell them to the state-planned cigarette factories. The thinking was 
that if the CNTC controlled the tobacco leaf supply, then the likelihood of non-state 
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planned factories surviving would be severely reduced. All state cigarette factories 
were placed under the CNTC’s authority and were permitted only to manufacture 
cigarettes, which were then sold to the CNTC. With the CNTC as the sole 
wholesaler and consequently a monopoly of the entire distribution network, this 
would further minimize opportunities for any non-state-planned factories. In general, 
this monopoly-cum-monopsony aimed at ensuring that the CNTC could control the 
entire industry, exercising power on behalf of the central state.
11
 
2.2.2 The Multi-Level Governance of Government-Business Synthesis 
Under the Rules, the CNTC implemented its monopoly and monopsony 
through local agencies at the provincial, city, and county levels. It set the tobacco 
procurement and cigarette production “quotas” for each level in order to implement 
centralized production management (see Figure 2.1).
12
 Further in accordance with 
the Rules, each local tobacco corporation was led by the tobacco corporation above 
it together with the local government, but the former, referred to as tiao (条), was 
superior to the latter, referred to as the kuai (块).  In Chinese, tiao (条) means the 
vertical lines of authority over various sector reaching down from the ministries of 
the central government, while kuai (块) refers to the horizontal level of authority of 
the territorial government. At each level of the hierarchy, then, a higher-level 
tobacco corporation would oversee its subordinates to ensure that the tobacco 
industry was subject to this form of “vertical management.”
13
 
As stipulated by the provisions of the Rules, the State Tobacco Monopoly 
Bureau (STMB) was also established to enforce regulations pertaining to the 
tobacco monopoly, deal with infringements, and so on.
14
 In essence, the STMB was 
responsible for enforcing industrial administration while the CNTC was engaged in 
the actual business of tobacco. However, the division of labor between the CNTC 
and the STMB was anything but clear, since they shared the same set of personnel 
within a unified line of command—a common organizational form in China known 
as “one crew with two separate titles” (yitao renma, liangkuai paizi 一套人马, 两块
牌 子 ). In other words, they constituted the vertical management of the 
government-business synthesis all the way from the central authorities down to the 
counties. 
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Figure 2.1 - The Structure of the Tobacco State Monopoly 
Source: Supplied by the author 
2.2.3 Control of Overall Quantity 
Under this structure, the CNTC would be obliged to adhere to the annual 
planned total figures for tobacco leaf procurement and cigarette production, which 
were to be formulated by the central planning authority. The CNTC would further 
break down the totals into different quotas which the local tobacco corporations and 
cigarette factories were compelled to follow. The first step entailed tobacco 
procurement, where the local tobacco corporations would sign contracts with 
tobacco growers with a specified planting area and for a specified quantity. After 
flue-curing, tobacco growers were required to sell their output to the CNTC at the 
fixed official prices on the basis of leaf quality. The tobacco growers naturally had 
little choice but to sell their tobacco leaves to the CNTC as the sole purchaser. In 
this vein, the monopsony could guarantee that the central procurement plan would 
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be implemented according to the set criteria. Next, the CNTC would sell the tobacco 
leaves to the cigarette factories according to their demand, which was based on 
individually assigned production quotas. The whole system was designed to match 
the supply of agricultural material to the demand for cigarette production under the 
control of overall quantity. 
Under this design, there was little consideration for any local variations in this 
monopoly system. The circumstances of individual tobacco farmers or local tobacco 
corporations played no role in the plan. In addition, all the tobacco corporations 
under the CNTC had to buy cigarettes from the industrial enterprises according to 
the assigned procurement quotas, which, when added together, would be equal to the 
total cigarette production figure (see Figure 2.2).
15
 In this vein, CNTC’s monopoly 
of the wholesale market ensured that all cigarettes would be sold. After that, all 
state-licensed retailers were compelled to purchase the cigarettes from the tobacco 
corporations. This meant that the entirety of all tobacco products under the national 
plan could be cleared at the state-specified prices so that the incomes of the entire 
CNTC system would be stabilized and its contribution to the state coffer in the form 
of profits and taxes would be safely maintained. That was the general logic behind 
how the tobacco state monopoly system would be able to constitute a highly secure 
mechanism for fiscal extraction. 
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Figure 2.2 - The Design of Control of Overall Quantity 
 
Source: Supplied by the author 
In summary, this institutional design was based on an integrated framework 
within the CNTC, where all the production activities, from tobacco procurement and 
cigarette manufacturing to distribution, had to adhere to the annual plans from the 
top down. The method was in fact derived from past attempts for a planned economy. 
Without doubt, its logic deviated from the course of market-oriented reform; the 
central authority wished to revive a planned-economy model in this sector so that it 
could secure “monopoly profits” even as it had to be embedded in a more general 
scenario where market-oriented reform had already been set in motion. 
 
2.3 Finalizing the Tobacco State Monopoly 
In 1983, when the Rules were passed and came into effect, the establishment 
of the tobacco state monopoly in toto remained far from complete. When first 






























from other governmental departments, e.g., the Ministry of Light Industry, the 
Ministry of Commerce, and the Bureau of Supply and Sales. Most of these had 
previously been responsible for tobacco-related work in these departments. Initially, 
the CNTC was unable to establish its local agents and instead depended on local 
authorities to fulfill that task.
16
 In this context, local tobacco corporations at the 
provincial level were established by the provincial governments. However, given 
that the entire infrastructure—including the manpower and administrative and other 
resources—was provided by the provincial governments, these provincial tobacco 
corporations were not immediately turned into “agents” of the CNTC but rather fell 
under the authority of the provincial governments.  
As soon as the provincial corporations were established, the existing cigarette 
factories owned by the provincial governments became directly affiliated to these 
corporations. In addition, the provincial governments required their subordinate 
local governments at the municipal and county levels to build the tobacco 
corporations in their jurisdictions, which were under the dual leadership of the host 
local governments and the superior tobacco corporations. For example, after the 
government of Yunnan Province established the Yunnan Province Tobacco 
Corporation in 1983, several cigarette factories, including Yuxi, Qujing, Zhaotong, 
and Kunming, were placed under the purview of the provincial corporation.
17
 The 
Yunnan Province government later asked the municipality and county governments 
to establish the local tobacco corporations.
18
 Consequently, once all of the tobacco 
corporations under the provincial level had been subsequently established, the 
vertically administrative relationship between the supervisor (the CNTC) and its 
subordinates (the provincial tobacco corporations) were not yet instituted until after 
negotiations on converting the administrative subordination of provincial tobacco 
corporations were completed. 
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2.3.1 The Obstacle to Converting Administrative Subordination 
Once the local tobacco corporations were successfully established, the CNTC 
launched negotiations with provincial governments around the country to bring local 
tobacco corporations under its authority. Nonetheless, moving administrative 
subordination from the provincial governments to the CNTC turned out to be a very 
tough task, especially in some provinces, such as Yunnan, where the tobacco 
industry had already become a crucial source of revenue. 
Local governments’ fiscal gains obtained from the tobacco industry, which had 
been constantly formed and strengthened under fiscal decentralization and SOE 
reform, became a major barrier to accomplishing administrative subordination. For 
one, when provincial tobacco corporations were led by provincial governments, 
those profits exceeding the portion retained by the corporations would flow into 
local governments coffers, as stipulated by the SOE reform at that time. Meanwhile, 
from the context of fiscal decentralization, the local governments did not have to 
remit all taxes and profits collected from the SOEs in their geographical territories to 
the central government. Rather, they could retain a certain amount once they 
fulfilled their obligations to the central government under the fiscal contracts that 
were formulated via repeated central-local bargaining every year.  
When the local governments were granted greater fiscal capacity under the 
fiscal decentralization reform, however, they were also required to balance their own 
budgets, promote local economic growth, and fulfill the tasks handed down by 
higher levels of government in return. An unintended consequence of fiscal 
decentralization was thus the strengthening of financial links between local 
governments and local SOEs, as the more revenue local governments collected, the 
more they could keep for themselves.
19
 In this context, once the administrative 
leadership was shifted from the local governments to the CNTC, the existing 
interests that local governments derived from the tobacco corporations would be 
under threat. In particular, while the negotiations were set in motion, the SOE reform 
already launched new arrangements for profit-and-tax allocation from the end of 
1983. Under this Profit-to-Tax policy (ligaishui 利改税), the SOEs could keep all of 
the remaining profits after paying taxes in the newly specified categories so that the 
financial relationship between the SOEs and the governments would be clear 
without repeated bargaining being necessitated.  
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By replacing profit delivery, the original share of the profits was thus divided 
into three categories: income tax, adjustment tax, and enterprise retention fund (i.e., 
company retained profit); the taxes here flowed into state coffers according to 
ownership (i.e., the local or central government). Before the change of 
administrative subordination, the income tax and adjustment tax from provincial 
tobacco corporations were classified as local, fiscal revenue under the Profit-to-Tax 
policy (see Figure 2.3).
20
 However, once administrative subordination was realized, 
the above taxes channeled into the central state’s revenue. In such a context, local 
governments would resist administrative subordination in order to protect their 
vested interests. And so the CNTC could do nothing but compromise with the local 
governments in order to complete the change to administrative subordination.
21
 
Figure 2.3 - Profit Allocation in the Tobacco Industry under the SOE Reform 
(1979-1987) 
 
Source: Supplied by the author 
2.3.2  The Trade-offs for Changing Administrative Subordination 
Amidst all of the bargaining over subordination, the negotiations with the 
Yunnan Province Government—as one of the most important tobacco-growing and 
cigarette-manufacturing provinces at that time— was highlighted as the most crucial 
“battle.” The outcome there would greatly influence other provinces’ stances with 
regard to administrative subordination. Tobacco taxation and profits made up almost 
half of the fiscal income for Yunnan Province in 1984—the year in which the 
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Profit-to-tax Reform (1983-1987) 
Profits divided into three categories: Income tax, adjustment tax, and 
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The Retention of Profits Reform (1979-1983)   
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 The first manager of the CNTC, Li Yisan (李益三), 
recalled after arriving in the province in 1984 how the bargaining process was 
consumed by hardship. During the process, Li once asked for help from the 
secretary general of the State Council, Du Xingyuan (杜星垣), when visiting 
Yunnan. Even though Li continually tried to draw support from the central 
authorities, many trade-offs were still made in the negotiation so that the 
administrative subordination agreement could finally be signed, forty-six days after 
his team first arrived in Yunnan.
23
 
The trade-offs included the most important control mechanisms in the original 
formulation: the shared authority for personnel appointments and the autonomy to 
produce more cigarettes than stipulated under the state plan. In this sense, the result 
was that local governments began to hold institutionalized power within the tobacco 
state monopoly system, so that the requirement of “dual leadership” stipulated in the 
Rules — tiao superior to kuai — became a blurred one. The first trade-off meant that 
when the CNTC appointed leading managers in local tobacco corporations and 
cigarette enterprises, they had to seek approval from the local governments.
24
 In this 
regard, this compromise gave the local governments a powerful means to intervene 
in the local tobacco corporations and cigarette enterprises. Yi-min Lin employs the 
concept of “particularistic (local) state action” to explain why a political market 
would emerge where enterprises were constantly engaged in seeking favor from the 
local governments, which controlled large amounts of local resources, had 
considerable regulatory power, and selectively distributed liabilities after the 
decentralization reform was initiated. But this notion does not sufficiently explain 
why local governments were able to intervene in tobacco business by manipulating 
the CNTC’s local agents in the first place.
25
 While local governments could 
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some regard “the particularistic state action” as the informal mechanism of local control. 
For example, see Christine P.W. Wong, “Between Plan and Market: The Role of the Local 
influence the activities of SOEs in their geographical territories through 
particularistic state action, the veto power for personnel appointments—emerging as 
a term of exchange for completing the construction of a tobacco state monopoly—in 
reality constituted the fundamental source of local governments’ controlling 
capacity. 
A second concession—the autonomy to produce more than the stipulated 
number of cigarettes—meant that, aside from meeting the production quotas 
assigned by the CNTC, the cigarette firms could also enjoy autonomy in terms of 
non-plan-specific production. For example, in the subordination agreement for the 
Yunnan Province Tobacco Corporation, the profits from that excess production, i.e. 
non-plan specific production, would remain within the province.
26
 A similar 
trade-off also appeared in talks with other provinces over the following years, and 
negotiations throughout the country concerning administrative subordination were 
finally concluded in 1986.  
Excess cigarette production under the negotiations of administrative 
subordination was a legacy adopted by SOE reform dating from the late 1970s. In 
order to transform the planned economy regime then, the first step implemented by 
the central government was to expand the managerial autonomy of SOEs, rather 
than immediately abolishing the state production plan entirely. In the document 
“Several Regulations Concerning the Expansion of SOE Managerial Autonomy” 
issued by the State Council in 1979, expanding the autonomy and rights of SOEs 
regarding excess production (producing beyond the state plan-specific quantities), 
product sale, profit distribution, employment, and the usage of capital were all 
clearly specified.
27
 By this, SOEs could manufacture extra products after fulfilling 
production requirements under the state compulsory plan and sell them to other 
buyers who were not necessarily specified by the state. Compared with the reforms 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the growing of non-plan-specific 
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Without exception, the state-owned cigarette enterprises also started to 
increase beyond-plan production under the SOE reform. For example, in 1980 the 
Yuxi Cigarette Factory (the predecessor of the Hongta Tobacco Group) was granted 
by the Yunnan Province Government the right to sell fifty percent of its beyond-plan 
products and retain the profits for its own usage. After the establishment of the 
Yunnan Tobacco Corporation in 1982, the provincial tobacco corporation took over  
distribution of all plan-specific cigarettes and twenty percent of non-plan-specific 
cigarettes from the Yuxi Cigarette Factory, while the Yuxi Factory continued to hold 
the selling right of the remaining eighty percent of its non-plan-specific cigarettes. 
The profits derived from the non-plan-specific sales could then be used to buy 
auxiliary materials for cigarette production, such as rolling paper, filters, package 
paper, and tobacco leaves for greater production investment. While the Rules did 
prohibit “non-plan-specific growth” in the tobacco sector, even though it was a very 
common phenomenon in various industries in the 1980s, it turned out to be a de 
facto occurrence in the tobacco industry as well—a factor that the CNTC had little 
option but to accept in order to complete administrative subordination. As a 
consequence, as long as the cigarette factories could obtain sufficient production 
materials, they could continue to produce more than the quota limit specified by the 
state plan under the current SOE reform.
29
 
In this context, the fulfilling of a “state plan” became a “bare minimum” rather 
than a total capacity figure. Thus, the control of monopolistic output was not totally 
in place from the outset, even though the CNTC had finally concluded all of the 
administrative handover throughout the country by 1986. After that, all the local 
tobacco corporations were officially turned into the local agents of the CNTC, and 
the cigarette firms became central SOEs under the CNTC’s purview (See Figure 
2.4).  
But there existed many breaks in the chain of command. On the one hand, the 
CNTC had to share authority with the local governments for making personnel 
appointments, while on the other, the CNTC’s local agents continued to be 
responsible for their own individual budgetary accounts and had abundant autonomy 
with regard to producing and selling the non-plan-specific products. In consequence, 
the outcome of establishing a tobacco state monopoly through trade-offs had the 
same result ultimately as the current SOE reform. Thus, while the administrative 
                                                     
29 The Editorial Board of Hongta Group, Hongta jintuan zhi 1956-2005 (The chronicle of the 
Hongta Group 1956-2005) (Kunming, China: Yunnan People’s Publishing House, 2006), 
CD-ROM; Interviewee No. 57. 
subordination was conducive to fulfillment of the state plan formulated by the 
CNTC, the CNTC as a whole was actually far from being an integrated framework.
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Figure 2.4 - Tobacco State Monopoly Structure after Administrative 
Subordination 
2.3.3  The Emergence of a Two-Track System 
In this context, a two-track system—whereby a state planning program 
coexisted with free-market elements that permitted non-plan-specific products to be 
transacted—appeared in this sector instead of the revival of a “planned economy” 
once the tobacco state monopoly was established. Under the state-planned track, the 
plan-specific cigarettes were distributed via the multi-tiered wholesale system of the 
CNTC. For example, once the Yunnan Province Tobacco Corporation was 
established in 1982, it took on full responsibility for distributing the plan-specific 
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cigarettes manufactured by the Yuxi Cigarette Factory up until 1992. Within the 
province, the cigarettes were distributed from provincial-, municipal-, and 
county-level corporations to licensed retailers at the state-specified prices (producer, 
distributor and wholesale prices). Moreover, the Yunnan Province Tobacco 
Corporation also sold the plan-specific cigarettes to other provinces.
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Alongside the state-planned distribution, cigarette enterprises could sell their 
non-plan-specific products to the tobacco corporations at different levels and in 
different regions. Also, private individuals who had special connections with the 
cigarette firms or who “borrowed the hat” from other tobacco corporations (i.e. 
colluded with other tobacco corporations in guise of their staff), began to purchase 
the non-plan-specific cigarettes directly from the cigarette manufacturers. In these 
transactions, the prices were dictated by supply and demand according to the market 
rather than as specified by the state. Thus, a trade market between the cigarette 
manufacturers and the wholesalers arose and subsequently continued to expand its 
sphere of activity (more discussion on the development of the market is presented in 
Chapter Four). Without the two-track system, a market would not have developed in 
the tobacco sector, since all the transactions had to comply with state directives, 
including those dealing with price and quantity. In addition, from the outset this 
territory where the local governments could continue to expand their influence and 
where competition would originate and grow in the tobacco state monopoly system.   
2.4 Conclusion 
When historical institutionalists consider “compliance” as a variable in 
discussing institutional change and stability, they imply that the implementation of 
institutions is always subject to interpretation and contestation, even though they are 
formally codified. This chapter returns the debate on struggles over the application 
and enforcement of institutions to an earlier stage—to the question of how to 
establish the executive body of an institution in the first place—that has remained an 
overlooked issue but one of crucial importance in the context of China as a 
transitional economy. For example, Wang’s tobacco study apparently neglected to 
investigate this process, the result being that she attributed the possibility of local 
governments’ intervention to the principle-agent problem, whereby the central level 
of the CNTC/STMB could not obtain sufficient information so that in practice its 
provincial agents became the most powerful decision-makers and worked together 
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with local governments.
32
 Nonetheless, the reality was far more complicated than 
such an information gap, since it was extremely challenging to rebuild a 
state-monopoly sector against a backdrop where the planned-economy system was 
gradually being dismantled and replaced by market-oriented mechanisms. This is 
exactly why the creation of the tobacco state monopoly gave rise to such 
controversy in the early 1980s. In this respect, the manner in which this institutional 
system was to be created supplies an important point for analysis.          
By exploring the construction process of the tobacco state monopoly, this 
chapter demonstrates that the temporal order of processes provides a crucial 
determinant in the formation of an institutional system, as path dependence would 
indicate. As discussed above, once the local tobacco corporations were set up by the 
local governments, from the outset their connections with the local governments 
were continuously secured, especially under the scenario of SOE reform and fiscal 
decentralization. This situation resulted, therefore, in strong constraints on 
converting these corporations into the CNTC’s local agencies with the aim of 
establishing a vertical management system in the tobacco industry, as initially 
formulated. In changing the administrative subordination of these local tobacco 
corporations, the CNTC could not avoid compromises with the local governments. 
Though the administrative subordination process finally came to an end after more 
than four years of bargaining, the concessions made meant that the tobacco state 
monopoly had already deviated from its original design.  
For one, having satisfied the requirements of the state plan, the cigarette firms 
and tobacco corporations at each level continued to enjoy autonomy in 
manufacturing and selling the surplus products under the current path of SOE reform. 
Meanwhile, local governments were able to manipulate the CNTC’s local agents, 
which were granted a great deal of autonomy, by taking advantage of the leverage 
they had in personnel appointments. In this context, local governments turned out to 
be crucial actors in shaping the working of the tobacco state monopoly system. In 
this light, the interaction between local governments and CNTC’s local agents would 
largely determine the industrial governance pattern, which accounted for how the 
exchanges were conducted between the suppliers of raw materials, the 
manufacturers, and the wholesalers in the production chain, and thus, the way in 
which the tobacco state monopoly worked overall. 
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Chapter Three 
 
The Three Phases of Institutional 
Arrangements 
In this chapter, I employ the analytical tools of institutional change—i.e., 
incremental change and critical juncture—to develop a framework for three distinct 
phases in the history of the tobacco state monopoly: first, from the establishment of 
the CNTC to the initiation of tax-sharing system (1982–1993); second, from the 
inception of the tax-sharing system until a recentralization reform for the CNTC was 
introduced (1994–2004); and third, the period over the time when the 
recentralization reform for the CNTC was initiated and then suspended (2005–2012), 
by which time the collection of data for this study was concluded. This temporal 
division is based on the premise outlined in Chapter Two that “local governments” 
became crucial actors in the tobacco state monopoly system once they were granted 
a degree of influence in the local tobacco industry via their say in the personnel 
appointment for the CNTC’s local agents.  
The “incentives” and “opportunities” provided to the local governments by 
their intervention into the tobacco industry, however, have not always been constant 
over the past three decades. From a historical institutionalist approach, an institution 
does not exist in a vacuum but takes form in a given political context linked to a 
range of variables. Thus, when some variable changes, actors within an institution 
may shift their preference with regard to behavioral strategies and then alter the 
goals of that institution.  
In this light, I first identify the different policy realms that decided not only the 
incentives for local governments but also the available opportunities for pulling 
strings behind the backs of the CNTC’s agents. Given that each policy realm had its 
own course of development, the political context can thus act as a framework for 
presenting the various ways in which these realms were interconnected at different 
times. This resulted in three particular phases of institutional arrangement whereby 
interaction between the local governments and the CNTC’s local agents initiated 
incremental changes in the implementation of the tobacco state monopoly. The 
“patterns of governance” that emerge exemplify how a range of interdependent 
players along the production chain—from suppliers of raw materials, cigarette 
manufacturers, and distributors of cigarette products—conducted exchanges to allow 
economic activity to continue. Under these patterns of governance, different types of 
competition emerged that then triggered consequences pertinent to the production 
conditions for a new critical juncture arising at the conclusion of each phase.  
In this way, regulatory change of the tobacco state monopoly occurred in a 
more fundamental way at these critical junctures. There, new rules of the game came 
to be laid down by the central authorities and thus constituted a new premise for the 
next institutional phase and the governance pattern that arose with it. The analytical 
framework developed in this chapter, then, provides the foundation required for 
exploring in the following chapters the institutional development of the tobacco state 
monopoly in each phase—from the incremental change in the patterns of 
governance to regulatory changes of the tobacco state monopoly system at critical 
junctures. 
3.1 Implementing the Tobacco State Monopoly: the Political 
Context 
By identifying the policy realms in which the principal actors of the tobacco 
state monopoly—the local governments and the CNTC’s local agents—were located, 
the political context in which the tobacco state monopoly arose was already revealed 
in the preceding chapter.  
Local authorities had resisted conversion to administrative subordination, 
principally because it would result in the loss of their tobacco industry revenues. 
This high degree of sensitivity to fiscal interests reflected perfectly in the policy of 
fiscal decentralization that was then current. In the early days of market-oriented 
reform, fiscal decentralization aimed to create an emerging market economy by 
mobilizing local initiatives. Under this reform, the central government transferred a 
huge number of resources to local governments through a variety of fiscal contract 
systems: lower-level governments were obliged to remit a certain amount of revenue 
to the governmental tiers above them but were able to retain the remainder. In this 
context, a quasi-fiscal federalist framework appeared, by which local governments 
had primary authority and responsibility for their local economies while being 
subject to strict budgetary constraints.
 
Local governments, then, were motivated to 
increase revenue collection in any way possible.
1
 Fiscal reform policy thus created a 
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strong incentive compelling local states to become involved in the local tobacco 
industry in order to increase their fiscal revenues, even after the conversion to 
administrative subordination. 
Second, CNTC local agents continued to retain a great deal of autonomy under 
the SOE reform, even after administrative subordination. Rather than privatizing 
SOEs, the Chinese SOE reform was initiated by the central state by delegating 
increased decision-making autonomy and rights for profit retention to the companies 
in order to improve productivity and efficiency. In the mid-1980s, the major 
endeavor in extending the autonomy of SOEs evolved to promoting a contract 
responsibility system, under which many contractual and residual rights were 
delegated to managers in order to motivate them to maximize profits by exercising 
greater authority in the SOEs.
2
  
In fact, the autonomy created by the SOE reform prepared the ground for local 
government manipulation of the tobacco corporations and cigarette companies in 
their regions. The existence of autonomy supplied the precondition that allowed 
local authorities to intervene in the activities of the CNTC’s agents by any means 
available. In this regard, the course of the SOE reform involved not only the 
institutional setting in which the CNTC’s agents were embedded, but also the 
analytical thread for exploring the opportunities (or constraints) on local authorities 
with respect to manipulating the CNTC’s agents.  
In sum, fiscal and SOE reforms provided the political context in which local 
governments and the CNTC’s agents were shaped with respect to implementing the 
rules of the tobacco state monopoly as designed. Under those circumstances, 
interactions between local authorities and the CNTC’s local agents created space for 
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incremental change in the industrial governance pattern of the tobacco sector, as 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 - Political Context for Implementing Tobacco State Monopoly Rules 
  
Source: Supplied by the author 
3.2  The Varied Political Contexts of the Three Phases 
In general, the fiscal and SOE reforms initiated a series of measures for the 
“devolution of power and transfer of profit” (fangquan rangli 放权让利), which 
comprised at root the motives and opportunities that local authorities could initially 
use to intervene into the local tobacco business. These two reform measures, 
however, gradually came to cause more breakdowns and crises for the governance of 
the entire state apparatus in general. Out of this, rising concerns with regard to the 
capacity of the central state to address these issues triggered various 
“recentralization” programs for both fiscal revenue and SOE governance.  
Over the past few decades, both reform measures have traveled a similar path 
from decentralization to recentralization, though it should be noted that the 
movements were not simultaneous. While recentralization of fiscal revenue was 
initiated in 1994, SOE governance was not geared toward recentralization until after 












bring about distinctive institutional settings that influenced how local authorities 
interacted with the CNTC’s local agents. The interactions of these two reforms 
influenced the three distinct patterns of governance noted below: 
 
 During the first phase (1983-1993), from the establishment of the CNTC 
to the initiation of tax-sharing system, it was characterized by a 
combination of decentralization measures in the fiscal policy and SOE 
governance. 
 During the second phase (1994-2004), from the inception of tax-sharing 
system until the recentralization reform for the CNTC was set into 
motion, it was characterized by a combination of fiscal revenue 
recentralization reform and SOE governance decentralization. 
 During the third phase (2005-2012), beginning from when the 
recentralization reform for the CNTC was implemented and suspended 
in 2012, it was characterized by a combination of recentralization 
measures for both fiscal revenue and SOE governance. 
 
Below, I illustrate how these two threads of reform proceeded in parallel from 
the early 1980s onward. By reviewing their paths of development separately, this 
discloses how the three distinctive phases exemplify not only the varying 
combinations of the two reform measures, but also how the different degrees of 
incentive and constraint at play functioned with respect to the local authorities’ 
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Third Phase (2005-2012) 
Source: Supplied by the author 
3.2.1 The Fiscal Reform under the Central-Local Relationship 
After fiscal decentralization was set into motion, local states had the incentive 
as well as the discretionary authority to conduct jurisdictional economic activities. 
With this, a profusion of theoretical models for analyzing the local state-market 
relationship appeared.
3
 While these abundant case studies mapped the diversity of 
the local government-business relationship, many of them also disclosed how local 
states had pursued their own interests by circumventing central control. In other 
words, though the fiscal decentralization effectively motivated local officials to 
revitalize local economies, it also resulted in the unintended consequence that those 
same officials would provide a minimum rather than a maximum of compliance in 
terms of central policy implementation on a number of fronts.
4
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A plethora of studies on China’s central-local relationship discussed the 
capacity of the central state in this circumstance, and some began to examine the 
central government’s reaction and strategy toward local governmental dissidence.
5
 
In these studies, the cadre responsibility system emerged as the crucial mechanism 
for strengthening the ability of the central government to exercise control. This 
system was created by the Communist Party of China (CPC) at the same time as the 
fiscal decentralization program to ensure that local decisions conformed to the 
requirements set by the central authorities. Under this system, cadre performance 
was evaluated on the basis of a variety of targets identified in a performance contract 
created with the next level of government. The evaluation results not only would 
affect cadre bonuses but also would determine their promotion, demotion, and even 
dismissal.
6
 In this way, the CPC attempted to maintain an iron grip on personnel 
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This dual approach for controlling personnel appointments and cadre 
evaluation did indeed make it easier to hold local cadres accountable, but it was not 
an absolute panacea, given both that China’s bureaucratic system was exceptionally 
large and that the fiscal decentralization reform made its workings even more 
complex and fragmented. First proposed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg, a 
“fragmented authoritarianism” model was used to describe the Chinese government 
after the market-oriented reform. This model argued that authority below the top tier 
of the Chinese political system was disjointed, so that it emphasized the importance 
of bureaucratic bargaining and negotiation to shape a so-called “negotiated economy” 
in place of the previous planned economy.  
However, this fragmentized situation—reflected in this negotiated 
economy–gradually became seen by the early 1990s as a sign that the central state 
was in the midst of a crisis of governance.
8
 The central state consequently decided 
to strengthen its authority by recentralizing fiscal revenue.  
The logic underpinning this policy decision can be found in the book, A Study 
of China’s State Capacity, edited by Shaoguang Wang and Angang Hu and 
published in 1993.
9
 The state capacity referred to by the book points primarily to 
the capacity of the central government, and the authors construe state capacity as 
having included four different types: an extractive capacity (the capacity to mobilize 
economic resources), a steering capacity (the capacity to guide the economic 
development of society), a legitimating capacity (the capacity of the state to employ 
political symbols to create consensus among the citizens), and a coercive capacity 
(the capacity of the state to employ violent means to maintain its status). Of the four 
types, the authors clearly stated that “the state’s capacity to mobilize and extract 
financial resources is the core of state capacity and the foundation of the state’s 
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ability to realize the other capacities.”
10
 The authors contended that economic 
reforms had already undermined the (central) state capacity in general terms and 
warned that the decline of the central state’s fiscal revenue would continue. The 
book argues that a strong (central) state is necessary for market reform. The Chinese 
government accepted this argument, thus triggering a tax-sharing reform in order to 
readjust the central-local power relations in 1994.
11
 
This tax-sharing system fundamentally strengthened the control of the central 
government over fiscal revenues in three ways. First, the previous fiscal contract 
system between the central and local governments was terminated. With repeated 
bargaining with local authorities out of the picture, the central government now 
owned its own independent tax category—the central tax—under the new fiscal 
system. Under this new fiscal system, all tax revenue was divided into three 
categories—a central tax, a local tax, and a central-local shared tax. By this, the ratio 
of central fiscal income to national revenue greatly increased; for example, prior to 
the tax-sharing reform, tax distribution between the central and local governments 
stood at 22 percent and 78 percent in 1993, respectively, but became 55.7 percent 
and 44.3 percent the very next year.
12
 Second, the central government’s authority to 
collect tax had ceased to be delegated to the local governments, and the central 
government now had its own independent agencies in all provinces. This allowed it 
to collect the central tax directly through its own institutions rather than having to 
rely on local remittances as before. Moreover, when a national tax system to collect 
central taxes was established, this established also a local tax system to collect local 
taxes. This meant that tax diversions by local governments could to some extent be 
reduced. Third, a series of fiscal transfer arrangements was established, which made 
it easier for the central state to adjust the developmental gaps in different regions. In 
general, these institutional changes in themselves already greatly shifted fiscal 
authority from the provinces to the central state.
13
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At the same as the tax-sharing system, an enterprise contract management 
responsibility system under the SOE reform also came to an end. Once the 
tax-sharing reform was launched, the SOEs were no longer obliged to surrender 
their profits since they were generally in a poor financial position at that time.
14
 All 
SOEs had to pay were the central and local taxes under the new tax code; the 
requirement for paying profits to the state was accordingly removed. 
In this way, the tax-sharing system became a comprehensive package of 
measures designed to deal with the financial relationship between the central-local 
authorities and the SOEs. It could be viewed as a first step toward establishing a 
more rule-based, modern fiscal system. But when fiscal revenue was recentralized 
under the tax-sharing system, expenditures required for executing local obligations 
and projects were not concurrently removed. For example, while the ratio of local 
fiscal income to national revenue dramatically declined from 78 percent in 1993 to 
44.3 percent in 1994, the ratio of local fiscal expense to national expenditure only 
slightly decreased from 71.7 percent to 69.7 percent in the same period. This 
unbalance between local fiscal revenue and expenditure did not change afterwards 
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1991 29.8 70.2 32.2 67.8 
1992 28.1 71.9 31.3 68.7 
1993 22.0 78.0 28.3 71.7 
1994 55.7 44.3 30.3 69.7 
1995 52.2 47.8 29.2 70.8 
1996 49.4 50.6 27.1 72.9 
1997 48.9 51.1 27.4 72.6 
1998 49.5 50.5 28.9 71.1 
1999 51.1 48.9 31.5 68.5 
2000 52.2 47.8 34.7 65.3 
2001 52.4 47.6 30.5 69.5 
2002 55.0 45.0 30.7 69.3 
2003 54.6 45.4 30.1 69.9 
2004 54.9 45.1 27.7 72.3 
2005 52.3 47.7 25.9 74.1 
2006 52.8 47.2 24.7 75.3 
2007 54.1 45.9 23.0 77.0 
2008 53.3 46.7 21.3 78.7 
2009 52.4 47.6 20.0 80.0 
2010 51.1 48.9 17.8 82.2 
2011 49.4 50.6 15.1 84.9 
Source: Adapted from Zhongguo caizheng nianjian 2012 (China’s annual financial report 
2012) (p. 459-62), by He Jieping, 2012, Beijing: China State Finance. 
 
Under the new budget constraints, greater fiscal burdens were placed on local 
governments, which intensified competition between local governments with regard 
to increasing their incomes. Under the circumstances, the relationship between 
companies and local states also changed. For example, many local governments had 
aided township and village enterprises (TVEs), which had prospered rapidly in the 
1980s, by not demanding taxes thus allowing more profits to be retained by the 
TVEs and shared with the host governments. But under the tax-sharing system, these 
TVEs now had to pay central and local taxes through specific tax institutions, which 
meant that income diverted to local governments was reduced. As a consequence, 
local governments lost the motivation to support the development of TVEs, which 
constitutes one of the major factors for the decline of the TVEs during the 1990s.
15
 
In addition, many local SOEs were sold off when they could not produce income for 
the local authorities. In general terms, local governments became keen to 
disassociate themselves from companies running at a loss.  
In these ways, state-enterprise relationships were indirectly reshaped by the 
tax-sharing system put in place after 1994.
16
 In this context, the interrelationship 
between local governments and tobacco corporations and cigarette enterprises also 
changed, albeit in different way. Given that the high tax rate for the tobacco industry 
under the new tax-sharing system would directly influence local fiscal income, the 
incentive for the local states to become involved in the local tobacco industry 
actually increased. This will be further discussed in Chapter Five. 
3.2.2 The Reform of SOE Governance 
In general, productivity within the SOEs improved in the 1980s when they 
were granted greater autonomy under a more decentralized structure, but during the 
1990s their profitability declined dramatically, principally due to increased 
competition from the emerging non-state sector and the social welfare they assumed. 
This proved to be a major issue that required much attention from the central state, 
and so the focus in SOE reform began to shift from delegating authority to 
restructuring ownership through the introduction of a shareholding system in the 
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early 1990s. The introduction of this shareholding system resulted in the 
privatization of small and medium-sized SOEs, most of which were owned by local 
states and were active in competitive industries such as machinery, textiles, food 
processing, and so on. Given that these gradually deteriorated into fiscal burdens for 
local states, over half of these small SOEs were privatized by the end of 1996.
17
    
While local states were encouraging the privatization of small and 
medium-sized SOEs in their jurisdictions through shareholding reforms in the 1990s, 
most of the large SOEs in a number of strategic industries, including national 
security, technological innovation, and the domestic economy, remained under the 
control of the central state. Moreover, the central authority not only decided to 
reserve the ownership rights of these central state-run SOEs but also endeavored to 
reorganize and refinance them so that they would become a part of even bigger 
groups.  
A policy of “grasping the large, letting the small go” (zhuada fangxiao 抓大放
小) was thus introduced in 1997, officially confirming the different state strategies 
concerning SOE reform in competitive and strategic sectors.
18
 The objective was 
stated explicitly in President Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 15
th
 Party Conference in 
1997: 
The leading role of the state-owned sectors should manifest itself 
mainly in its control power. We should make a readjustment of the 
state-owned sector of the economy. The SOEs must be in a 
dominant position in major industries and key areas that concern 
the life-blood of the national economy… we shall effectuate a 
strategic reorganization of SOEs by properly managing large 
enterprises while adopting a flexible policy towards small ones.
19
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In 1998, the then Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo also re-emphasized the goal of 
creating a group of globally competitive large enterprises:  
International economic comparison shows us that if a country has 
several large companies or groups, it will be assured of 
maintaining a certain market share and a position in the 
international economic order. The US, for example, relies on 
General Motors, Boeing, Du Pont, and a batch of other 
multinational companies. Japan relies on six large groups and 
Korea relies on ten large commercial groupings. In the same way, 
both today and in the next century our nation’s position in the 
international economic order will to a large extent be determined 
by the position of our nation’s large companies and groups.
20
 
It was argued that the decision to nurture a batch of large SOEs as the 
“national team”—those capable of competing with the large firms—stemmed mainly 
from a detailed study of the experiences of the East Asian developmental countries 
that had gradually built up globally powerful, large corporations via state support. In 
studying their developmental experiences, the Chinese government believed that it 
was necessary to create these large enterprises as pillars of China’s national 
economy, but, unlike other East Asian developmental states, only the central SOEs 
would fulfill this role, guaranteeing the state’s capacity to steer economic 
development in China.
21
 Negotiations revolving around joining the WTO during the 
1990s further created a powerful rationale—one which was fundamentally based on 
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However, since the introduction of the policy of “grasping the large,” a 
number of policies and special rights aimed at enlarging the selected SOEs did not 
function well. For one, the endeavor to construct large, state-owned corporate 
groups through mergers and acquisitions within the relevant core businesses were 
seriously thwarted by local governments that feared losing their vested interests, 
especially in the case of a merger involving two dominant companies (i.e. strong and 
strong merger).
23
 Though the attempt to construct vertically integrated multi-plant 
companies in some key industries emerged during the 1990s—i.e., restructuring 
Sinopec and CNPC in the petroleum industry—, the “subordinate” enterprises had 
gained so much autonomy and developed their own business activities under the 
SOE reform in the preceding stage that it proved difficult to reintegrate the various 
subordinate companies.
24
 As a result, the failure to establish giant SOEs prevailed 
across industries to such a degree in the 1990s that the question was once asked: 
how could the Chinese state, an authoritarian regime with plentiful experience in 
central planning, seem incapable of steering industrial restructuring?
25
 
The apparent growth of central SOEs once China had joined the WTO negated 
this question. As China’s WTO entry neared, the nation’s leadership had a much 
stronger motivation for initiating a new round of SOE reforms to integrate their 
fragmented control over the assets of centrally-run SOEs. In the negotiations leading 
up to its WTO membership, and even though China had committed to liberalizing 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in sectors that had been previously closed, this 
liberalization was not a uniform but rather sector-specific process. Given that China 
joined the WTO with the status of a developing country, it could retain selective 
control in the important sectors. However, even so, the Chinese government was 
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eager to develop their “national champions” in these sectors for fear that the 
government would be forced to further open domestic markets in the future.
26
  
This provides the context for the SOE governance recentralization reform 
initiated after China’s entry into the WTO. The establishment of the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in 2003 stood as the 
milestone for this round of reforms, which were intended to clarify and solve the 
problem of central property rights via new agency responsible for managing state 
assets on behalf of the central state. This reform allowed once-dispersed control and 
management to be collated and placed exclusively in the hands of the central state 
via the SASAC and other counterparts.
27
 On the basis of this clarified structure of 
central property rights, the SASAC has played a redefined role—a combination of 
regulator and investor with a mandate to keep the state asset growing. Under this 
centralized management framework, the central SOEs have been transformed 
through a series of mergers over the preceding decade into a handful of large 
companies in a number of state monopolies or strategic industries.
28
 
Although the CNTC has not fallen under SASAC, it launched its own 
recentralization program by following the mode of SASAC in 2005. Under this 
recentralized framework, the autonomy of the CNTC’s local agents has been 
relatively constrained, and they were now accountable to their superiors within the 
tobacco state monopoly regime. Accordingly, this likewise eroded the ability of local 
states to manipulate the CNTC’s local agents. Thus, the opportunities available for 
local states to intervene in the tobacco industry were further limited by increased 
constraints.  
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In summary, a fragmentation of the multilevel governmental system and its 
dispersed control over the central SOEs in the pillar industries were offset separately 
by the “recentralization” measures for fiscal revenue and SOE governance. However, 
once the central state’s capacity to obtain financial resources increased in light of 
fiscal reform, the motivation driving local states to become involved in the local 
tobacco industry likewise intensified. As vertical management (tiao) was gradually 
introduced into a number of pillar-sector central SOEs after the latest SOE reform 
went into motion, opportunities for local states to manipulate the CNTC’s local 
agents declined. The opposing developmental trends, expressed in the incentives and 
capacities of the local governments, would bring about different dynamics and 
tensions between local governments and the CNTC’s agents and result in distinctive 
patterns of industrial governance.  
3.3 The Links between the Different Phases 
From the power-distributing perspective of historical institutionalism, in the 
following chapters I analyze the development of the tobacco state monopoly in each 
of its three phases. The analysis of each phase starts from the question: what pattern 
of industrial governance is configured by the interaction between local states and the 
CNTC’s agents. In this respect, the formation of some governance pattern points to 
how modes of exchange between the multiple players in the production chain would 
change incrementally and deviate from the originally intended rules of operation for 
the monopoly. However, given that each phase is subject to a varying political 
context, which determines the distinctive pattern of governance, one must ask how 
these phases link sequentially, so that we may see the evolving process of the 
tobacco state monopoly system as a “moving picture” during the past three decades. 
Drawing on insights from historical institutionalism, two important points of 
analysis enter into this study: the consequences of the industrial pattern of 
governance, and regulatory change at critical junctures. In fact, the former 
constitutes a critical antecedent connected to the production condition for the latter’s 
occurrence. That is to say, the consequence that takes shape under the governance 
pattern produces a degree of tension and dynamism becomes an internal force that 
leads to the eventuation of critical juncture. Moreover, since the governance pattern 
refers to the actual modes of exchange between multiple players along the 
production chain, different types of competition occurring amongst the trades 
between cigarette manufacturers and wholesale distributors would accordingly occur 
according to those distinctive patterns of governance. In this sense, because 
competition under each pattern of governance triggers the abovementioned 
consequence, it becomes necessary to carefully characterize and understand the 
consequence, since it connects the “incremental change” presented through the 
pattern of governance and the “abrupt change” of the regulatory regime of the 
tobacco state monopoly at each critical juncture. 
As opposed to the gradual changes prompted by interactions between local 
governments and the CNTC’s local agents, the regulatory changes initiated by the 
central authorities are exemplified by the new rules of the tobacco state monopoly 
itself and are converted into a new premise at the start of each subsequent phase. For 
this reason, regulatory change arising at the critical juncture also then becomes a 
linking point between two different phases (see Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3 - Analytical Framework in Each Phase 
 
By employing the main arguments—gradual change and critical juncture—of 
historical institutionalist approach, the analytic framework illustrated in Figure 3.3 is 
used for the discussion over the following three chapters. Under this framework, 
while these issues—including the original monopoly rules, governance pattern, 
competition type, resulting consequence, and regulatory change—are closely 
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examined, the institutional development of the tobacco state monopoly system phase 
by phase over the past three decades becomes clear, as presented in Figure 3.4 
below.  
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Phase 1 - The Two-Track System: From 
Start to End 
Building from Chapter Two, the emergence of the two-track system rather than 
the original institutional design of the tobacco monopoly serves as the starting point 
of analysis for this chapter. When the CNTC was established 1982, it was shaped by 
institutional settings already in place—i.e., the decentralization reforms in fiscal 
policy and SOE governance—and this resulted at a very early stage in the entire 
institutional architecture deviating from the original formulation of state-planned 
control. The market, aside from the state-planned facilities, growing out of the trade 
in non-plan-specific products brought the two-track system into being in the tobacco 
sector.  
Recognizing this, I first delve into how interactions between local 
governments and the CNTC’s local agents made the primary rules of the game 
change incrementally and finally result in an alternative pattern of industrial 
governance for the tobacco sector. By exploring this process, it will be seen why this 
type of “quasi-free competition” could occur in the tobacco state monopoly at all. I 
also investigate the consequences under this governance pattern and discuss further 
how these consequences would bring about an abrupt change to monopoly 
regulations in the early 1990s. 
4.1 The Political Context: Decentralization Reforms on Two 
Fronts 
As indicated in Chapter Three, a feature of the 1982–1993 phase was the 
twofold decentralization reforms. In this section, I further elaborate how the fiscal 
distribution design under the fiscal policy motivated local states to get involved in 
the local tobacco industry and also how the formulation of SOE profit-sharing under 
the SOE reform drove the CNTC’s local agents to constantly raise production during 
this phase. 
4.1.1  The Profit Incentive for Local Governments 
The fiscal decentralization reform was formally initiated by the central 
authorities upon this measure—sharing revenues according to specific sources and 
classifying payments according to the contract system—throughout the country in 
1980. Under this policy, while the fixed income at each level of local government 
basically consisted of the taxes and the profits remitted by local SOEs, they also had 
to hand a portion of the income to higher-level governments according to 
agreements reached during revenue-sharing negotiations between the center and the 
provinces. Though the fiscal contract system was modified several times through 
revenue-sharing negotiations in the following years, the logic remained similar. In 
general, after the revenue-sharing arrangements were confirmed through 
central-local negotiations, the more revenue local governments collected, the more 
they could keep for themselves. So rather than acting as collection agents for the 
Ministry of Finance, local governments could now directly take a certain portion of 
taxes they collected under the policy of fiscal decentralization.
1
 
In view of this, local governments were unlikely to dissociate themselves from 
the tobacco industry because of the high tax rates imposed on this sector. Before the 
CNTC was created in 1982, the industry and commerce tax (gongshang shui 工商税) 
on tobacco products had been classified as local fiscal revenue. At the time, the 
industry and commerce tax constituted the largest tax source in China, and in this tax 
category the rates on tobacco products—between 40 and 66 percent—were much 
higher than other rates, given the unhealthy and addictive ingredients.
2
 When the 
Rules on the Tobacco Monopoly was instituted in 1983, the Ministry of Finance 
proclaimed a new regulation that restructured the industry and commerce tax levy on 
tobacco products. The new approach meant that the tax on tobacco leaves would be 
retained at a local level, but the tax on cigarette products would be shared between 
the central and local governments, in view of the fact that it constituted such a large 
sum. The cigarette tax collected in 1981 was thus seen as a benchmark, which could 
in the future be retained by local governments. Anything over that benchmark was 
split 50-50 between the central and local governments.
3
 As a result, the fiscal 
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incentive for local states remained after the industry and commerce tax on cigarettes 
was transformed from a local to a central-local shared tax in 1983.  
The following year, the product tax (chanpin shui 产品税) replaced the 
industry and commerce tax, but the rates on tobacco products continued to be higher 
than for any other product (between 32 and 60 percent). The product tax was paid by 
the cigarette manufacturers on the basis of three factors: their official selling price to 
the tobacco corporations (manufacturer price, chuchangjia 出厂价), the tax rate, and 
the quantities sold.
4
 Moreover, this levy also covered the non-plan-specific tobacco 
products. The upshot of this was that the more cigarettes the local enterprises 
produced, the bigger the share of taxes to the local states. In this light, it made sense 
that, when Yunnan was devastated by an earthquake in 1988, the Yunnan Province 
Government asked the central state to provide loans for importing more cigarette 
manufacturing machines to make up for the loss in capacity caused by the 
earthquake rather than asking for funds to be transferred to rebuild the disaster-hit 
areas. The local government believed that greater financial income would be 
realized from increased cigarette production rather than from relief aid.
5
 
Moreover, with tolerances for non-plan-specific production in the wake of 
administrative subordination agreements, local governments could now also obtain a 
“bonus” from cigarette enterprises, such as the share of “retained cigarettes” 
(zhengfu liuchengyan 政府留成烟). Allocated by cigarette enterprises in their 
geographical territories, this share of “retained cigarettes” could mean extra income 
for the local governments. In 1990, for instance, Yunnan Province Government 
received 70 thousand cases of retained cigarettes from the cigarette enterprises in the 
province, which the government made a profit from by selling them through the 
Yunnan Province Tobacco Corporation.
6
 As a consequence, both taxation and 
profits could persuade local governments to collude with local cigarette enterprises 
to maximize the production figures. 
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4.1.2 The Financial Incentive of the SOEs 
The first step of the SOE reform involved granting greater decision-making 
autonomy and retained higher profit-sharing to SOEs in the late 1970s. For example, 
the cigarette enterprises in Yunnan Province could retain 90 percent of after-tax 
profits before 1983.
7
 In order to prevent constant renegotiations about how profits 
were to be shared between the SOEs and states, the central authorities introduced a 
profit-to-tax reform in 1983 (see Chapter Two). Under this policy, profit was divided 
into three categories: income tax, adjustment tax, and the fund to be retained by the 
company. This meant that the cigarette firms and tobacco corporations could retain 
what was left after paying the two new taxes.  
With the conversion to administrative subordination, cigarette enterprises and 
tobacco corporations continued to keep the funds in their own individual financial 
accounts under the SOE reform. In 1987, the enterprise contract responsibility 
system replaced the profit-to-tax system, and the tobacco corporations gained further 
managerial autonomy, since their only obligations now were contractually-stipulated 
financial duties (see Figure 4.1). Under the enterprise contract responsibility system, 
the CNTC handed over profits to the Ministry of Finance in accordance with its 
contract. Under this premise, the CNTC would subcontract payment obligations to 
provincial tobacco corporations throughout the country.
8
 After fulfilling these 
payment obligations, all local tobacco corporations and cigarette enterprises could 
retain the remainder. In this way, the enterprise contract responsibility system did 
not change the incentive structure for local cigarette enterprises in increasing 
non-plan-specific production that would generate greater profits for themselves. 
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Figure 4.1 - Profit-and-Tax Allocations in the Tobacco Sector under SOE 
Reform 
 
Source: Summarized by the author 
4.2  The Incremental Change under the Two-Track System 
Driven by these financial incentives, discovering the means for steadily raising 
production became a common concern for the local governments and the CNTC’s 
local agents in the political context of the twofold decentralization reforms. With this 
goal of increasing production in mind, two issues in particular needed to be tackled 
in the 1980s. First was how to ensure that the supply of raw materials—i.e., tobacco 
leaves—quantitatively and qualitatively sufficed for the cigarette manufacturers; 
second involved the problem of selling the non-plan-specific products in a way that 
both taxation and profits were increased smoothly.  
Below, I shift the focus to discuss how local governments cooperated with the 
CNTC’s local agents to seek solutions regarding these two aspects. This provides the 
background for how incremental change would occur in this phase of the state 
tobacco monopoly. Before analyzing that change, however, the rules of the game in 
Enterprise Contract Responsibility System (1987-1993) 
Taxation : Product tax, as 
above 
Profits divided into two parts: the profit to 
the state according to contract and the 
remaining profit for enterprise 
Profit-to-tax Reform (1983-1987) 
Taxation: Product tax, into 
local and central-local  
government shared revenues 
Profits divided into Income tax, adjustment 
tax, and the fund to be retained by the 
company. Taxes into the state coffer. 
The Retention of Profits Reform (1979-1983)  
Taxation: Industry and 
commerce tax, into local fiscal 
revenue 
Profits: Expanding the profit retention for  
SOEs through bargaining 
the tobacco state monopoly at the start of this phase need to be identified, since these 
rules supply the baseline for comparing to outcomes of later incremental changes.  
Here, the rules mainly covered two dimensions: the separation of 
manufacturing and commerce (the trade of tobacco leaves and of cigarette products) 
along the production chain, and the two-track system of state plan and market. In 
reality, these two dimensions remained closely related, because it was a prerequisite 
that the modes of exchange presented by the latter were nested in the former (see 
Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2 - Primary Rules of the Tobacco State Monopoly in the First Phase 
Source: Supplied by the author 
Rules
* The Separation of Manufacturing and Commerce
* The Two-track System
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4.3  The Introduction of a Three-in-One System 
Cigarette manufacturers required a greater supply of tobacco leaves in order to 
feed their non-plan-specific production under the two-track system. In this section, I 
first illuminate how the tobacco “monopsony” was implemented on the 
state-planned track and then explain how the resulting three-in-one system, which 
not only ensured the quantity but also the quality of tobacco leaves, came into being.  
The basic operating principles of a tobacco monopsony can be seen in the 
Rules of Tobacco Monopoly. Under the Rules, the State Planning Committee would 
formulate a tobacco procurement plan, corresponding to the cigarette production 
plan for the same year. Based on this plan, county tobacco corporations would then 
sign procurement contracts that specified the planting area and production quantity 
with tobacco farmers through their local tobacco stations. After flue-curing, tobacco 
farmers were required to sell their outputs to the local tobacco corporations at fixed 
prices set according to the evaluated quality grades via its local agents.
9
 In this, 
tobacco growers had no choice but to sell their tobacco leaves to the local tobacco 
corporation as the monopsonistic purchaser, and the tobacco corporations would in 
turn sell the flue-cured leaves to cigarette manufactures under the state-planned 
arrangements. The operation guaranteed that the state plan, including procurement 
and distribution of tobacco leaves, would be implemented according to the set 
criteria (see Figure 4.3). 
In addition to the state-planned arrangements under this tobacco monopsony, 
growing tobacco in excess of the state-planned quota was actually permitted and 
encouraged by the local governments in which the tobacco fields were located, since 
they would collect further product tax on tobacco leaves from local tobacco 
corporations in line with the quantities purchased, the official prices, and the tax 
rate.
10
 In Yunnan Province, for example, taxes on both plan-specific and 
non-plan-specific tobacco leaves were retained at a local level throughout the Sixth 
Five-Year Plan (1981–5). Under the circumstances, the shortage of tobacco leaves 
for state-planned production was substantially reduced, but most cigarette 
enterprises instead faced a severe shortage of high quality tobacco leaves in the 
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1980s. So, contrary to earlier tobacco shortages, another kind of “tobacco war” 




Figure 4.3 - Institutional Arrangement of Tobacco Monopsony 
 
Source: Supplied by the author 
In general, shortages like these were common, because it was not easy for 
individual farmers to improve their agricultural skills under the household contract 
responsibility system that was in place in the 1980s. Moreover, even when the local 
tobacco corporations could obtain a quantity of high-quality tobacco leaves, they 
were not necessarily guaranteed to local cigarette enterprises, as the state-planned 
arrangements stipulated that they could be distributed to others.
12
 However, 
high-quality tobacco leaves were essential for producing high-class cigarettes that 
would result in higher profit margins and taxes for the cigarette enterprises and the 
local governments, respectively, as specified by the central authorities (see Table 
                                                     
11 Wang, State-Market Interactions, 54-8; Andrew H. Wedeman, From Mao to Market: Rent 
Seeking, Local Protectionism and Marketization in China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 113-27.  
12 Interviewee No. 66. 
4.1).
13
 In this context, some experimental projects began to be conducted locally in 
order to obtain greater quantities of high-quality tobacco leaves. 
Table 4.1 Cigarette Manufacturer Prices and Proclaimed Tax Rates (1984) 
Cigarette Class Manf. Price (RMB per 
case)* 
Tax Rate (%) 
First Class Above 1200  60 
Second Class 680-1200 60 
Third Class 430-680 56 
Fourth Class 280-430 50 
Fifth Class Below 280 32 
*As a standard, a case of cigarettes has 10 thousand cigarettes (a case has 50 
cartons, a carton has 10 packs, a pack has 20 cigarettes) 
Source: Adapted from Zhongguo yancao tongzhi (p. 1405), by Yang Guoan, Beijing, 
China: Zhonghua Book Company, 2009. 
The Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise was the first to take the initiative in proposing in 
the mid-1980s a trial project to set up the “first workshop” (diyi chejian 第一车间) 
for tobacco growers to improve the quality of tobacco leaves. The intention behind 
this first workshop was to get the cigarette company to grow its own main ingredient 
directly so that the quality would satisfy demand. However, given that the 
cultivation of tobacco, the purchase of leaves, and the manufacture of cigarettes 
were undertaken by different and separate bodies under the then-current structure of 
tobacco state monopoly structure, the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise was unable to realize 
its plan without the support of the local governments. In 1985, the Yuxi Cigarette 
Enterprise was able, with the aid of the Honghai County Government, to cultivate 
and manage its own tobacco fields for the first time by directly offering the specific 
seeds to farmers and asking them to plant tobacco according to its instructions. In 
circumventing the local tobacco corporation, the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise became 
responsible for the entire investment, including irrigation facilities and other 
subsidies, and fertilizer during the growing process. As a result, the high-quality 
tobacco leaves produced amounted to 42.12 percent of the total crop, much higher 
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than the average percentage (16.2) for the Yuxi area. The total harvest was over 
double the average production output.
14
 
In view of these satisfying results, the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise attempted to 
introduce trial projects in other counties in the Yuxi area in 1986. However, 
discontent voiced by the local tobacco corporations in Yunnan started arose, 
asserting the kinds of experiments were destroying their authority. In order to quell 
this disquiet, the then-governor of Yunnan Province, He Zhiqiang (和志强), called a 
meeting where he expressed his strong support for Yuxi’s projects and efforts. 
Yunnan Province Government took this step further and began to assist the Yuxi 




In 1987, the director of the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise, Chu Shijian (禇时健), 
proposed a more radical idea: to establish a “three-in-one” combined system to 
replace the earlier trial project. This involved merging the Yuxi Tobacco Corporation, 
the Yuxi Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, and the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise into a single 
entity. In terms of organizational structure, this restructuring of the existing 
production chain was intended to further stabilize cigarette production by closing the 
gap between the supply of tobacco leaves and the demand by cigarette 
manufacturers by internalizing the exchanges within the same entity. Chu’s proposal 
was enthusiastically endorsed by the Yuxi Government, as the following 
demonstrates: 
The establishment of the three-in-one system is consistent with the 
spirit of economic reforms enforced by the central government. It 
will serve as a good example of how to activate the SOEs. This 
reform will also effectively solve the problems in tobacco and 
cigarette production which our area has been facing. Under the 
three-in-one system, the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise will play the 
leading role, and the Yuxi Tobacco Monopoly Bureau and Yuxi 
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With the backing of the Yuxi Government, Yunnan Province Government 
followed suit and supported the proposed three-in-one system. With the local 
governments wholeheartedly endorsing the proposal, the Yunnan Tobacco 
Corporation also began to push for it and finally obtained the approval of the CNTC 
in 1987. Chu was then appointed as manager of the Yuxi Tobacco Corporation, head 
of the Yuxi Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, and director of the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise 
under the three-in-one system. This new system saw concentrated decision-making 
power to further facilitate the provision of high-quality tobacco leaves while 
maintaining a sufficient supply for non-plan-specific cigarette production. 
After its inception, local governments further strengthened the three-in-one 
combined system. For example, as one of the tobacco bases for the Yuxi Cigarette 
Enterprise, Jiangchuan County Government took several steps to encourage villages 
and peasants to raise both the production levels and the proportion of high-quality 
tobacco leaves. In 1988, the county government allocated 0.3 RMB per dan (担; one 
dan is equal to 50 kilograms) to facilitate production above 1987 levels and 800 
RMB for increasing the output of high-quality tobacco leaves by one percent for 
each village.
17
 Under the circumstances, at a time when many cigarette enterprises 
were struggling with a shortage of high-quality leaves in the 1980s, the Yuxi 
Cigarette Enterprise had already taken advantage of their quality tobacco supply to 
become a nationally recognized company, thanks to famous brands such as 
Hongtashan (红塔山).18  
As a result, the Yuxi company grew rapidly in the 1980s, and, in view of its 
success, the three-in-one system was consequently promoted by the Yunnan Tobacco 
Corporation and implemented in other regions, where other cigarette enterprises 
such as Dali and Honghe were located.
19
 This also explains how taxes and profits 
                                                     
16 Wang, State-Market Interactions, 76. 
17 The STMB of Jiangchuan County, Jiangchuan xian yancaozhi (The chronicle of tobacco in 
Jiangchuan County) (Dehong, China: Dehong Nationality Publishing House, 2006), 
165-70.  
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top), China Tobacco, December 18, 2010, accessed March 15, 2012, 
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19 Interviewee No. 66.  
collected from the tobacco industry for Yunnan’s fiscal revenue rose dramatically 
from the mid-1980s onwards—the ratio of taxes on and profits from tobacco for the 
provincial fiscal revenue in Yunnan Province climbed from 49.3 % in 1985 to 91.6 
% in 1990 (see Figure 4.4). Other provinces around the country went on to copy 
system in the following years. 
Like many experiments and trials initiated by local authorities and approved 
after the fact by the central state during the initial reform stage,
20
 this three-in-one 
system inserted into the tobacco state monopoly aimed at solving a shortage of 
high-quality tobacco leaves while upgrading cigarette company operations via 
whatever means seemed appropriate. The creation of the three-in-one system 
demonstrated that, while the ownership of the cigarette enterprises still rested with 
the central state and local governments were not the residual claimants (as for 
instance in the case of the TVEs),
21
 local governments were given incentives to 
support and spur development under the fiscal decentralization reform. Moreover, 
the proposal to create the three-in-one system proved that SOEs could be motivated 
to pursue output and production growth aggressively under a framework of SOE 
reform and not simply depend on government bailouts or subsidies, as suggested in 




The combination of the two decentralization reforms engendered the birth of 
the three-in-one system, with due regard for the cooperation between the local 
governments and the cigarette enterprises. The separation of commerce and 
manufacturing was inverted and became the combination of commerce and 
manufacturing, which allowed cigarette manufacturers to efficiently manage their 
own tobacco fields and ensure that the quality and quantity of tobacco leaves were 
substantially able to meet their needs. In view of the result, even though the 
three-in-one system was not a compulsory policy formulated by the central state, it 
was continually mimicked and adopted in regions beyond the province of Yunnan 
and gradually led to “institutional isomorphism” throughout the country.
23
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Nonetheless, this development also further fragmented the authority of the state 
tobacco monopoly regime. 
Figure 4.4 - Ratio of Taxes on and Profits from Tobacco for the Provincial 
Fiscal Revenue in Yunnan Province (1980–1990) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Yunnan sheng juanyan xiaoshou gongsizhi 1982–2006 (p. 258), by Jin 
Yibing, 2008, Kunming, China: Yunnan People’s Publishing House, 2008. 
4.3.1  The Prevalence of Illicit Wholesalers 
Once raw material supply issues were resolved through the introduction of the 
three-in-one system, selling the entire non-plan-specific cigarette output turned out 
also to be an urgent issue. According to the original institutional design, the tobacco 
corporation was the only legal local cigarette wholesaler, and only state-licensed 
retailers were permitted to purchase cigarettes from them. Under these state-planned 
arrangements, the plan-specific cigarettes would be distributed via the multi-tiered 
CNTC wholesale system. For example, after the Yunnan Province Tobacco 
Corporation was established in 1982, it became responsible for distributing the 
plan-specific cigarettes manufactured by the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise. Within the 
province, the cigarettes circulated from provincial, municipal, and county 
corporations to licensed retailers at the state-specified prices (manufacturer, 
                                                                                                                            
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological 
Review 48 (1983): 147-60. 
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distributor, wholesale prices). The retailers were also required to adhere to the retail 
prices when selling the cigarette to customers. In addition to the inter-provincial 
trade, the Yunnan Province Tobacco Corporation also sold the plan-specific 
cigarettes to other provinces (see Figure 4.5).
24
 
Figure 4.5 - Distribution of the Plan-specific Cigarettes 
Source: Supplied by the author 
 
Alongside this circulation under the state-planned arrangements, the cigarette 
enterprises began to sell their non-plan-specific products to the tobacco corporations 
at different levels and in different regions. However, as the non-plan-specific 
production grew constantly throughout this phase, cigarette enterprises were forced 
to find additional channels to clear their stock. And so a number of private 
individuals with connections to the cigarette enterprises, or who “borrowed the hat” 
from other tobacco corporations to masquerade as one of their employees, began to 
purchase the non-plan-specific cigarettes directly from cigarette manufacturers. 
Prices in these transactions were driven by supply and demand on a “free market” 
basis rather than as specified by the state. Thus, the two-track system here embodied 
not only state-planned and non-plan-specific production but also the resultant 
state-specified prices as well as “free market” prices. 
                                                     




















These private individuals also assisted local tobacco corporations to clear their 
inventories. Although tobacco corporations were entitled to monopolize local 
wholesale markets, there was no guarantee they could sell their entire inventory, 
since not all cigarette brands were equally popular, e.g., Hongtashan brand in the 
1980s. In particular, most tobacco corporations in the 1980s relied on the traditional 
retailers inherited from the Mao era, i.e., the state-owned shops and supply and 
marketing cooperatives (SMCs) in the rural areas, which were compelled to call on 
the regional tobacco corporations in person to collect the products.  
County tobacco corporation staff often preferred sitting in their offices 
(zuoshang 坐商) instead of working actively to create and expand distribution 
networks.
25
 Taking advantage of this inconvenient situation, some private 
individuals began to purchase the cigarettes in bulk from the tobacco corporations 
and non-licensed retailers. They were seen as the illicit wholesalers (dahu 大户), 
who colluded with tobacco corporations to clear their inventory.
26
 A former official 
of the Shaoxing County Tobacco Corporation recalled how cigarette distribution was 
handled in the 1980s: 
It was very common to sell our cigarette products to dahu. In fact, 
we preferred selling products to the competent dahu. Why? We 
were doing business and they could buy our products in larger 
quantities. That meant we could get our money back quickly!
27
 
Moreover, influence of dahu grew constantly under the shield of local 
governments during this period. They not only created their own retailing networks 
but also autonomously established “free” cigarette wholesale marketplaces where 
they made deals directly with customers in public places.
28
 Here, the meaning of 
“free” contrasts with traditional circulation within the CNTC’s multi-level wholesale 
distribution. In other words, these physical marketplaces were not approved by the 
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CNTC but protected by local governments. In fact, many local governments were 
active participants in creating free wholesale cigarette marketplace.
29
 By 
establishing these wholesale marketplaces, the local governments not only profited 
from charging rents and service fees but also could facilitate the distribution of local 
cigarette products. These “illegal” wholesale marketplaces, which had not obtained 
permission from the CNTC, mushroomed in 1980s and in the following years 
rapidly spread across the country (see Figure 4.6). Their existence further 
contributed to the growth of illicit wholesalers. According to the survey conducted 
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Figure 4.6 Distribution of Non-Plan-Specific Cigarettes 
 
Source: Supplied by the author 
4.3.2 The Expanding Market under the Two-Track System 
Under the decentralization reforms in fiscal policy and SOE governance, local 
governments continued to aid the CNTC’s local agents in expanding 
non-plan-specific cigarette production for the purpose of financial gain. Through this 
interaction and cooperation, the three-in-one system emerged to stabilize the supply 
of high-quality tobacco leaves, while illicit wholesalers helped to accelerate the 
distribution of cigarette products throughout the country. In this context, with the 
increase of non-plan-specific production, the market was continuously enlarged. 
This expanding cigarette trade market under the two-track system gradually became 
the dominant pattern of governance during this phase. 
Under this pattern of governance, though the state-planned track remained in 
place, an ever-increasing number of cigarette products were exchanged through the 
market channel and a type of “quasi-free competition” began to emerge. Firstly, 
although the barrier to entering this industry was set by state regulations, the 
prohibition was constantly sabotaged by the allied interests of local governments 





















this. In addition, the unsanctioned cigarette manufacturers were able to survive as 
long as they could obtain non-plan-specific tobacco leaves and sell their cigarette 
products via the informal distribution networks.
31
 This meant that not all cigarette 
manufacturers and wholesalers were approved by the STMB for entry but still 
survived within the industry. And so, even though over three hundred 
non-plan-specific manufacturers had been closed down by 1985, non-state cigarette 
factories continued to spring up.
32
  
Moreover, while the central authorities envisaged the CNTC as a multi-tier 
system to run the entire sector, their local agents, including wholesalers and 
manufacturers who were delegated to monopolize the local wholesale markets and 
produce the cigarette products, were seldom accountable to the CNTC in terms of 
the business they conducted during this phase. Aside from sharing profits with their 
superior corporations, the agents could produce and purchase any products in any 
quantity after satisfying the CNTC state mandates. As a result, this low degree of 
“formalization” and “accountability” led to a quasi-free competitive situation in 
which a wide range of non-legal transactions co-existed with legal ones.  
Under this quasi-free competition, though some relatively large cigarette firms, 
such as Yuxi, carved out market niches in the late 1980s with high-quality cigarettes 
like Hongtashan as their flagship products, a significant number of small cigarette 
firms continued to survive, and they generally sold more homogenous products. 
Under the circumstances, this industry was shaped by the low market concentration 
of cigarette manufacturers: according to the data, there were already over 150 




In summary, in the political context of the two decentralization reforms, 
interaction and cooperation between local governments and the CNTC’s local agents 
led to an incremental change seen in the expanding market of the two-track system. 
This incremental change, of a type Mahoney and Thelen describe as a mode of 
“layering,” supplied additions or revisions to existing institutions or regulations 
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rather than introducing wholly new ones, thereby changing the manner in which the 
original rules structured exchange behavior.
34
 By this layering mode, the 
state-planned track did not disappear; rather, a market channel became increasingly 
prominent. With the growth in non-plan-specific cigarette production, not only did 
quasi-free competition come into being, but the existing state-planned arrangements 
also began to erode as the market track swelled. 
4.4 The Consequences under the Pattern of Governance 
The cooperation between local governments, the CNTC’s local agents, and 
non-state actors (illicit wholesalers) saw the aggregate supply of cigarette products 
rise on a continuous basis. But the incremental growth of non-plan-specific 
production also meant not only that the market was expanding but also gradually 
becoming saturated, with the exception of some high-quality cigarette brands. In 
1990, with over 32 million cases of cigarettes brought to market, the glut only 
became worse (see Figure 4.7).
35
 This led to one-third of the total production 
capacity being mothballed in the early 1990s.
36
 Under the quasi-free competition, 
cigarette manufacturers were compelled to lower their prices in market. As a result, 
most companies at that time—with the exception of the profit-making Yuxi, Kuming, 
Shanghai, and Changsha cigarette enterprises—were in the red and were even forced 
to take out loans to pay their taxes.
37
 In other words, the entire market had already 
changed from a seller’s market into a buyer’s market—an evolution that was to 
become the critical antecedent for the regulatory change to the tobacco state 
monopoly system. 
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Figure 4.7 - National Production Figures of Cigarette Products (1982–1990) 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Zhongguo yancao fazhan baogao 1949–1999 (The report on China’s 
tobacco development 1949–1999) (p. 615), by STMB, 1999, Beijing, China: Industry and 
Commerce Press. 
4.4.1  Conflicts with the Non-State Actors 
When this buyer’s market emerged in the early 1990s, the illicit wholesalers 
gradually came to dominate the market distribution networks. Required to adhere to 
official retail prices, the traditional retailers did not have the leeway that the illicit 
wholesalers and retailers had to freely lower their sales prices for products procured 
through the state-planned track. Conversely, the illicit wholesalers could take 
advantage of their flexible pricing to enlarge their market share. Under the 
circumstances, a great number of state-owned shops and SMCs were compelled to 
abandon the cigarette retail market as they could not compete, especially with the 
ever-increasing glut. According to a survey conducted by Hebei Province 
Government, more than 85 percent of SMCs in the rural areas of Hebei Province 
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cigarettes through alternative channels.
38
 Meanwhile, another survey also revealed 
that illicit wholesalers occupied an average of more than 50 percent of the rural 
market share, even reaching up to 90 percent in some areas.
39
 In this context, the 
traditional retailers had little choice but to purchase more from the illicit wholesalers 
if they hoped to survive. And so the illicit wholesalers gradually consolidated their 
grip and dominated the wholesale market.
40
 
As the illicit wholesalers continuously expanded their operations, they were 
even able to force local tobacco corporations to adhere to the wholesale prices they 
set. For example, the Bazhou City Tobacco Corporation in Hebei Province was 
compelled to follow the prices set by the local Shengfang wholesale marketplace, 
where more than 60 illicit wholesalers gathered and sold a plethora of cigarette 
brands in the early 1990s.
41
 Instead of cooperating with each other, a clash of 
interests began to appear between the illicit wholesalers and the CNTC’s local 
agents. The result was that state fiscal revenue and cigarette company profits were 
adversely hit. By the end of 1991, the collective debt of the cigarette enterprises 
under the CNTC’s framework had exceeded 78 billion RMB.
42
 
In view of the serious threat from illicit wholesalers and the resulting losses 
suffered by the cigarette enterprises, the State Council proclaimed The Notification 
on Further Strengthening the Management of the Tobacco State Monopoly in 1991, 
which required all levels of local governments to obtain approval from the CNTC 
when establishing wholesale marketplaces. Local governments, the State Council 
announced, were not entitled to approve these marketplaces, and the CNTC began to 
crack down on all the illegal wholesale marketplaces in order to recover pricing 
dominance. While the existence of these illicit wholesalers had once facilitated the 
circulation of cigarette products for a net gain, now they became a target for 
eradication as a net loss after the buyer’s market emerged. 
                                                     
38 Yang, Zhongguo yancao, 676. 
39 Ibid., 672. 
40 Guo Xiquan and Li Zhanzhou, “Jianli he wanshan juanyan jiage guanli tizhi” (Establishing 
and improving the cigarette price system), Price Theory and Practice 11 (1994): 11. 
41 Yang, Zhongguo yancao, 674-5. 
42 Yang Ning, “Shenhua juanyan jiage gaige jiaqiang hongguan diaokong he guanli” 
(Deepening the cigarette price reform, strengthening macro control and management), 
Price Theory and Practice 11 (1994):14. 
4.4.2  The Termination of the Two-Track Pricing System 
Aside from the crackdown on illicit wholesale marketplaces, the central 
authorities also decided to implement a price reform for all cigarette products in 
1992 to further shut out the illicit wholesalers. By this reform, cigarette 
manufactures were granted the right to price all cigarette products from 
manufacturing, distribution, wholesale, to retail.
43
 By no longer using 
state-specified prices, the state-licensed retailers became more responsive to market 
dynamics so that the advantage that illicit wholesalers enjoyed would be constrained 
to a certain degree.
44
 
The central authorities had in fact already annulled the state-specified prices 
on thirteen well-known brands of high-class cigarettes, such as Hongtashan, and 
permitted the cigarette enterprises to set the prices for these brands themselves in 
1988. Under the quasi-free competition, these brands had become so popular that 
their prices in the market were much higher than the official prices under the 
state-planned track. Given this situation, tobacco corporations and illicit wholesalers 
alike had fought to get as many of these high-class cigarettes as possible, since 
selling these products meant enormous profits. Also, these high-class cigarettes had 
become difficult to find in the traditional retailers’ shops because illicit wholesalers 
often bought them immediately and then re-sold them in the coastal areas at higher 
prices.
45
 In order to combat the variety of profiteering activities, price reform had 
first been initiated in 1988 but was limited at the time only to specific high-class 
cigarette brands. 
The price gap between the two tracks had created a huge source for 
rent-seeking not only in the tobacco sector but also across different industries during 
the 1980s.
46
 Wedeman’s study demonstrated that when the central authorities could 
not or did not control this unbridled rent-seeking, the resulting competition would 
                                                     
43 Under the price reform, the pricing rights were granted to cigarette manufacturers; however, 
in principle, they still must get the approval from the CNTC on the prices they formulated 
before selling products.   
44 Xue Shi, “Tantan juanyan jiage shuanggui zhi” (The discussion of cigarette double track 
system), China Tobacco, August 1, 1991, accessed on March 23, 2014, 
http://www.echinatobacco.com/101588/102220/102430/102438/34678.html  
45 Han Zhankui, “Qianyi juanyan jiage gaige mubiao” (The analysis of cigarette price reform), 
Price Theory and Practice 4 (1994): 40; Yang, “Shenhua juanyan,” 14; Yang, Zhongguo 
yancao, 660. 
46 This situation is evident in the corruption case against Chu Shijian, see Appendix A.  
drive the prices from those fixed by administrative fiat toward market-clearing 
levels. In other words, the competitive rent-seeking would trigger the dissipation of 
rent, thereby driving the economy closer to a market and thus contributing to the 
necessity of price reform at a later stage.
47
 
Here, the partial price reform in the tobacco industry was consistent with 
Wedeman’s argument, but this present study would extend the observation to the 
other side as well: when the shortage becomes a glut, the gap between a higher 
state-specified price and a lower market price makes the two-track system difficult 
to sustain. A price gap like that seen in this study provided a great opportunity for 
empowering the illicit wholesalers to conquer a retail market. Therefore, rather than 
suppressing the rent-seeking activities, the comprehensive price reform initiated in 
1992 became a method for suffocating the illicit wholesalers. Price reform in this 
sense became a means by which CNTC’s leverage in the industry could be 
recovered from non-state actors, rather than a policy that led to further deregulation.   
4.5 The Regulatory Change of the Tobacco State Monopoly 
System 
When the price reform was fully set into motion, bringing an end to the 
two-track system for pricing in the tobacco sector, it also created the necessary 
conditions for transforming the existing rules of the tobacco state monopoly. While 
the price reform did introduce a market mechanism into the tobacco industry, it did 
not automatically lead to a solution for overproduction. High taxation encouraged 
local governments to pressure cigarette enterprises to raise production continually 
even though the glut problem had already emerged. But if overproduction were not 
limited, the price reform alone would instead see profits cut for the CNTC’s local 
agents and further intensify the conflict between local governments and cigarette 
manufacturers. In this way, the introduction of price reforms generated the 
occurrence of a critical juncture whereby the central state decided to initiate a 
regulatory change—setting the “control of overall quantity” regulation in the 
tobacco state monopoly system—in order to strengthen the authority of the CNTC 
regime as well as maintain fiscal returns from this industry. 
The trend of overproduction driven by local governments had in fact already 
been predicted. In a report titled “Improving Economic Efficiency in the Chinese 
Tobacco Industry,” conducted by the Institute of Industrial Economics at the Chinese 
                                                     
47 Wedeman, From Mao to Market, 21-2. 
Academy of Social Sciences in 1986, it stated that local governments would be 
pushed toward unconstrained production for the sake of fiscal revenue; the authors 
suggested, then, the introduction of a “tobacco monopoly tax” to be levied and 
collected exclusively by the central state in order to partially replace the existing 
Product Tax of cigarettes shared by the central state and local governments. The 
report suggested that when local governments could not gain more revenue from the 
tobacco tax, they would lose the incentive to engage in excessive production.
48
  
The proposal was not, however, adopted at that time. Opposition came not 
only from the local governments but also from the State Administration of Taxation, 
which feared that the introduction of such a new tax would destroy the hard-won 
consensus of central-local fiscal relations then in place.
49
 The potential problem of 
overproduction would not be rectified, then, until the early 1990s, when the central 
authorities required all the taxes on the non-plan-specific production to be 
considered as central fiscal revenue in 1991, in an attempt to constrain the rise in 
overproduction.
50
 In conjunction with the price reform, the central state also further 
promulgated the Tobacco Monopoly Law to fulfill the control of overall quantity for 
cigarette production in the following year. 
In Wang’s study on the Chinese tobacco industry, she argued that local 
governments were “pragmatic” market competitors, who would respond to 
competitive pressure and make demands that purely political actors would not.
51
 I 
basically agree that local governments were in a constant state of flux, as Wang 
suggests, but it must also be pointed out that local governmental interests were not 
always consistent with those of the CNTC’s local agents. In places where a shared a 
common interest for increasing the production levels arose, then local governments 
might act as a “market competitor”—as Wang suggested—e.g., in the active role 
seen in building the three-in-one system in Yunnan Province.  
However, while Wang paid much attention to exploring how local 
governments promoted the development of the SOEs, she did not analyze the 
incremental change presented in industrial governance after the introduction of the 
three-in-one system. Here, by contrast, this study uncovers how the cooperation 
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Technology Publishing House, 2007), 285-9. 
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51 Wang, State-Market Interactions, 15. 
between local governments and the CNTC’s local agents to raise production was 
already transformed as the market dynamic changed. When the cigarette enterprises 
could not benefit from increasing production due to the gluts, local governments 
were still motivated to pressure them to raise the levels, since the conduct of the 
local governments was basically driven by fiscal concerns. In this light, the clash of 
interests between the local governments and the CNTC’s local agents was 
exacerbated, which in turn compelled the central state to make more fundamental 
changes to regulations in order to protect the tobacco state monopoly system. 
In this context, the Tobacco State Monopoly Law formally stipulated that the 
cigarette manufacturers had to stick to the quotas set under the state plan, which 
became a binding rule rather than the previous bare minimum. In other words, the 
Law officially prohibited non-plan-specific cigarette production. Here, the content of 
the “state plan” was substituted with control for the overall quantity in the industry. 
In this sense, there was no longer a distinction between state-planned and 
non-plan-specific cigarette production, as had previously existed.  
With the two separate tracks of production scrapped, production levels for 
each cigarette enterprise had to adhere to the annual quotas set by the state, but 
cigarette manufacturers now had pricing autonomy for their products once the price 
reform was instituted. Cigarette enterprises were now fully responsible for freely 
exchanging their products with the tobacco corporations throughout the country, but 
they could not decide own production levels under the new rule of overall quantity 
control. Launched by the central authorities, this regulatory change to the state 
tobacco monopoly demonstrated the outcome of a critical juncture by the end of this 
phase: while the market had displaced state-planned arrangements, it was placed 
under another kind of state control: quota allocations in the tobacco sector. 
4.6 Conclusion 
My analysis of this phase first examines how the market expanded through 
cooperation between local states and the CNTC’s local agents in the 1980s. As the 
market dynamic changed, however, tension between formal and informal 
actors—i.e., the CNTC’s agents and illicit wholesalers, respectively—as well as 
contradictions between local governments and cigarette manufactures were tackled. 
At the end of this phase, the “market architecture” differed greatly from when it 
started (see Figure 4.8) and became a new condition for the next phase.    
Under the decentralization reforms in fiscal policy and SOE governance, local 
governments worked under the two-track system with the CNTC’s local agents to 
constantly increase the non-plan-specific cigarette production. Their cooperation not 
only gradually led to the prevalence of the three-in-one system but also resulted in 
the rise of illicit wholesalers. Driven by the rapid growth of non-plan-specific 
production, an expanding market under the two-track system turned out to be the 
leading pattern of governance and brought about the emergence of quasi-free 
competition in the tobacco monopoly system in the 1980s. 
Under this pattern of governance, a series of gluts beginning in the late 1980s 
transformed the market from a seller’s to a buyer’s. Under these conditions, 
traditional retailers under the CNTC multilevel framework failed to compete with 
illicit wholesalers and were forced out. The cooperative relationship between the 
CNTC’s local agents and the informal wholesalers deteriorated into conflicts and, in 
order to squeeze out the illicit wholesalers and maintain the authority of the CNTC 
regime in the tobacco sector, the central state not only began to crack down on the 
illicit wholesale marketplaces but also to implement fully price reform to constrain 
the illicit wholesalers’ activities. 
Once the price reform was fully initiated, it further exposed the inconsistency 
between the interests of the local states and the cigarette manufacturers with regard 
to production levels. It was in this context that the regulatory change to the tobacco 
monopoly system was introduced, which represented the desire to control overall 
quantities and the resulting quota allocations under the Tobacco State Monopoly Law 
promulgated in 1992. By this, the two-track system was abolished, and a “market” 
covered all trade in tobacco products. However, this market obviously deviated from 
one in a “free market” model, representing rather a mixture of market elements and 
state control by which manufacturers had autonomy in terms of exchange and 
pricing but could not determine their production levels. The outcome of this 
transformation provided a new premise for the second phase that began in 1994. 
Figure 4.8  Summary of Institutional Change Process in the First Phase 
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Phase 2 - The Prevalence of Local 
Protectionism 
When the Tobacco Monopoly Law was promulgated in 1992, it created a legal 
foundation to formally implement the control of overall quantity in the tobacco state 
monopoly. Coupled with the earlier change, the rules of the game at the starting 
point for this second phase exhibited two factors: a combination of manufacturing 
and commerce, and a control of overall quantity. As summarized in Figure 5.1, a 
great many complex manufacturing and commercial entities existed under the 
three-in-one system along with parties acting exclusively as wholesalers (where 
there were no cigarette manufacturers in the same region) who officially enjoyed the 
autonomous transactions within the market.  
This situation constituted the starting condition for the process of institutional 
change during the second phase (1994-2004). In this chapter, I first examine how 
interactions between local governments and the CNTC’s local agents led to a 
specific type of incremental change in industrial governance and its resulting type of 
competition. This makes clear also the consequences under this pattern of 
governance and how they would trigger yet another more fundamental regulatory 
change in the tobacco state monopoly system at the conclusion of this phase. 
5.1 The Political Context in the Second Phase 
In this section, I elaborate how the tax-sharing system implemented in 1994 
changed fiscal arrangements between the central and local governments concerning 
tobacco in order to examine why the “incentive” of intervention on the part of local 
governments into the local tobacco industry would grow under these new fiscal 
arrangements. I then discuss SOE reform measures implemented during this phase 
and subsequently identify the developmental trends of interaction between local 
governments and CNTC local agents that resulted from this new political context. 
Figure 5.1 Primary Rules of the Tobacco State Monopoly during the Second 
Phase 
5.1.1 Fiscal Arrangements for Tobacco under the 1994 Tax-Sharing 
System 
Under the new tax policy, instead of being forced to return to the bargaining 
table each year, all tax revenue could now be collected under three distinct 
categories: a central tax, a local tax, and a central-local shared tax. The tax codes 
under this new fiscal system stipulated that the tobacco-specific taxable goods 
covered all three categories, as summarized in Table 5.1. 
 
 
Table 5.1 Principal Tobacco-Specific Taxes under the Tax-sharing System* 
Tax Category Tax Payer Tax Formula Recipient 
Rules
* The Combination of Manufacturing and Commerce
* The Control of Overall Quantity
[The Total Amount Control]
Market    ( : exchange relationship)






Source: Summarized by the author
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Tobacco corporations Tobacco cost price (i.e. 
purchase amount x 
prices) x 31%  
Local tax 
Income tax Cigarette 
manufacturers & 
tobacco corporations 
Taxable income x 33% Local Tax *** 
* This table is based on the situation as it stood in 1994; some rates were modified at 
a later stage.  
** The special agricultural tax was scrapped for all agricultural products in 2004 
except for tobacco leaves, which is now subject to the tobacco leaf tax. 
*** Income tax became the central-local shared tax in 2002. 
Source: “Xuenzu, changye zhengce yu difang baohu zhuyi” ( p. 114), by Yi-Wen Cheng, in 
Xuenzu yu zhongguo changye fazhan, ed., Yongping Wu and Tak-Wing Ngo, 2010, Beijing, 
China: The Commercial Press. 
Sales tax and value-added tax (VAT) were the major taxes in the fiscal revenue 
extracted from the tobacco sector under the tax-sharing system. When VAT replaced 
the original product tax for all products, sales tax was introduced, but only for the 
purpose of levying tax on eleven specific goods that were normally regarded as 
“non-essential supplies.” The sales tax was created to guarantee that general fiscal 
incomes were not lower than previous levels. All cigarette products were included 
on the sales tax list; their rates, although amended several times in this phase,
1
 
remained among the highest of all taxed goods (see Table 5.2).
2
 
Table 5.2 Sales Tax Rates on Cigarette Products 
Year Tax Rates 
1994  45% for cigarettes priced above 780 RMB per case 
                                                     
1 Yang, Zhongguo yancao tongzhi, 1416-7.  
2 The second highest tax rate amongst all the taxed goods under the sales tax was for 
cosmetics, the tax rate of which was 30%, according to the latest adjustment in 2011, much 
lower than what now became the highest one (56%) for cigarette products. For details 
please refer to the website of the China State Administration of Taxation, 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n8136506/n8136608/n8138877/n8139027/8357266.html. 
 40% for the all cigarettes priced below 780 RMB per case 
1998 
 50% for cigarettes priced above 6,410 RMB per case 
 40% for cigarettes priced between 2,137 to 6,410 RMB per case 
 25% for cigarettes priced below 2,137 RMB per case  
2001 
 Initially every case of cigarettes was taxed 150 RMB 
 Later, 45% for the cigarettes priced above 12,500 RMB per case; 
30% for the all cigarettes priced below 12,500 RMB per case  
Source: Tao Ming (2005), Shanghai, China: Academia Press, p. 248. 
On the face of it, sales tax was intended to go wholly to the central state, but it 
played a crucial role in local fiscal income through a “tax refund” policy (shuishou 
fanhuan 税收返还 ). In order to persuade local governments to accept this 
tax-sharing reform, the central state designed this tax refund measure as a 
compromise. Under this, the central state would first approve provincial revenue 
transferred to the central coffers as the “refund base.” Once all payments had been 
made and the sum of the sales tax and VAT (hereafter to be referred to as “the two 
taxes”) had increased by one percent, this then obliged the central state to refund the 
provincial governments 0.3 percent of the central tax on that part above the base 
level; this, in order to protect the existing local income.  
In this way, local governments received not only 25 percent of the VAT 
revenue but also a share of the two taxes. The greater the revenue collected under 
the two taxes, the greater the refund the provinces would receive from the central 
state. In other words, although the central authorities formulated several measures 
for the transfer of fiscal revenue in order to correct the developmental gap between 
different provinces, the tax refund as a single category of all the fiscal transfer 
measures had the effect of protecting local vested interests. By 1996, the amount of 
tax refund had reached 72 percent of the whole transfer of fiscal revenue. And 
although it declined to 45.1 percent by 2001, the sum of the two taxes remained a 
large determining factor when it came to what income local governments could 
obtain from the central state through the transfer of fiscal revenue.
3
  
                                                     
3 Lo Meijuan, “Zhongguo yancao chanye huanjing yu hongta jituan weilai zhanlue quxiang 
yanjiou – yancao chanye de zhengzhi jingjixue yu feiguifan shichang jingzheng yanjiou” 
(The study of China’s tobacco industrial competitive environment and the future strategy of 
Hongta Group – the political economy of the tobacco industry and the study of informal 
competition) (Post Doc. Diss., Hongta Group, 2004); Tao, Zhuanmai tizhixia, 247-9; Wang 
Shigu and Li Baojiang, “Yancao hangye ‘qiangzhe quruo’ de zhiduxing gengzu – cong 
This method of fiscal redistribution was particularly influential in the major 
cigarette-producing provinces, as measured by the ratios of the sum of the two taxes 
from the tobacco industry compared to totality of the two taxes paid to the central 
state; data for 1995 is summarized in Table 5.3 below. 
Table 5.3 Ratios of the Two Taxes from the Tobacco Industry to the Totalities of 
the Two Taxes Paid to the Central State (year: 1995) 
Province Ratio (%) Province Ratio (%) 
Yunnan 83 Fujian 31 
Guizhou 57 Henan 26.5 
Hunan 41.2 Shanxi 25 
Anhui 40 Hubei 24.6 
Hainan 32.1 Sichuan 24 
Source: Adapted from Shuizhi gaige yilai shuishou tongji ziliao, 1994-1998 (The 
statistic data of tax income since the fiscal reform, 1994-1998), by the State 
Administration of Taxation, 2000, Beijing, China: China Taxation Publishing House. 
In this sense, the tax refund policy made not only the VAT but also the sales 
tax a central-local shared tax. These two taxes also determined how much local 
governments could collect in the other minor categories of local fiscal income, such 
as the city establishment tax and the education surcharge fee, because they 
functioned as the benchmark for calculating these local taxes.
4
 Additionally, until 
2002, income tax also flowed into the coffers of the local governments.
5
  
In general, then, local fiscal revenue continued to be of greater significance to 
the tobacco industry after 1994, such that when a local fiscal situation degenerated 
under the tax-sharing system (see Table 3.1), fiscal revenue obtained by the local 
governments from the tobacco sector became even more crucial.
6
 
                                                                                                                            
yancao shuishou ji xiangguan caizheng zhengce jiaodu fenxi” (The institutional barriers 
making the winners lose their advantages in the tobacco industry), China Industry Economy 
4 (2002): 14-6. 
4 The city establishment tax = (sales tax + VAT + business tax) x 7 %; the education 
surcharge fee = (sales tax + VAT + business tax) x 1.5%. 
5 The income tax became the central-local shared tax after 2002, with 60 percent going to the 
central and 40 percent to local governments.  
6 Lo, “Zhongguo yancao”; Liu Wei, Jingji zhuangui guocheng zhongde chanye chongzu: yi 
yancaoye weili (The industrial restructuring in the economy transition: the example of 
5.1.2  Cigarette Manufacturers under SOE Reform 
While changes in fiscal structure played an important role in determining the 
political context for this phase, such changes occurred along with modifications to 
SOE governance as well. Replacing a previous enterprise contract responsibility 
system, the central authorities decided to move towards a policy of “building the 
modern enterprise system,” which aimed for further removing SOEs from the 
previous state redistribution system.
7
 Different from policies that granted greater 
decision-making autonomy to the SOEs and allowed them to retain greater profits 
than during the previous phase, these new reforms aimed to create a new corporate 
form after the introduction of the Company Law in 1994, which provided the first 
legal basis for transforming the SOEs into autonomous legal entities. In many ways, 
this “modern enterprise system” was a rhetorical stand-in for Occidental-style 
management practices,
8
 where managers were expected to act more like 
entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the central state also converted the previous 
“governmental appropriations” granted to SOEs into “loans”—entailing that 
companies had to pay interest on the principal—in order to further harden the 
budgetary constraint. Once these reform measures were set into motion, however, 
the SOEs still had to cover social welfare provisions, such as healthcare and housing, 
for their workers. In light of the additional financial burden this assumed, the central 
authorities decided that SOEs did not need to share their dividends with the state 
once the tax-sharing system was initiated.
9
  
In general, these measures were intended to create the institutional 
arrangements under which SOEs would further be compelled to take greater 
responsibility for their own profits and losses. In this context, many cigarette 
manufacturers applied for a change in status according to the Company Law and 
                                                                                                                            
tobacco industry) (Beijing, China: China Social Sciences Press, 2005), 109; Yang and Yang, 
Zhongguo caizheng, 127. 
7 See the document “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli shehuizhuyi shichang jingji tizhi 
ruogan wenti de jueding” (The decisions of several issues about building socialist market 
economy), http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/134902/8092314.html (accessed Sept 1, 
2013).   
8 Doug Guthrie, China and Globalization: The Social, Economic, and Political 
Transformation of Chinese Society (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006), 54-7. 
9 Zhang Zhuoyuan and Zheng Haihang, Zhongguo guoyou qiye gaige 30 nian huigu yu 
zhanwang (The review and outlook of China’s SOE reform during the past 30 
years)(Beijing, China: People’s Publishing House, 2008), 290. 
consequently became legal entities. The Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise, for instance, was 
restructured into the Yuxi-Hongta Tobacco (Group) Corporation in 1995.
10
 Despite 
this, no clear relationship existed with respect to assets between the cigarette 
companies and their “superiors” within the CNTC regime. Moreover, once 
profit-sharing was suspended under the tax-sharing system, the original subcontracts 
pertaining to the financial duties of the entities at different levels were accordingly 
annulled. As a result, while each cigarette company could in principal control their 
own budgets and enjoy autonomy in terms of actual operations by keeping their own 
separate legal status, the parent-subsidiary corporate structure had yet to be created 
within the CNTC. Under this circumstance, the decentralized form of governance 
remained with the CNTC.
11
 
Against this backdrop, most cigarette manufacturers were determined to grab 
every available advantage from their fixed quota allocations to produce high-class 
products. And so, while the entire volume of cigarette production did not grow under 
the policy of controlling for overall quantity, continuously hovering at around 33 to 
34 million cases during this phase (see Table 5.4), a glut in upper-end cigarette 
products began to occur.
12
 A deputy chief for the STMB confirmed this trend for 
producing more expensive cigarettes, noting for example that during the first nine 
months of 1996, the production of first- (highest) class cigarettes increased by 
53.8%, while that of the second- and the third- class cigarettes increased by only 
16% and 18% respectively. At the same time, production levels for fourth- and the 
fifth- (lowest) class cigarettes declined by 11.9% and 51.1%, respectively. During 
the first half of 1997, the total production output of first-class cigarettes increased by 
30.6% compared to the same period in 1996, while the wholesalers’ inventories at 
the end of that period increased by 43.8%.
13
 
                                                     
10 In the meantime, the Yuxi-Hongta Tobacco Corporation became the core body of the 
Hongta Group set up in 1995. For more information see Hongta jintuan zhi.  
11 It should be noted, however, that even if their assets were not interlinked, the cigarette 
companies still had an “administrative relationship” with their superiors under the CNTC 
umbrella, so that the monopoly regulations such as the control of overall quantity could still 
be implemented.  
12 Tao, Zhuanmai tizhixia, 200-5. 
13 Zhou, “Fiscal Decentralization,” 114-33. 
Table 5.4  The Sum of Cigarette Production (1994–2002) 
Year Production Sum 










Source: Adapted from Zhongguo yancao chanye, by Lo Meijuan, 
Post Doc. Diss., Hongta Group, 2004 
It must be added that this development was also encouraged by local 
governments, since the higher prices of high-class cigarettes would mean more sales 
tax. Where the two taxes for the tobacco industry contributed to raising local fiscal 
revenue via the tax refund, amounts from sales tax considerably exceed VAT (see 
Table 5.5). From 1994 to 2000, the sales tax paid by cigarette companies was 
responsible, on average, for 75 percent of the two taxes. In addition, differently than 
from other countries, sales tax in China was levied on cigarette manufacturers on the 
basis of three factors: tax rates, production levels, and manufacturer prices. This 
method was formulated mainly for the sake of convenience, since it would be much 
easier in China’s context than collecting taxes from numerous wholesalers or 
retailers.  
While this method of levying taxes would indeed simplify the collecting 
process, it did not guarantee that all the taxes would be received, especially when 
cigarette manufacturers were unable to shrink their inventories when faced by gluts. 
In this context, local governments began to collude with the cigarette companies in 
their geographic locales in order to clear local products to ensure that high profits 
and corresponding taxation levels could be easily obtained. Thus, a variety of local 
protectionism measures emerged to gradually become the dominant pattern of 
governance for this phase. 
Table 5.5 The Sales Tax and VAT from the Tobacco Industry* 
Year 
Sales Tax  VAT 
1994 342.6 111.1 
1995 372.1 136.8 
1996 438.8 166.8 
1997 478.5 179.2 
1998 497.0 196.2 
1999 514.1 205.3 
2000 544.8 225.3 
*Unit: 100 million RMB 
Source: Adapted from Zhongguo yancao tongzhi (p. 1416, 1420), by Yang Guoan, 2009, 
Beijing, China: Zhonghua Book Company. 
5.2   The Surge in Local Protectionism 
Local protectionism here refers to a situation where local governments, 
through administrative controls, make nonlocal cigarette products difficult to obtain 
in their geographic jurisdictions in order to protect local fiscal interests. This type of 
local protectionism became widespread throughout China in the mid-1990s. Local 
governments would create trade barriers in order to afford this protection to those 
local cigarette companies that could not produce well-known brands. In addition, the 
major “importing” provinces in terms of cigarette consumption, like Zhejiang and 
Jiangsu provinces, engaged a number of protective measures, as their fiscal revenues 
became eroded when increased flow of cigarettes from other regions diluted the 
market share of local products.
14
  
Below, I first examine how this protectionist conduct was exercised by local 
governments along with its resulting change in competition type, after which I will 
further discuss the consequences, including both the failure of the “quota trade” 
program and the emergence of “victims.”  
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5.2.1  The Means of Local Protectionism 
The introduction of the Tobacco Monopoly Law did not lead to centralized 
governance in the tobacco sector during this phase, and in practice all the tobacco 
corporations in the CNTC regime still controlled their own budgets and enjoyed 
substantial autonomy. This kind of “decentralized” framework provided plenty of 
room for local governments to interfere in the tobacco industry, especially as they 
continued to retain leverage with regard to personnel appointments to local tobacco 
corporations. Even though local tobacco corporations could have independent legal 
status, the opportunity for local governments to intervene in their operations did not 
disappear. Under these circumstances, and aside from a few local tobacco 
corporations that existed under the three-in-one system and had a strong incentive to 
promote their local cigarette products since they were in the same boat as the 
cigarette manufacturers, the remaining local tobacco corporations found themselves 
under constant pressure from local governments to procure the bulk of their cigarette 
products from amongst those made within the province. 
In addition, efforts to improve distribution networks created further conditions 
facilitating protectionism by local governments. In 1994, the CNTC began to 
improve its own wholesale and retail networks in order to further constrain the 
growth of illicit wholesalers. The first measure that the CNTC implemented 
involved creating more wholesale centers accessible to retailers in rural regions. Due 
to technological developments, phone-based ordering began to replace on-location 
pickups, and local tobacco corporations now became responsible for delivering 
cigarettes to their retail customers.
15
  
The CNTC also initiated the first “national ordering meeting” of cigarette 
wholesalers, at which all inter-provincial deals between cigarette enterprises and 
tobacco corporations were required to be made through the signing of procurement 
contracts. This was the first regular, national meeting for the inter-provincial 
cigarette trade, the prior absence of which had in part allowed illicit wholesalers to 
fill the voids and expand their spheres of influence. From the time of that first 
national trade meeting for cigarettes in 1994, it has since been held twice a year on a 
regular basis.  
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This concentrated administration of the procurement procedure meant that 
only CNTC-certified members could join the meeting to undertake trade activities. 
Under such circumstances, intra-provincial and inter-provincial cigarette trade came 
to be conducted separately.
16
 Ironically, this united national ordering meeting for 
inter-provincial cigarette wholesalers thus paved the way for local governments to 
stop cigarettes from other provinces entering their local markets during this period. 
Local governments would often require local tobacco corporations to directly restrict 
inter-provincial procurement activities. 
Some even forbade local tobacco corporations from participating in the 
national ordering meeting at all. According to an article in the monthly publication 
of the STMB, Tobacco Economic Information, very few tobacco corporations 
attended the Spring national wholesale ordering meeting in 1997 that did not have 
permission from their provincial governments. The result was that the total volume 
transacted during that meeting was down 26.52 percent from the previous year. 
Under these circumstances, a boycotting of nonlocal cigarettes soon had a ripple 
effect, such that when a province’s products were boycotted by other provinces, 
local governments had little option but to sell those products at home by reducing its 
orders from outside of their province.
17
 
Under pressure from local governments, provincial tobacco corporations 
would also order subordinate companies—including city- and county-level tobacco 
corporations—to sell a given quantity of local cigarettes through their own channels. 
In this context, the strengthening of the CNTC’s distribution networks actually 
granted more favorable conditions to local governments in terms of their 
protectionist measures. Some local governments would conduct occasional 
inspections to check whether local retailers were selling cigarettes made outside of 
the province. For example, in Jiangsu Province, the local licensed retailers were 
fined 50 RMB for each pack of nonlocal cigarettes found. These measures were a 
common maneuver employed by local governments during this period.
18
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As a result, unlike the “enclave SOEs” referred to in Yi-min Lin’s study as 
vulnerable targets for predatory local state action due to their central-state 
ownerships, local governments could now provide massive levels of protection to 




5.2.2  The Failure of the Quota Trade Program 
With this prevalence of local protectionism, in 1997, the CNTC had little 
choice but to scrap the “quota trade” program it had introduced. When the Tobacco 
Monopoly Law was promulgated in 1992, many provincial governors endeavored to 
bargain with the CTNC in order to obtain higher cigarette product quotas. But it was 
extremely difficult to adjust those quotas to any significant degree once they were 
assigned, as doing so would directly influence local fiscal revenue. Faced with 
resistance from local governments, the CNTC decided to maintain the existing quota 
allocations but also introduced a program of “quota trade” in 1994 so that greater 
flexibility became available to cigarette manufacturers for responding to market 
demand. 
Under this program, cigarette enterprises were permitted to transfer their 
quotas to other manufacturers who could produce popular and high-class cigarette 
brands, receiving “compensation” in return from these quota buyers. Formulated by 
the CNTC, this compensation amounted to the quota sellers receiving fifty percent 
of the goods manufactured under these “transferred quotas” conditions and at 
discount prices from the quota buyers, so that the quota sellers could benefit from 
selling the popular products in the market.
20
  
The practice of quota trading proved controversial and was subject to attacks 
from different camps. Those determined to maintain the integrity of quota 
allocations argued that quotas should not become tradable commodities. Those 
advocating a free market, meanwhile, opposed the program on the grounds that the 
trade in quotas would protect poorly-performing cigarette enterprises such that the 
provinces where those substandard cigarette firms were located would object to any 
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further cuts to their existing quotas.
21
 While controversial, the program was 
nevertheless seen as the best possible option under the circumstances; it survived 
only for three years and was scrapped in 1997 as a failure. 
Studies identify the main reason for its failure hinged on its inability to meet 
the fiscal demands of local governments,
22
 since quotas were transferred, local 
fiscal revenue would decline in proportion to the cigarette production quota 
transferred. Although local cigarette enterprises could receive compensation, this 
loss of fiscal revenue to local governments could not be offset. As a result, local 
governments intervened to prevent cigarette companies from conducting quota 
trades and chose instead to adopt local protectionism measures in order to sell local 
products at the levels assigned by the quota allocations. After three years, the quota 
trading program had made little headway. In this light, its failure resulted directly 
from local protectionism. 
5.2.3 The Emergence of “Victims” 
While a number of relatively large cigarette manufacturers had come into 
being during the previous phase, production and market share alike barely increased 
under the quota trading program and the local protectionism of this phase. Given this 
circumstance, they controversially came to be labeled as “victims.” This designation 
had some merit for those heavily reliant on exports to other provinces, since local 
markets could not absorb their entire production outputs; Table 5.6 displays the 
eight provinces with the greatest local production output exceeding sales in 2001. 
Yunnan Province, the largest cigarette-producing province in China, made the 
situation clearer than in the other provinces. For example, when Yunnan’s cigarette 
production output stood at around 6.2 million cases in 2001, only 1.2 million cases 
were consumed within the province and the rest—nearly 5 million cases—had to be 
sold to other provinces.
23
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Local Sale Production-Sale 
Gap 
Yunnan 618.04 121.53 496.51 
Guizhou 180.79 86.25 94.54 
Shanghai 130.83 61.98 68.94 
Henan 291.56 236.23 55.38 
Hunan 244.22 191.28 52.94 
Anhui 171.36 145.61 25.75 
Shandong 233.17 209.85 23.32 
Hubei 188.93 168.18 20.75 
*Unit: 10 thousand cases 
Source: Adapted from Zhongguo yancao nianjian 2001 (p. 20–24; 372–377), by the STMB, 
2002, Beijing, China: China Science & Technology Press. 
In the above case, cigarette enterprises in Yunnan, including the largest—the 
Yuxi-Hongta Tobacco Corporation—faced a dire situation. Even the high-class 
brand of cigarettes Hongtashan manufactured by Yuxi-Hongta, which had been 
extremely popular in Chin throughout the 1980s, were unable to sustain their sales 
figures in late 1990s. Consequently, the quantity of Hongtashan sold in 2000 was 
down 40 percent from 1996, while the taxes and profits generated by Yuxi-Hongta 
fell by approximately 70 percent during the same period.
24
 This predicament 
resulted in the STMB launching a public campaign to “promote Hongtashan, protect 
the tobacco industry” in 1999.
25
 The STMB continued to issue regulations 
prohibiting local protectionism, but the trade barriers erected were not significantly 
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The emergence of local protectionism in this respect was evidently contrary to 
the notion “Federalism, Chinese style” proposed by Montinola Gabriella, Yingyi 
Qian, and Barry R. Weingast.
27
 They coined this concept by comparing China’s case 
with Occidental, market-preserving federalism and found that a range of actions in 
China under the market-oriented reforms were consistent with the features of such 
federalism, e.g., the effect of inter-jurisdictional competition under a 
decentralization of authority, which served both to constrain the predatory behavior 
of local governments and to provide them to a considerable extent with a range of 
positive motivations to foster China’s economic prosperity as a whole. Although the 
authors also highlighted the differences between China’s system and Occidental 
federalism—for example, that China lacked an adequate mechanism for policing the 
domestic common market—this analogy actually overstated the merits that resulted 
from the inter-jurisdictional competition under fiscal incentives since local 
institutional arrangements could also hinder economic development in China’s 
context, as Eric Thun observed in his study.
28
 
In summary, the collusion between local cigarette manufacturers and local 
governments led incrementally to a widespread prevalence of local protectionism. 
This became a dominant pattern of governance in the industry and saw “restricted 
competition” arise in the cigarette trading market. In this governance pattern, the 
autonomy on exchange, which cigarette manufacturers and tobacco corporations had 
begun to officially enjoy after the termination of the two-track system, was now 
largely “usurped” by local governments. As a result, the domestic market for the 
cigarette trade became fragmented by local governments pressuring local 
wholesalers to restrict cigarette procurement from other provinces. Under this 
restricted competition, the market concentration for the relatively large cigarette 
manufacturers that had emerged during the previous phase floundered. As Mahoney 
and Thelen note, the situation perfectly demonstrated the gradual change model of 
“conversion,” whereby actors exploit an inherent ambiguity in institutions to convert 
them toward a new function, purpose, or to have a different impact.
29
 In this context, 
the “state monopoly” had transformed into “local monopolies” in all but name. 
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5.3  The Consequences of Local Protectionism 
When the potentially large cigarette manufacturers that had previously 
surfaced were unable to grow, but instead shrank under local protectionism, they 
were compelled to find new strategies in order to escape their predicament, since 
exporting local cigarette products was already beyond the capacity of the local 
governments where these manufacturers were based. Under restricted competition, 
they began to pursue two policies: the exchange of investment for market shares and 
diversification of investment in non-tobacco business. These became the salient 
consequences for the pattern of governance in this phase. 
5.3.1  The Exchange of Investment for Market Shares 
After termination of the quota trade program, the STMB again endeavored to 
restructure through mergers the small and medium cigarette enterprises, i.e., those 
producing less than 300 thousand cases per year.
30
 The first case of this kind of 
trans-provincial merger involving the Changchun Cigarette Enterprise in Jilin 
Province and the Yuxi-Hongta Tobacco Corporation in Yunnan Province occurred in 
1999.  
The Changchun Cigarette Enterprise, the first cigarette company established in 
Northeast China in 1934, was approaching bankruptcy by 1997. With no liquid 
capital, its debts to assets ratio stood at 152 percent. Under the circumstances, the 
STMB proposed merging Changchun with the Yuxi-Hongta Tobacco (Group) 
Corporation. Led by the STMB, the Changchu City Government, the Yuxi City 
Government, the Jilin Province Government, the Yunnan Province Government, the 
two provincial-level tobacco monopoly bureaus, and the two corporations 
themselves negotiated the merger in 1998, with the deal sealed and the merger 
agreement signed the following year.  
Following the merger, Changchu was renamed the Hongta-Changchu Cigarette 
Enterprise, and Yuxi obtained 50 thousand cases of cigarettes in quotas from 
Changchun per year under the signed agreement. Aside from these additional quotas, 
the merger also meant another significant benefit for Yuxi-Hongta: it finally had the 
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opportunity to break the trade barriers of local protectionism and enlarge its market 
share in the northeast region of the country.
31
  
This “merger” however did not actually involve the complete integration of 
the two companies. There was no unified production scheme to determine which 
brands and quantities Hongta-Changchu or Yuxi would produce, and the Changchu 
City Government also did not lose its leverage over the newly restructured firm. 
Consequently, while Hongta-Changchu as a legal entity received financial and 
management support from Yuxi-Hongta after the merger, it continued to maintain its 
autonomy with regard to manufacturing its own brands using the rest of its quotas. 
In this sense, the merger, though pushed by the STMB, was more akin to an 
exchange of investment for the local market share, with an added benefit of 
additional quotas for Yuxi.
32
 
Given local protectionism and the resulting restricted competition, cigarette 
companies whose production output far exceeded local sales had few options except 
to assent to this kind of exchange of investment for market shares as a strategy. In 
fact, this situation was not unique only to be the tobacco industry. In China’s beer 
industry, similar problems of local protectionism occurred during the 1990s.
33
  
Along with abovementioned merger case, Yuxi-Hongta also invested further in 
cigarette enterprises in other provinces in order to overcome the difficulties under 
local protectionism. In 2002, they cooperated with the Hainan Tobacco Corporation 
to establish the Hainan-Hongta Cigarette Company as a “joint investment.”. 
Yuxi-Hongta later used this same strategy to set up the Hongta-Liaoning Cigarette 
Company together with the Liaoning Tobacco Corporation. Under these joint 
investments, these non-provincial cigarette companies began to produce 
Yuxi-Hongta brand cigarettes and distribute them through local networks. 
Along with investing in tobacco businesses, cigarette companies also 
negotiated with other local governments to obtain market access via non-tobacco 
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investments, such as by building hotels.
34
 These kinds of exchange practices were 
common, but the effect they had was relatively limited. As a result, a large number 
of small-scale cigarette manufacturers continued to survive. By the end of 2002, 
there were 127 cigarette companies under the CNTC, though only four companies 
produced more than one million cases of cigarettes per year; most were producing 
less than 300 thousand cases (see Figure 5.2). Even the largest national brand, 
Hongtashan, held a mere two percent market share, while market concentration 
figures for the largest cigarette companies actually continued to decrease between 
2000 and 2002 (see Table 5.7). 
 
Figure 5.2 - Distribution of Production Figures across all Cigarette Enterprises 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Zhongguo yancao chanye, by Lo Meijuan, Post Doc. Diss., Hongta 
Group, 2004 
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Total Number: 127 
Table 5.7 The Market Concentration of Cigarette Companies (%) 
        Year 
CR  
2000 2001 2002 
 CR1* 6.6 5.6 5.0 
CR4 17.8 16.8 16.1 
CR8 28.2 27.1 26.4 
*CR1, CR4, and CR8 here separately refer to the market share of the largest 
company, the largest four companies, and the largest eight companies across the 
entire market. 
Source: Adapted from “Woguo yancao hangye jizhongdu yanjiu”, by Huang Bo and Li 
Xinghua, 2004, Journal of Guangdong University of Technology (Social Science Edition) 4 
No. 4, p. 37. 
5.3.2  Investment Diversification in Non-Tobacco Business 
Given that it was difficult to increase market share in the face of local 
protectionism, cigarette manufacturers turned to non-tobacco investments. Here 
again, this strategy of diversifying investments through non-core business 
investments was not limited to the tobacco industry,
35
 but the unique characteristics 
of the tobacco industry—fixed cigarette quotas and high tax rates—further catalyzed 
the exacerbating trend for local protectionism and thus proved a driving force for a 
great many more diversified undertakings by cigarette manufacturers than in other 
sectors. 
The various investments of the Yuxi-Hongta Tobacco (Group) Corporation 
typify this diversification. Prior to the mid-1990s, Yuxi had already been engaged in 
diversified investments, but most of these were linked to the tobacco industry and 
included printing, packaging, and machinery associated with cigarette 
manufacturing. The purpose of investing in this category was to reduce transaction 
costs by internalizing the components required for end products. But investment 
started to dwindle as the total production capacity for cigarettes came to far exceed 
the actual demand after 1995.  
In view of these impediments to expanding its core industry, Yuxi-Hongta 
decided to expand its non-tobacco business by devoting 40 percent of its core 
business profits to creating “another peak.” By 1995, the enterprise had forty-one 
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diversified investment interests, although the total monetary sum was relatively 
small (2,670 million RMB). By contrast, between 1996 and 2000 the non-tobacco 
investments by Yuxi-Hongta reached 8,450 million RMB.
36
 
This rapid and large-scale diversification to non-tobacco investments did not 
prove as profitable as Yuxi-Hongta anticipated. The rate of return on total assets 
shrank consistently from 1997 to 2001, and the ratios on the non-tobacco business 
were actually much lower than the core industry (see Table 5.8). In 2001, twenty of 
the seventy enterprises the company had invested in were running at a loss; the 
diversified undertakings had actually worsened Yuxi-Hongta’s overall financial 




Table 5.8 Yuxi-Hongta Tobacco (Group) Corporation’s Rates of Returns on 
Total Assets for Diversified Undertakings and on Tobacco Business (1997-2001) 
Year Diversified Undertakings 
(%) 
Tobacco Business (%) 
1997 1.61 19.75 
1998 2.95 19.60 
1999 4.56 12.89 
2000 3.75 9.83 
2001 2.68 7.32 
Source: Adapted from Zhongguo yancao chanye, by Lo Meijuan, Post Doc. Diss., 
Hongta Group, 2004 
 
According to Lo’s study on the diversified investments of the Hongta Group, 
intervention by local governments exacerbated its overall financial position.
38
 As 
local fiscal revenue plummeted under the tax-sharing system, the diversified 
investments of Yuxi-Hongta gave the local governments the opportunity to take 
advantage of the situation. With fiscal revenue from the tobacco industry dwindling 
under local protectionism, local governments now jumped at the chance to hijack the 
non-tobacco investments of Yuxi-Hongta in its favor.  
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According to one interviewed source, who had been involved in 
Yuxi-Hongta’s diversified investments from 1996, sixty percent of the investment 
projects were dominated by the local authorities, though half of them could not 
actually meet Yuxi-Hongta’s demand. Though Yuxi-Hongta created the Hongta 
Industrial Corporation for the specific purpose of overseeing diversified investments, 
its business interests were widely scattered, and there was little or no united and 
deliberate plan or targeted evaluation. The company’s investments covered more 
than seventy projects in thirteen different industries by the late 1990s, and there was 
no clear connection between them, with the result that some investment projects in 
the same sector—such as hydropower and building materials—actually competed 
with each other and thereby cut potential profits.  
Consequently, when Yuxi-Hongta faced those trade barriers set by other local 
governments in order to block their cigarette products, its investments in 
non-tobacco business, which were intervened in by its own local host governments, 
could not become more profitable either.
39
 This situation seems to demonstrate that 
the host local governments had become “predatory,” in line with Pei’s assertion: that 
the autonomy of a local government could be expected to prey upon society when 
effective structural constraints were lacking.
40
 However, in the 1980s the selfsame 
local governments had acted as a “helping hand” when it came to supporting the 
local cigarette manufacturer: by setting up the three-in-one system.  A decade later, 
however, it became a “grabbing hand” as the local governments sought to get more 
from the non-tobacco business interests.  
The fluid role of local governments here demonstrates how they might be 
either developmental or predatory. That is to say, developmentalism or predation are 
not the nature of local governments; the mode of their operation is determined by 
other institutional incentive mechanisms rather than something intrinsic to local 
governmental structures. Driven by the pressure of raising fiscal income, local 
governments had a great deal of flexibility in terms of adjusting or covering up their 
actions according to the institutional context and/or dynamics in which such actions 
occurred.   
5.4  Production Conditions for Regulatory Change to the State  
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Tobacco Monopoly 
The abovementioned consequences not only exposed the problems the tobacco 
sector faced under the governance pattern of local protectionism, but also 
demonstrated the failure of the “grasping the large” policy proposed by the central 
state in the mid-1990s, which was aimed at establishing gigantic, indigenous groups 
to compete with large transnational corporations from other developed countries. 
Aside from the inter-province mergers that lacked substantial integration, 
intra-province mergers also were not truly formed in the tobacco sector during this 
phase. After China’s accession to the WTO in 2001, however, the threat of 
globalization transformed the policy failure into a perception of vulnerability that 
required a new institutional response.  
Out of this, the CNTC was further urged to take seriously the issue of creating 
a “big and strong” national team of cigarette enterprises. Below, I further 
characterize the failure of the “grasping big” policy in terms of intra-province 
mergers and then elaborate why China’s accession to the WTO would act as a trigger 
for the CNTC to restructure the tobacco sector. This involved an initial step—the 
separation of manufacturing and commerce—carried out in order to curb the rise of 
local protectionism, which then led to centralization reform of CNTC governance at 
the end of this phase. 
5.4.1  Intra-Province Mergers without Substance 
Led by the policy of “grasping the large,” the central authorities viewed the 
establishment of a “group” (jituan 集团) as the principal method for forging large 
SOEs in the 1990s; the tobacco industry would be no exception. In fact, the STMB 
had already started promoting the creation of conglomerates in the tobacco industry 
after the publication of the Opinions on Establishing Trial Tobacco Groups in 
1993.
41
 Several tobacco groups were established in the following years; Shandong 
and Henan provinces, for instance, entered the first round and established two 
groups. But the main intent behind creating tobacco groups in the provinces was to 
rescue a number of local cigarette enterprises from the brink of bankruptcy. To tie a 
strong, core enterprise with several weaker companies in one group became the most 
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(1993) 42” (Opinions on establishing trial tobacco groups), 
http://code.fabao365.com/law_229708.html (accessed July 30, 2013).  
common arrangement.
42
 Led by provincial governments, this sort of “welded” form, 
based on the administrative tools for establishing a group, lacked true integration, 
meaning that the different parts of a tobacco group were usually only loosely 
connected. This same dynamic appeared commonly in other industries as well after 
the advent of the policy of “grasping the large” during the 1990s. In a study on 
China’s steer industry from the late 1980s to early 2000s, Sun found that the Chinese 
government’s consolidation policy was, by and large, not successful.
43
 
Created in 1995, the Hongta Group is a good example of the welded structural 
characteristics for these types of intra-province mergers. Besides the Yuxi-Hongta 
Tobacco (Group) Corporation making up the core body, the Hongta Group also 
included four other cigarette companies in Yunnan Province (see Figure 5.3). 
However, each of them still had independent legal status, and they shared no unified 
production scheme. Thus, even after becoming a part of the group, these cigarette 
companies continued to be independently responsible for their production plans and 
management. This loosely integrated feature was not recognized in Wang’s tobacco 
study, but it actually constitutes the main backdrop to illustrate the distinction 
between intra-provincial mergers in this phase and the next phase when the 
centralization of SOE reform was initiated.
44
 
It should also be noted, however, that some differences did indeed exist under 
the umbrella of a “group” in this phase. For example, as the strong core body, Yuxi 
would offer loans and transfer senior management cadres to the other cigarette 
enterprises in order to improve their position. In view of the support provided by the 
core body, the local governments, which did not lose control over the cigarette 
enterprises in their jurisdictions, would welcome the fact that local cigarette 
companies were “incorporated” into the group.
45
 Without true integration, this kind 
of loosely-coupled organizational relation echoes the inter-province mergers 
described earlier. Consequently, the policy of “grasping the large” in the tobacco 
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industry was not truly realized during this period so that mergers without substantial 
integration became common under decentralized governance of the CNTC.  
Figure 5.3  Structure of the Hongta Group in 1995 
5.4.2  The “Open but Heavily Guarded” Door under the WTO 
In recent decades, China’s cigarette market has been seen as an ultimate prize 
by all of the transnational tobacco companies (TTCs).
46
 According to a survey 
conducted in 2011, China had the world’s largest proportion of smokers in the 
world—more than 300 million; nearly 3.5 times the size of the U.S. cigarette market 
and over 12 times the size of the German market, the largest market in Western 
Europe.
47
 Most transnational tobacco companies saw China’s accession to the WTO 
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as a great opportunity for expanding their business territory, especially with tobacco 
consumption in North America and Western Europe steadily declining as a result of 
the growing anti-tobacco campaign that started in the 1970s. 
Since the 1970s, transnational tobacco companies from the United States and 
Western Europe began expanding into untapped markets abroad, first in Asian 
countries in the 1980s, by forcing lower tariffs, and then in the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) in the 1990s, by taking over the former state-owned tobacco corporations.
48
 
While the TTCs were able to continually enlarge their territories in these areas, it 
was much more difficult to gain accesses to China’s market. For one, China had 
re-created its tobacco state monopoly in the 1980s rather than privatizing its SOEs, 
as had happened in the former Soviet Union. For another, China’s tobacco industry 
was protected by high tariffs. Given the oversupply on the domestic market during 
the 1980s, the import quota of foreign cigarettes was strictly controlled and 




The transnational tobacco companies were also prohibited from establishing 
their own cigarette enterprises in China, although joint ventures were permitted 
during the early stages of economic reform if the Chinese government considered 
these as a way to obtain technical assistance from TTCs.
50
 Nonetheless, only three 
joint ventures were permitted before China joined the WTO.
51
 As a result, 
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according to official statistics, the market share of foreign brands never exceeded 
one percent throughout the 1990s.
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In this context, large-scale smuggling of foreign cigarettes into China in order 
to circumvent barriers to market access turned out to be a “workable” channel for 
the transnational tobacco companies. According to internal documents from British 
American Tobacco (BAT), the illegal import of cigarettes to China grew rapidly 
from the early 1980s and dramatically exceeded legal imports. The CNTC estimated 
that 99 percent of foreign cigarettes sold in China in 1996 were contraband. In 1998, 
Premier Zhu Rongji and President Jiang Zemin launched a long-running, 
anti-smuggling campaign, which included investigating the suspected involvement 
of the People’s Liberation Army in the illegal trade of cigarettes. In Hong Kong, 
investigations conducted by the Independent Commission against Corruption led to 
the murder of a key witness, and a Hong Kong BAT executive was convicted of 
taking bribes related to cigarette smuggling.
53
  
With the situation becoming more and more volatile, TTCs took China’s 
accession to the WTO as an unprecedented opportunity, and embarked on lobbying 
activities in the US and EU during the negotiation process for China’s WTO 
membership. The BAT lobbying team, for example, advanced four priorities in their 
dealings with the US and EU, including a reduction of tariffs, the abolition of retail 
licenses to sell foreign cigarette brands, the abolition of a distribution monopoly, and 
the abolition of restrictions on advertising and marketing.
54
 Despite the fact that 
TTCs took advantage of this negotiating stage to aggressively promote their interests, 
the Chinese government nonetheless kept a tight rein on the domestic market after 
joining the WTO in 2001. 
Roselyn Hsueh used a cross-industry study to argue that the Chinese 
government employed a bifurcated strategy while conducting regulatory reform 
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under globalization. By this strategy, it relinquished control of what were perceived 
as non-strategic industries while enhancing its control over strategic ones, 
determined according to their significance for national security, technological 
innovation, and the domestic economy. Hence, the strategic value of a sector came 
to determine the Chinese government’s attitude toward it during the WTO 
negotiations. The greater the degree of strategic value, the more likely the state 
would exercise deliberate control; the lower the degree of strategic value, the more 
likely the state would exercise only incidental control.
55
  
This analysis readily accounts for China’s stance on the tobacco industry in the 
WTO agreement. While China was strongly committed to securing WTO 
membership, its tobacco industry still provided over seven percent of the national 
fiscal revenue. The tobacco industry constituted one of the largest fiscal contributors 
of all the industries in China, even though its growth was frustrated by the prevalent 
local protectionism. Given the fiscal significance of the industry, the Chinese 
government elected to retain its state monopoly and guard the domestic market 
while also agreeing to liberalize some aspects of it as a concession. Consequently, 
under the WTO terms for tobacco, China had to: reduce the import tariff on tobacco 
leaves from 28 percent in 2001 to 10 percent by 2004; reduce the cigarette tariffs 
from 49 percent in 2001 to 25 percent by 2004; scrap the export rebate for 
flue-cured tobacco leaves and cigarettes; scrap the bonus awarded for exporting 
cigarettes; scrap the “Special Tobacco Retail Sale Permit” by 2003; and scrap the 
import quota imposed on foreign cigarettes by 2005.
56
  
In general, China’s accession to the WTO did remove some obstacles to the 
TTC’s penetration of the Chinese market, but the CNTC’s grip on distribution and 
imports remained. For one, while the Retail Sale Permit for foreign cigarettes was 
abolished, foreign cigarette corporations were still not permitted to establish 
distribution systems in China. For another, despite the non-existence of an import 
quota, the de facto quota remained controlled by the CNTC, since it monopolized 
the entire cigarette importation business. Similarly, while joint ventures constituted a 
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special exemption, official sanction had to be given in advance, and these joint 
ventures were in any case not encouraged by the Chinese authorities since domestic 
technology for cigarette production had already made great progress.
57
 In fact, no 
new joint ventures were created once China became a WTO member. 
This “open but still heavily guarded door” policy ensured that TTCs were 
unable to dramatically extend their market share into China, but the WTO accession 
did pressure the CNTC—in anticipation of further, future liberalization—to initiate a 
restructuring reform of China’s tobacco industry.
58
 Thus, even though China did not 
entirely open its domestic market to the TTCs after the country’s WTO accession, 
the potential threats of liberalization had already been identified toward specific 
reform agendas. 
5.4.3  The Separation of Manufacturing and Commerce 
Given that most TTCs had already taken advantage of a variety of bilateral, 
regional, and international trade agreements to further conduct mergers and 
acquisitions around the world, China’s accession to the WTO made the CNTC more 
eager to increase the economies of scale for the domestic cigarette enterprises in 
order to raise their competiveness. The obvious sales gap between TTCs and Yuxi, 
the largest cigarette manufacturer in China, acutely illustrated this.
59
 In 2002, the 
sales volume of Yuxi was only 10 percent of Phillip Morris, the largest tobacco 
group in the world at that time,
60
 while occupying only approximately five percent 
of China’s national market (see Table 5.9). In this context, the CNTC believed it was 
necessary to tackle the prevailing local protectionism so that large, indigenous 
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tobacco SOEs could be established. From this perspective, “the separation of 
manufacturing and commerce” emerged in 2003 as an initial effort towards this goal. 






Yuxi  Total Cigarette 
Enterprises of the 
CNTC 
Revenue 804.1 389.7 371.4 18.4 203.7 
Returns 111.0 20.4 30.0 3.5 19.3 
Sales Volume (10 
thousand cases) 
1829.4 1554.6 907 190.2 3399.6 
*Unit: US $ 100 M 
Source: Adapted from “China’s Tobacco Industry and the World Trade Organization” (p. 
221), by Elisa Tong et al., 2008, in Tobacco Control Policy Analysis in China, ed. Teh-wei 
Hu, Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific. 
The underlying logic in separating the two wings of manufacturing and 
commerce was to sever the bonds between local tobacco corporations and local 
cigarette manufacturers so that the former could purchase more nonlocal cigarette 
products and thus benefit its own survival. The combination of manufacturing and 
commerce arose initially out of a concern for raw materials but became a means to 
implement local protectionism during this phase, since local tobacco corporations 
and cigarette manufacturers shared a common interest. The intention behind the 
separation, then, was to remove local protectionism by breaking up the existing 
three-in-one system.  
Once this occurred in 2003, cigarette manufacturers were placed under the 
purview of the newly-created provincial “tobacco industrial corporations.” As new 
entities, the provincial tobacco industrial corporations were responsible for 
managing the cigarette manufacturers within their jurisdictions, but remained agents 
of the CNTC (see Figure 5.4). By the end of 2004, eighteen provincial-level tobacco 
industrial corporations had already been established.
61
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Under these new institutional arrangements, local tobacco corporations were 
required to meet the targets set by their new superior, rather than ones in the interest 
of local cigarette enterprises. But separation was unable to truly root out local 
protectionism since local governments retained their local leverage. These limited 
results spurred the CNTC to then introduce an even more fundamental change in 
2005—the centralization reform of the CNTC regime—in order to annul the 
leverage held by local governments in the tobacco sector.
62
 
Figure 5.4 - The New Structure of the CNTC after the Separation 
 
 
Source: Supplied by the author 
5.5   Conclusion 
Once the “market” replaced the two-track system in the tobacco sector at the 
beginning of this phase, interactions between local governments and cigarette 
manufacturers incrementally fragmented the domestic market through the 
manipulations by local cigarette wholesalers. This method of interaction was driven 
mainly by the new political context of this phase. That is, when the recentralization 
of fiscal revenue under the tax-sharing system caused local governments to further 
intensify their intervention into the tobacco industry, they would collude with local 
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cigarette manufacturers through their leverage in the local tobacco corporations to 
maximize the procurement of local products by introducing trade barriers so that 
high taxes and profits could be obtained. This wave of local protectionism became 
prevalent in the cigarette trade, and the resultant restricted competition turned the 
tobacco state monopoly into more of a local monopoly. 
As such, the relatively large cigarette enterprises that had emerged in the 
previous phase barely expanded their market share or production scale and were 
consequently compelled to invest not only in other cigarette manufacturers in other 
provinces in exchange for further market accesses and production quotas but also in 
non-tobacco interests for the purpose of improving their financial positions. Limited 
success in this at times instead further worsened the overall finances of these 
enterprises. Faced with these developmental difficulties and threats posed by China’s 
accession to the WTO, the CNTC decided to actively curb local protectionism by 
separating cigarette manufacturing and commerce as an initial measure in 2003. 
Although the result was not sufficiently significant, it did trigger a more radical 
regulatory opportunity. In consequence, the tobacco sector now underwent a formal 
transformation from a decentralized to a “centralized” stage in 2005. Figure 5.5 










Figure 5.5  Summary of the Institutional Change Process in the Second Phase 
Source: Summarized by the author 
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Phase 3 - The Rise of the Central-Led 
Competitive Monopoly 
Generally speaking, the state-market interaction in the previous phase was 
much more complicated than as described in Wang’s tobacco study. Although she 
pointed out that some local governments belonging to the “importing” camp could 
function, albeit in a protective manner, as a helping hand for local cigarette 
manufacturers by pressuring local cigarette wholesalers, she overlooked that other 
“exporting” local governments that would not gain more benefits from the tobacco 
business could turn to meddling in cigarette companies’ diversified undertakings. In 
reality, these were two sides of the same coin under the local protectionism, and 
neither was conducive to forging large cigarette SOEs. In the face of China’s 
accession to the WTO, then, the central authorities were eager to build national 
teams in strategic industries. They therefore set out to transform the CNTC’s 
governing framework from a decentralized to a centralized one by introducing the 
corporatization reform in 2005, which further removed the trade barriers under local 
protectionism.  
In this chapter, I first elaborate the specifics of this centralized governance in 
the CNTC, which constituted the new foundation for the rules of the game—i.e., the 
separation of manufacturing and commerce, and the control of overall 
quantity—during this phase (2005-2012)(see Figure 6.1.). Further, I analyze the 
industrial policy adopted by the STMB under this new, centralized regulatory 
framework intended to forge the large cigarette SOEs. Last, I describe how 
interactions between local governments and the CNTC’s local agents under these 
new institutional arrangements illuminate how “central-led competitive monopoly” 
and the resulting “quasi-oligopoly competition” would emerge, as now seen in 
China.  
 
6.1   The Centralized Regulatory Framework of the CNTC 
This phase is contextualized by the combination of the previous 
recentralization of fiscal revenue reforms and the SOE governance recentralization 
reforms after 2005 (as discussed in Chapter Three). As the former, embodied in the 
tax-sharing system, continued into this phase, the latter embodied a centralized 
governance framework within the CNTC under the term “corporatization.” As Oi 
points out, rather than putting firms at the center of analysis in corporate 
restructuring, the state often played an explicit and determining role in the 
restructuring of SOEs in China.
1
 The introduction of the corporatization reform of 
the CNTC verifies this argument. 
Figure 6.1 - Primary Rules of the Tobacco State Monopoly in the Third Phase 
 
 
Source: Supplied by the author 
6.1.1  The Process of Corporatization 
According to the original institutional design, the leverage of local 
governments in the tobacco state monopoly system should have been relatively 
limited, but the actual situation was often different, as previous chapters have 
demonstrated. From the outset, this deviation was derived from the establishment 
process, through which the CNTC had little choice but to rely on local governments 
to complete the infrastructure of the entire system. Under such circumstances, even 
though the “administrative subordination” aspect took hold in the 1980s, the CNTC 
was unable to control its local agents in an efficient manner. Under the low level of 
accountability, the CNTC’s local agents began to collude with local governments. 
Their interactions led in the first phase to the expansion of the market and a resulting 
quasi-free competition, and then moved on in the second phase to segment the 
domestic market and constrain the competition in the cigarette trade. 
The corporatization reform initiated in this phase aimed at strengthening the 
CNTC’s steering capacity by clarifying asset relationships between different levels 
of the CNTC so that the leverage of local governments under the centralized 
regulatory framework could be wiped out. This asset relationship had not existed 
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prior to the reform; a situation exposed clearly by Zhang Yuxia (张玉霞), the 
director of the STMB’s finance division, at an interview in 2006:  
The concept of ‘property right’ did not take shape at that time 
(when the CNTC was established), and only administrative 
management could be perceived in our minds. Compared with 
other industries, the administrative management was regarded as 
more comprehensive in this industry since it was under the 
framework of the state monopoly. So outsiders would see us as a 
unified entity, and no one could break in. However, this viewpoint 
could not apply to our financial situations as presented in the 
ledger. In other words, there was no asset connection between the 
CNTC and its subordinates.
2
 
As market-oriented reform proceeded, the idea of property right was gradually 
constructed in China, beginning in the 1980s. Under these circumstances, the Rules 
of Procedure Concerning the State Asset Transfer without Compensation was issued 
by the Ministry of Finance in 1999.
3
 Here “the transfer without compensation” was 
based on the premise that all of the assets were of the same state and that the 
purpose of the transfer was to reset the powers of asset usage according to certain 
clearly-defined asset relationships. 
The principle of asset transfer without compensation was applied to the 
restructuring of the CNTC as soon as the document the Opinions Further Clarifying 
Asset Management in the Tobacco Industry and Elaborating the Tobacco 
Corporation Reform was issued by the State Council in 2005.
4
 This crucial 
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310 ” (Opinions about the management of state assets in the tobacco industry from the 
Ministry of Finance), http://www.cntiegc.com/src/2011-10/10005556.html (accessed March 
document (known as Document No. 57 in the tobacco sector) signaled the onset of 
the CNTC’s corporatization during the post-WTO era. According to this document, 
all local tobacco corporation and cigarette enterprise assets were to be turned over to 
the Ministry of Finance without compensation by the end of 2005, as they were all 
central assets that had been validated by administrative subordination during the 
1980s.  
This means that, although the corporatization of the CNTC was triggered by 
China’s accession to the WTO, it did not occur in a vacuum. After the transfer, the 
Ministry of Finance allocated all of these assets to the CNTC. As the sole 
stockholder, the CNTC handed over its net assets to all of the provincial tobacco 
corporations and tobacco industrial corporations as long-term investments. These 
provincial-level corporations subsequently invested in their city corporations and 
local cigarette enterprises. Through this rearrangement of all of the assets, a new 
type of parent-subsidiary corporate structure was thus institutionalized throughout 
the entire tobacco sector. Following on the context of dividing manufacturing and 
commerce, three levels of parent-subsidiary relationship—the CNTC, the provincial 
industrial tobacco corporations/provincial tobacco corporations, and the cigarette 
enterprises/city tobacco corporations—were set up in the manufacturing and 
commercial divisions separately. Thus, while the CNTC’s local agents had already 
adopted a “corporate form” as legal entities previously, they were formally turned 
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6.1.2  The New Division of Labor within the CNTC 
It was not just asset relationships that underwent great changes with 
corporatization reform: the division of labor within the CNTC itself also 
experienced reorganization. Prior to this, each level of the tobacco corporations, 
from the central authority down to the county level, was able to take part in the 
wholesale business where tobacco products were concerned, while the division of 
labor among them remained not clearly regulated. One informant who used to work 
at the Guizhou Province Tobacco Corporation explained the situation of the cigarette 
trade before the corporatization reform took effect: 
Tobacco corporations of all levels were able to conduct cigarette 
wholesale business in the past. For example, the provincial 
corporations would sell the cigarettes they purchased to the city 
and county corporations. But the county corporations could also 
buy cigarettes from cigarette manufacturers directly… It was no 
problem for the county corporations to procure cigarettes from the 
local manufacturers as well… So the province and city 
corporations would even charge their subordinates [county 




The situation described above was altered by the new division of labor 
following corporatization. First, the independent legal personality of the county 
corporations was annulled under the new corporate structure: the county 
corporations were thus restructured as branches of city tobacco corporations. In 
particular, they became responsible for executing the tasks assigned by their 
superiors, e.g., city corporations. Second, city corporations became the only entities 
qualified to operate the wholesale business for tobacco products under the 
supervision of provincial corporations. Third, in addition to supervising the 
wholesale business of the city corporations, the provincial corporations had to 
formulate the general guidelines for cigarette procurement. Finally, the CNTC 
assumed an investor’s responsibilities in maintaining and raising the value for all 
assets. In other words, under this new division of labor, all wholesale activities were 
concentrated with the municipal-level agents of the CNTC, and the province- and 
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county-level agents quit from the wholesale business altogether. As a result, the 
number of cigarette wholesalers was dramatically reduced, and those who remained 
became more able to monopolize local markets under this highly organized 
governance framework. 
6.1.3  Uprooting the Leverage of Local Governments 
Similar to the role which the SASAC played in other industries, the CNTC on 
behalf of the state assumed the task of preserving and increasing the asset value of 
the entire sector after the corporatization reform. However, different other central 
SOEs under the SASAC’s management, the CNTC has held the form of a 
government-business synthesis, i.e. the CNTC-STMB combined entity, so that it has 
remained its own regulatory regime under the leadership of the Minister of Industry 
and Information Technology
7
 rather than being incorporated into the authority of 
the SASAC. Thus, the CNTC began to centralize its corporate governance on the 
basis of asset relationships, while personnel appointments for its subsidiaries were 
placed in its hands rather than being handled by local governments as had previously 
been the case. Those deciding on personnel assignments only needed to inform local 
governments of their decisions—according to the new structure, so no permission or 
approval whatsoever was required for their actions.
8
 The initiation of 
corporatization reform, then, terminated local governments’ right to appoint 
personnel, which removed a powerful leverage point they had used to manipulate 
local wholesalers. 
In addition, the cigarette manufacturers’ autonomy was further regulated under 
the parent-subsidiary corporate framework of the CNTC, with the result that local 
governments became more constrained to a certain degree in the ability to intervene 
into tobacco industry operations. In accordance with the Trial Rules for Managing 
the CNTC’s Assets issued in 2006, each subsidiary’s autonomy to dispose of 
corporate assets became relatively limited.
9
 For example, the Hongta Group was 
                                                     
7 The CNTC/STMB has been under the leadership of the Minister of Industry and 
Information Technology since 2008; before that, it was supervised by the State Economic 
and Trade Commission (SETC) from 2003.  
8 Interviewee No. 4; Interviewee No. 27. 
9 For more information, please see the document issued by the STMB, “Guojia yancao 
zhuanmaiju guanyu yinfa ‘zhongguo yancao zonggongsi guoyou zichan guanli 
guiding(shihing)’ de tongzhi” (The trial rules for managing the CNTC’s assets), 
http://yingtan.gov.cn/bmgkxx/syczmj/fgwj/fg/200804/t20080429_2352.htm (accessed May 
now obligated to get permission from the CNTC if it wanted to invest more than five 
million RMB in businesses not related to the tobacco industry.
10
 The CNTC 
therefore made it more difficult for local governments to ask the Hongta Group for 
help in investing large amounts of capital locally in other non-tobacco concerns; 
something they had easily done before. 
In addition, “target management” along the vertical line of authority was set in 
motion within the CNTC. Under this, a range of indices were formulated by the 
parent corporation, i.e., the CNTC, to evaluate the performance of its subsidiaries, 
and the results of this evaluation would determine rewards and penalties, if any, that 
the leading cadres of the subsidiaries would receive. This set of targets helped the 
CNTC to direct the operations of its subsidiaries level by level (see the example in 
Table 6.1).  
This target management turned out to be an effective control method under the 
new corporate framework. It, along with the new division of labor, were vividly 
described by an interviewee who worked at a county tobacco corporation in Guizhou 
Province: 
Our county corporation was very rich before the legal personality 
was annulled. Unlike many county corporations elsewhere, we did 
not need to get loans for purchasing cigarettes. Since the 
annulment, we are currently just the executive department [of the 
city tobacco corporations]... All financial expenditure is regulated 
by the city corporation, and we cannot even decide which brands 
of cigarettes to sell either. What we can do is just sell the cigarettes 
which the city corporation ordered, and we are responsible for 
executing the annual sales plan made by the city corporation. Then 
the city corporation evaluates our work performance according to a 
number of targets including the sales volume. If we cannot sell all 
of the cigarettes they ordered, our salaries will be deducted 
accordingly… do you think this is fair?
11
 
In this new division of labor, if one focuses only on the operation of county 
tobacco corporations, it indeed looks like the return of a planned-economy model. 
                                                                                                                            
20, 2011).  
10 Interviewee No. 11. 
11 Interviewee No. 38.      
However, this division occurs within the context of corporatization reform, whereby 
county tobacco corporations act as a branch of the city tobacco corporations, which 
are the main actors conducting procurements in the market. Through this division of 
labor and the accompanying target management, the CNTC became more capable of 
constraining the protectionist behaviors of its local agents under the new 
parent-subsidiary corporate framework. 
In Wedeman’s study, he argued that the practices of local protectionism would 
gradually disappear with the deepening of the market economy in China, since local 
governments would realize that no one could truly benefit by the mutual trade 
barriers.
12
 However, in analyzing the development of the tobacco industry, it is clear 
that market forces did not automatically make local protectionism go away. On the 
contrary, local protectionism was constrained by the corporatization reform, which 
was introduced by the central authorities to strengthen the controlling capacity of the 
CNTC after China’s WTO accession. Corporatization in this context was more akin 
to a shortcut to centralization of the industrial governance than a halfway house on 
the road to privatization.  
In addition to securing the power of personnel appointment and asset 
management, the CNTC now had greater ability to limit local governmental 
interference and to implement vertical management on all fronts of the tobacco 
sector. Table 6.1 below shows how the evaluated targets under the new target 
management included not only the procurement ratio of cigarettes outside of the 
local province but also the profit ratio, measures that both further hampered the 
protectionist measures exercised by local governments. In this context, the 
fragmented domestic market began to move toward unification as the monopoly 
management decoupled from local practices.  
Table 6.1  The Evaluated Target List of the Guizhou Province Tobacco 
Corporation 









Cigarette Sales amount 
The procurement ratio of the top 
                                                     
12 Wedeman, From Mao to Market, 215. 
(50%) 30 brands 
The procurement ratio of 
cigarettes outside the local 
province 
Management Capacity of 
State Assets 
(35%) 
The fiscal contribution  
The capital maintenance and appreciation ratio 
The profit ratio 
The ratio of turnover on current assets 
Innovation Capacity (15%) 
Comprehensive Management (15%) 
Source: Provided by Interviewee 
6.2  Making Big Brands as an Industrial Policy 
In addition to establishing a parent-subsidiary corporate framework for the 
CNTC, the STMB in this phase began to formulate an industrial policy for forging 
giant cigarette SOEs. Although the barriers to trade were significantly reduced and 
the trade market was unified following corporatization, by no means were the 
central authorities suddenly to abandon the existing practice of quota assignments. 
In fact, maintenance of the quota allocation in cigarette production proved to be a 
way of attending to the local governments’ vested fiscal interests as the 
corporatization reform came into being since the quota figures were directly related 
to local fiscal incomes. Under this premise, “the making of big brands” turned out to 
be the main industrial policy employed by the STMB to stimulate competition 
among the existing cigarette manufacturers and thus cause large cigarette 
conglomerations to come into existence. Therefore, rather than breaking the existing 
quota allocation directly, several measures were used by the STMB to shape the big 
brands. These will be discussed in the following section. 
6.2.1  The Catalog of the Top 100 Brands 
In 2004—before the corporatization reform came into effect—the STMB had 
already undertaken administrative measures to create a range of potential big brands 
by issuing a “Catalog of the Top 100 Brands.” Given that the international tobacco 
industry’s strategies were intimately linked with the idea of global big brands and 
that there existed more than five hundred cigarette brands in China in 2003,
13
 a goal 
of the Top 100 catalog was to limit the number of brands on the market to just one 
hundred, with any of the others not listed being forced to stop production within 
three years in 2007.
14
 This type of catalog management had been used as well for 
setting entry barriers to China’s auto industry in 1989, such that only those 
enterprises listed in the catalog were allowed to produce cars.
 15
 Unlike the 
appearance of this earlier catalog, however, the new tobacco industry catalog arose 
as a result of the STMB’s belief that it would provide an efficient way to produce the 
aggregate brands. Although at core an administrative measure, the STMB took each 
brand’s growth potential into consideration when picking the winners for the catalog. 
In other words, the Top 100 catalog aimed to identify those brands that were 
perceived to have a competitive advantage and thus a greater potential in market. 
The STMB ultimately included 121 brands in the catalog.
16
 
Motivated by the Top 100, cigarette manufacturers began to concentrate their 
resources to make only the cigarette brands that appeared in this catalog. As a result, 
more quotas were released and then used in manufacturing the brands in the catalog. 
However, none of this guaranteed that the Top 100 brands would survive in the 
market. Rather, the catalog broke new ground for another round of competition 
among cigarette manufacturers.
17
   
                                                     
13 Derek Yach and Douglas Bettcher, “Globalization of Tobacco Marketing, Research, and 
Industry Influence,” accessed March 15, 2011, 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/hjh23a99/pdf;jsessionid=82BFC555B552037F46645D5B8
9AABCBC.tobacco03. 
14 The catalog here only included high- and middle-class cigarettes. Low-class cigarette 
brands were not regulated by it.   
15 Yilin Chen, “Xunzu moshi de bianhua yu zhongguo zizhu pinpai qiche qiye de xingqi”(The 
transformation of the rent-seeking mode and the rising of independent brands in the 
Chinese auto industry), in Xuenzu yu zhongguo changye fazhan, 142-3. 
16 See the document issued by the STMB, “Juanyan chanpin baipaihao mulu, no. 
guo-yan-yun (2004) 542” (The catalog of Top 100 cigarette brands), 
http://law.lawtime.cn/d371899376993.html (accessed April 20, 2012).  
17 Tobacco China, “Shishi baipaihao zhanlue, tishen zhongguo yancao zhengti jingzhen shili” 
(Implementing the strategy of top 100 brands, improving the competition of China’s 
tobacco industry), accessed April 10, 2009, 
http://www.tobacco.gov.cn/html/14/1401/57204_n.html. 
6.2.2  The Catalog of 20 plus 10 
On the basis of the Top 100 catalog, the STMB decided to conduct another 
round of selection to determine the next group of “winners” following 
corporatization reform. In 2008, the STMB chose the “top core brands” according to 
a range of indices (see Table 6.2) and listed them in another catalog: “20 plus 10” 
(also known as “the Top 30”).
18
 From Table 6.2, it can be seen that most indices had 
to do with the brands’ market performance, e.g., market share and growth rate. 
Table 6.2 Indices for Selecting Top Core Brands 
                                                     
18 They initially chose 20 brands and added 10 later, thus the name “Catalog of 20 plus 10.”  







Sales volume in non-local 
provinces 
Percentage of sales volume 
in non-local provinces vs. 
total sales volume 
Sales revenue in non-local 
provinces 
Number of non-local 
provinces where brand is 
sold 
Shelf Sales Ratio 
Stock-to-sales ratio of 
brands at end of month 













Growth rate  
Growth rate in non-local 
provinces 
Brand Performance 
Average profit for per case 




Random testing of product 
quality 
In contrast to the Top 100 catalog, this new catalog aimed at fostering the top 
core brands by pouring more policy resources into their cultivation, with the 
provision of resources being closely associated with the corporatization reform. For 
example, the CNTC introduced “the procurement ratio of the top 30 brands (to the 
total procured volume)” as one of the major targets to be evaluated for its 
subsidiaries (see Table 6.1). Moreover, the procurement ratio also had to rise on an 
annual basis. If no improvement was shown over the course of three successive 




Accordingly, the implementation of this target became an imperative for all of 
the CNTC’s subsidiaries. In other words, the corporatization reform strengthened the 
CNTC’s steering capacity through targeted management, which had become a vital 
tool for fostering the top core brands through directing the purchase behavior of all 
the tobacco corporations after the separation of manufacturing and commerce in the 
tobacco sector. In this context, both the architecture of the government-business 
synthesis and the newly-built structure of parent-subsidiary corporate were able to 
ensure the effect of catalog management in the tobacco sector, and the market shares 
of top 30 brands would be further expanded accordingly.
20
 
In addition, the STMB simultaneously attempted to foster the top core brands 
by increasing production quotas. Given that the production of each cigarette 
manufacturer was limited by the quotas specified, the supply of Top 30 brand 
                                                     
19 Interviewee No. 10. 
20 Li Zehua, “Jinzhua peiyu pinpai diyi yaowu, zengqiang hangye hexin jingzheng shili” 
(Making the creation of big brands the first priority, strengthening the competitive capacity 
of this industry), China Tobacco, December 15, 2009, accessed June 10, 2014, 
http://www.echinatobacco.com/101588/101727/102002/48607.html. 
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Sales volume of enterprise 
Gross of industrial output 
value 
Level of Economic 
Benefits 
Realized tax and profit  
Source: Provided by Interviewee 
cigarettes might not fully satisfy the demand of wholesalers across the country. In 
this case, the STMB also promulgated a measure called “brand-oriented integration” 
in 2008.
 21
 According to this measure, only the cigarette companies owning the top 
core brands were authorized to negotiate with the other cigarette manufacturers to 
acquire their production quotas for these brands. For those companies that did not 
produce the top core brands, they became willing to produce those of other cigarette 
manufacturers, since this was a feasible way to retain their existing quota 
assignments.  
Although the STMB was not able to make sudden, dramatic changes in quota 
allocations, it could incrementally adjust the quotas according to the market dynamic. 
Hence, if cigarette manufacturers were unable to receive sufficient orders via the 
centralized order-placing meetings, they stood to lose some of their quotas in the 
coming year.
22
 In this respect, the “brand-oriented integration” measure was not 
only an expedient under the quota limits but also a method of resource provision for 
empowering the top core brands. The allocation of quotas was thus employed as a 
means for further motivating cigarette companies to develop big brands. 
Consequently, while the total number of cigarette brands declined significantly 
under the new regulations, the concentration ratio of cigarette brands also increased, 
as was to be expected. This development is shown in Table 6.3 below. 
Table 6.3  Concentration Ratios of Cigarette Brands (2003–2008) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Average sales 
volume of each 
brand (unit: 10 
thousand cases) 
3.68  6.51 9.98 10.24 14.63 20.55 
                                                     
21 Tobacco China, “Disange ‘shi’: 08 nian pinpai dingxiang zhenghe mulu” (The third ‘ten’: 
the joint- produced brands in 2008), 
http://www.tobaccochina.com/news/analysis/wu/20085/200852614712_304453.shtml 
(accessed March 10, 2012).  
22 After the separation of the local and inter-provincial cigarette trades was done away with in 
2006, all of the cigarette manufacturers traded with the city tobacco corporations, 
regardless of whether these were within or outside of the province. This was done via 
centralized online meetings to place orders every half year. The online transactions took 
place on the website of the Chinese Tobacco Electronic Commerce Corporation (中烟电子
商务网). 
CR4* 10.04% 11.59% 13.78% 15.06% 18.29% 18.53% 
CR8 13.59% 18.81% 23.21% 25.69% 32.02% 33.13% 
CR10 17.94% 19.3% 26.4% 31.9% 37.8% 39.55% 
* CR4: The concentration ratio of the four largest cigarette brands; likewise for CR8 
and CR10. 
Source: Adopted from “Zhuanmai tizhi xia juanyan pinpai buju yanjiu” (A study on the 
distribution of cigarette brands under the monopoly system), by Chang Yongkai, PhD diss., 
Tianjin University, 2009; Zhongguo yancao nianjian 2008 (China tobacco yearbook 2008) (p. 
218), by the STMB, 2009, Beijing, China: Economic Daily Press. 
After the two catalogs, the STMB continued this strategy by announcing the 
“235” policy guideline in 2010. According to this guideline, the STMB would be 
reducing the top core brands from 30 to 10—including two brands with a 
five-million-case production volume, three brands with three million, and five 
brands with two million—by 2015.
23
 In addition, the STMB then proposed another 
policy guideline called “461” to supplement “235”. This new guideline was aimed at 
promoting twelve brands representing more than 40 billion RMB in sales revenue, 
six of them more than 60 billion RMB, and one of them over 100 billion RMB—in 
order to emphasize the value enhancement.
24
 The 235 and 461 guidelines meant that 
cigarette manufacturers as a whole would have to make substantial efforts to 
increase their existing brands’ competitiveness. This was, after all, the only way to 
keep their places in the catalog for the next round of game. 
In general, this developmental trend demonstrated that the corporatization 
reform led to the centralized regulatory framework of the CNTC, where the making 
of big brands became an effective strategy for pushing the existing cigarette 
manufacturers to compete with each other to expand their market shares, even 
though the quota system remained in place. In this context, the brand catalogs 
                                                     
23 These production figures were established by working from the 2008 volumes of the top 
five foreign brands – Marlboro (9.04 million cases), Winston (2.52 million cases), Mild 
Seven (1.96 million cases), Rothmans (1.8 million cases), and Pall Mall (1.41 million 
cases).  
24 Tobacco China, “2010 nian zhongguo yancao pinpai zhanlue guihua tanjou – qiwen 
‘235’”(The exploration of formulating China’s cigarette brand strategy in 2010 – seven 
questions on ‘235’) , accessed January 12, 2013, 
http://www.tobaccochina.com/news/analysis/wu/20102/2010221152433_396583.shtml; 
Shucai Wang, “ ‘532’, ‘461’: dapinpai shidai yijing lailin” (’532’, ‘461’: the time of large 
brands is coming), China Tobacco, August 11, 2010, accessed February 28, 2012, 
http://www.tobacco.gov.cn/html/21/2105/210502/21050203/2807882_n.html. 
embodied the industrial policy of picking the winners, which led to the formation of 
the governance pattern in this phase: “competitive monopoly led by the central 
government.” In the following sections, I explore further how this governance 
pattern was constantly strengthened through interactions between local governments 
and the CNTC’s local agents under their context of dual centralization. 
6.3  The Transformation of Local Governments in the Tobacco  
Monopsony 
Under the corporatization reform and the resulting strategy of making big 
brands, interaction between the local governments and the CNTC’s local agents also 
took a new turn in this stage. First, after losing their leverage in the tobacco sector, 
local governments, driven by fiscal pressure under the tax-sharing system, turned to 
facilitate the work of the CNTC’s local agents instead. In this section, I explore the 
operation of the tobacco monopsony—i.e., that the CNTC operated as the only 
purchaser of tobacco leaves—in order to illustrate how local governments became 
the de facto agents of the CNTC in this phase, with the result that these new 
circumstances constantly fortified the emergent, central-led competitive monopoly. 
6.3.1  The Tobacco Monopsony in the Last Phase 
Since China is the largest cigarette producing country in the world, it has faced 
a perennial problem where its national tobacco industry is concerned: how to secure 
a sufficient and stable supply of tobacco leaves. In light of the sizable demand for 
this core ingredient of cigarettes, a tobacco monopsony was introduced from the 
beginning into the state monopoly system as a way to guarantee domestic 
self-sufficiency and reduce the risk of international price fluctuation. As a 
consequence, even after the import tariff on tobacco leaves decreased following 
China’s accession to the WTO, the country continued to grow more than 40 percent 
of the world’s tobacco leaves in 2009, while 95 percent of its production was 
consumed domestically.
25
 Notwithstanding, this industry’s operations in monopsony 
would also go through a shift from decentralization to centralization in this phase. 
                                                     
25 Michael Eriksen, Judith Mackay, and Hans Ross, The Tobacco Atlas, Fourth Edition (New 
York, NY: World Lung Foundation, 2012), accessed January 22, 2013, 
http://tobaccoatlas.org/industry/growing_tobacco/leading_producers/.  
According to the original design, the overall arrangement of the tobacco 
monopsony aimed to achieve a state plan; social responsiveness to local situations 
had a limited role to play. The actual activity of tobacco procurement, however, 
worked otherwise and was reflected in the “three-in-one” system of the first phase. 
The creation of this three-in-one system had enabled local cigarette enterprises to 
obtain a sufficient supply of qualified tobacco leaves by establishing their own 
workshops in the tobacco fields themselves. Moreover, cigarette manufacturers had 
encouraged the farmers to grow tobacco by offering them a range of subsidies, thus 
producing more tobacco than what the plan indicated.
26
 
After the Tobacco Monopoly Law was promulgated in 1992, strict monitoring 
of the total production in tobacco growing was not carried out in actual practice. The 
difference was mainly due to the fact that, unlike in industrial manufacturing, it was 
difficult to predict and control the volumes of the agricultural products produced in 
any precise way. Local tobacco stations would therefore conduct procurements in a 
relatively loose manner. The local stations usually purchased the extra tobacco 
leaves from farmers, a practice which was further tolerated under the pressure of 
local governments.  
Moreover, unlike many other commercial crops, tobacco leaves had only one 
destination: cigarette production. If the local tobacco corporations refused to buy 
surplus tobacco leaves, this would have had disastrous consequences for the tobacco 
farmers. In order to prevent the social unrest that would have arisen from such an 
event, most local tobacco corporations assented to their local governments’ requests 
to purchase all of the tobacco leaves. Under these circumstances, local tobacco 
corporations often had no choice and purchased all of the tobacco leaves from the 
farmers, who in turn came to expect all their yields to be bought. This soon became 
the standard practice.
27
 That is to say, the supply of tobacco leaves was shaped by 
                                                     
26 From The Editing Board of Hongta Group, Hongta jituan zhi, for example, according to 
the document The Economic Analysis of Tobacco Leaves in Yuxi during the Past Five Years, 
47 percent of the tobacco farmers’ total revenue had been paid by the tobacco corporations 
according to the official prices, while the remaining 53 percent had been subsidized by the 
Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise in the early 1990s. In addition, Yuxi had provided other forms of 
support during the growing process, including technical training and instruction and 
fertilizers as indicated in Chapter Four.  
27 Wong and Deepak, Zhuoguo: Guojia fazhan, 57-9, 72-3; Huang Huixiang and Tan Yuquan, 
“Cunji caizheng bianqian yu cunmin zizhi fazhan: Kunjing yu chulu” (Rural fiscal change 
and the development of village self-governance: the predicament and its solutions), 
Southeast Academic Research 4 (2007): 40. 
local governments, and their intervention did not respond to the actual demand of 
cigarette companies. Consequently, there arose a clash of interests between the local 
governments and tobacco corporations/cigarette companies. The overproduction 
crisis of 1997 was a prime example of this development. 
6.3.2  The Overproduction Crisis of 1997 
In 1996, when the change in local finances under the tax-sharing system 
coincided with a considerable price drop in the grain market, farmers were 
motivated to grow more tobacco leaves in order to maintain their incomes. In 1997, 
the results of this were apparent: tobacco leaf overproduction plagued the industry. 
Compelled by the local governments to purchase the surplus, local tobacco 
corporations and cigarette companies suffered considerably from the surfeit. Some 
tobacco corporations were unable to pay for the tobacco they had acquired and had 
to issue IOUs (da baitiao 打白条) to the farmers. A senior employee at the ZY 
Cigarette Factory in Guizhou complained bitterly when thinking back on the crisis: 
The local government was constantly pushing us… How could you 
[buy it all] when the farmers had already produced so many leaves? 




A year after the crisis in 1998, the STMB attempted a new scheme entitled 
“planned planting based on market guidance.” In this scheme, each cigarette 
company was required to purchase tobacco leaves at the “National Tobacco Leaf 
Trade Fair” and signed a letter of intent with the tobacco corporations they planned 
to conduct business with for each year. The amounts to be purchased were based on 
quotas assigned in the cigarette production plan. Based on these letters of intent, the 
STMB would formulate a plan for tobacco cultivation in each province, including 
the areas covered and the production amounts. In formulating these plans, the STMB 
also would take past records on cultivation and regional balances into consideration. 
The plan figures would then be broken down from the provincial to the village level. 
Tobacco corporations at the lowest level would sign a procurement contract with 
tobacco farmers in accordance with the planting plan (see Figure 6.2).  
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This new scheme was actually a return of the planned-economy model where 
not only were tobacco corporations not permitted to purchase any surplus tobacco 
leaves beyond the contract, but the farmers also had to limit their planting areas. 
Nonetheless, this scheme was never fully implemented until the corporatization 




Figure 6.2 Scheme of “Planned Planting Based on Market Guidance” in 1998 
Source: Adopted from Jinji zhuangui guochen zhong de chanye zhongzu: Yi yancaoye wei li 
(Industrial restructuring during the economic transition: the example of the tobacco industry) 















6.3.3  The Tobacco Monopsony under the Centralized Regulatory 
Framework 
With the termination of the three-in-one system and the arrival of 
corporatization, cigarette manufacturers were no longer able to involve themselves 
in tobacco planting as before. The scheme of “planned planting based on market 
guidance” previously proposed was finally implemented under this centralized 
regulatory framework. A cigarette enterprise was now permitted to purchase at most 
0.9 dan (45 kilograms) of tobacco leaves for each case of cigarettes produced in 
2009.
29
 Additionally, they were no longer allowed to buy tobacco leaves from the 
tobacco corporations above the amounts specified by the CNTC according to the 
cigarette production quotas of that year.  
In practice, cigarette companies were not forced by local governments to buy 
any extra tobacco leaves beyond the contracts, yet neither could they guarantee that 
the supply of tobacco leaves would neatly meet the companies’ demands under the 
quota system. This was because tobacco leaves procured by cigarette companies had 
to be alcoholized for around two years in order to be used for cigarette 
manufacturing. Under this time lag, a gap between supply and demand would appear; 
the supply of tobacco leaves, ready only two years after harvest, could not precisely 
match what a cigarette enterprise might need. Therefore, although it was possible to 
curb overproduction under the centralized regulatory framework, this delay usually 
led to tobacco shortages confronting cigarette manufacturers during the actual 
production process. A senior employee at the HT Group explained the situation: 
The key point is that the tobacco leaves we purchase every year are 
not used immediately. We have to wait for 1.5 years during 
alcoholization at least. During this period, our brands may expand 
from three million to five million cases. So we face this problem of 
not having enough almost every year and never stop asking the 
CNTC for more tobacco leaves.
30
 
As cigarette companies were unable to obtain the tobacco leaves they needed, 
they turned to the CNTC for help when the shortages occurred. The CNTC would 
keep a certain reserve of tobacco leaves on hand each year, and it would first allot 
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them to the cigarette companies which owned the top core brands. As a result, the 
supply of such reserved tobacco leaves became another “policy resource” for 
cultivating the big brands.
31
 Paradoxically, the existence of these shortages derived 
from the precise implementation of plan production in tobacco leaves. In a sense, 
when cigarette manufacturers could get sufficient or even excess tobacco leaves as 
previously, then tobacco provision could not be leveraged as a means of control.  
In fact, this precise implementation reflected a transformation of local 
governments in the tobacco monopsony during this period of time. In the centralized 
regulatory framework, local governments were unable to manipulate the tobacco 
corporations; instead, they had to watch carefully what the local tobacco 
corporations required in order to secure the taxation on tobacco leaves. When the 
Chinese authorities abolished the agricultural tax and special agricultural product tax 
in 2006 to reduce financial burdens on farmers, the tobacco leaf tax was not 
cancelled with them. As the only exception, this tax was still classified as a local tax, 
and its rate remained at 20 percent. However, given that the agricultural tax and 
special agricultural product tax on average constituted 70 to 80 percent of revenues 
in rural areas before the abolition of the tax, many local governments in this phase 
found themselves in a serious fiscal predicament and were more dependent on the 
transfer payment from the higher local governments.
32
 Under such circumstances, 
the tobacco leaf tax was naturally more significant for local fiscal revenues in the 
tobacco growing areas. In fact, this was exactly why the central state would keep the 
tobacco leaf tax in the post-agriculture tax era. As the State Council explained:  
Some new problems would arise if we were to stop levying the 
tobacco leaf tax. Firstly, it would hit the fiscal situation hard in 
tobacco-growing areas, especially for the county and township 
governments. According to the current fiscal system, the tobacco 
leaf tax is totally allocated to them, and it occupies a large 
proportion. Without the tobacco leaf tax, their fiscal plight would 
certainly further worsen. Secondly, it would have a negative 
impact on the operation of local governments at the grass-roots 
level and on the provision of local public services. Most 
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32 Liu Leshan and He Liancheng, “Quxiao nongyeshui ho de xianxiang caizheng kunnan 
wenti yanjou” (A study of the fiscal predicaments of county and township governments 
after the abolition of the agriculture tax), Reform of Economic System 3 (2005): 82. 
tobacco-growing regions are located in the west or in remote areas, 
and they usually do not have diverse financial sources. Therefore, 
local economies and public services heavily rely on the local 
governments. Termination of the tobacco leaf tax would lead to the 
decline of local fiscal income. Accordingly, it would be harmful 
for local development on all fronts. Thirdly, it would hurt the 
development of the tobacco industry. Tobacco is the main raw 
material in the production of cigarette products, so the elimination 
of the tobacco tax would seriously affect the tobacco industry since 




In this context, county governments would use this taxation as a means of 
compelling local township governments to complete the tobacco procurement task. 
For example, the share of tobacco leaf tax revenue that township governments 
would receive from their superior county government depended on the extent to 
which they fulfilled the tobacco procurement quotas. In some areas, county 
governments would award a portion of the tobacco leaf tax as a bonus to the leading 
cadres of townships when they successfully reached the required quotas.
34
 
Given the fiscal significance of the tobacco tax, county governments would 
also make use of duty contracts (zeren zhuang 责任状). In these contracts, a number 
of evaluation indices were established to discipline township governments into 
completing the tobacco-related tasks required by tobacco corporations. Generally 
speaking, duty contracts would be passed down the administrative hierarchy from 
county governments to village committees, with increasingly detailed evaluation 
indices as one proceeded down the command chain and with a range of rewards and 
penalties linked to the outcomes. This arrangement introduced a vigorous system of 
                                                     
33 The Legislative Affairs Office of State Council, “Youguan fuzeren jiu zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo yanyeshui zhanxing tiaoli da jizhe wen” (Q&A on China’s provisional 
regulations for the tobacco leaf tax ), 
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/fgkd/xfgwd/200612/20061200020938.shtml (accessed 
September 11, 2009).           
34 Jianyong County Government ,“Jiangyongxian renmin zhengfu guanyu erlingyiling nian 
kaoyan shengchan shougou youguan zhengce de yijian” (Opinions on 2010 tobacco 
production and procurement policies from Jianyong county government), 
http://www.jiangyong.gov.cn/File/zfwj/2010011117224073499.htm (accessed August 7, 
2011). 
administrative accountability and shifted the behavior of local authorities from 
merely responding to local needs and more to obeying higher level administrative 
instructions. The duty contract thus became an effective instrument for ensuring 
local compliance with regard to tobacco cultivation. An example of such evaluation 
indices on a duty contract can be seen in Table 6.4. This contract was signed 
between DJ Town and its village committees in Yunnan Province in 2008. 
Table 6.4 An Example of Duty Contract Evaluation Indices (DJ Town, Yunnan) 
Index Rewards and Penalties 
Success of planting areas  - Award of 1500-2000 RMB to village committees 
- Penalizing village committees 1000 RMB for 
failure with regard to planting area  
Executing collective tobacco 
seeding in floating tray
*
  
- Penalizing village committees 1000 RMB for 
failure on this index and compensating 5 RMB for 
each seeding tray 
- When the village committees finish the index, 
neither penalty nor reward incentive provided 
Best transplanting time from 
floating tray to farmland 
- Awarding 500 RMB when the village committees 
ensure tobacco seed transplantation is completed 
within 3 days during prime planting season 
Expansion of scale planting by 
combining individual farmland 
in the same area 
- Award of 200 RMB for each parcel of tobacco 
farmland greater than 100 mu (1 mu = 600 square 
meters) 
- Award of 100 RMB for each lot of tobacco 
farmland greater than 50 mu  
Fulfilling tobacco procurement 
amount 
- Award of 1500-2000 RMB to each village 
committees for successful fulfillment of plan 
- Penalizing village committees 200 RMB for every 
1000 kilograms below procurement amount 
Implementing safety 
regulations for tobacco flue 
curing 
- Award of 1000-1500 RMB to each village 
committees without any fire accidents caused by 
tobacco flue-curing 
-Penalizing 500 RMB for each fire accident caused 
by tobacco flue-curing 
Flue-cured tobacco leaves with - Award of 4 RMB to each village committees and 
superior/medium rate quality 2 RMB to each village group for every dan of 
superior/medium class tobacco leaves once the 
village committees fulfills the procurement 
amount and the portion of superior/medium class 
tobacco is over 50% 
Exclusive award for village 
party branch secretary (first 
person in charge) 
- The township government gives an exclusive 
award to the village party branch secretaries once 
they “pass” all the evaluation indexes   
* This index is listed here as the CNTC promoted “collective tobacco seeding” by 
subcontracting seeding cultivation in floating trays to specific contractors and then 
selling the results to tobacco farmers under the village committees’ supervision in 
order to maintain seed quality. This was part of the CNTC’s project of “establishing 
modern tobacco agriculture.” 
Source: Provided by interviewee 
As fulfillment of the evaluation indices linked directly to monetary rewards 
and penalties, their implementation was taken seriously by local authorities, 
especially at the village level. In fact, the rewards constituted an important source of 
fiscal income for many village committees because the transfer payments from 
higher government levels turned out to be far from adequate for local expenditure 
after the agricultural tax was abolished.
35
 Thus many village committees 
supplemented their incomes by cashing in on the money rewards given to them 
when they reached the indices on the duty contracts. Under the circumstances, the 
local governments and the village committees came to act as the de facto agents of 
tobacco corporations. A cadre in DJ Town commented on such a relationship:   
It would seem that our main job is to serve the local tobacco 
corporation. We must finish the job assigned by them so that we 
can receive the money. It is a very important income for us.
36
 
Under the dual centralizations in fiscal revenue and SOEs governance, local 
governments were converted to ensure precision in tobacco provision. Rather than 
manipulating the CNTC’s local agents as in the last phase, local governments now 
had to control or limit any possible uncertainty and risk in tobacco production and 
try to avoid the undesirable outcomes—shortage or overproduction—in order to 
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36 Interviewee No. 60. 
secure the tobacco tax and the monetary rewards. This implementation was also 
extended to support the CNTC in restructuring the production process and 
organizations in rural areas as exemplified in the project called “establishing modern 
tobacco agriculture.” 
6.3.4  Establishing Modern Tobacco Agriculture 
From Table 6.4, we can see that the village committees were required not only 
to meet specific production quotas in certain planting areas but also to grow tobacco 
leaves in specific ways. These included scale planting and collective seeding, which 
were promoted by a CNTC project known as “establishing modern tobacco 
agriculture.” Initiated in 2007, this project aimed to improve and equalize tobacco 
quality, increase the productivity of tobacco cultivation, decrease the demands of the 
labor force, and reduce costs. Specifically, the CNTC wanted to create favorable 
conditions for further stabilizing production without raising purchase prices in order 
to accelerate capital accumulation. One hundred thirty-five villages throughout 
China participated in the trial scheme in 2008. 
As part of this project, the CNTC formulated four measures—scale planting, 
intensive operation, professional division of labor, and technological 
management—as the main methods for achieving the project’s goals. Among these 
measures, scale planting was viewed as the most fundamental. Taking scale planting 
as its basis, the production process was formulated as “intensive operation at the two 
ends, mechanization in between” so that a professional division of labor could be 
implemented. That is, cultivating seeds and flue-curing tobacco leaves (the two ends) 
would be subcontracted to “professional contractors” who would collectively 
operate under the village committees’ supervision. Agricultural machines would then 
be introduced to facilitate the growing process between the two ends. Through this 
rearrangement of the production process, it was envisaged that the demands of the 
labor force would decrease substantially.
37
 In order to fulfill the intensive operation 
at the two ends, the CNTC also funded local governments to establish collective 
seeding workshops and flue-curing barns where professional contractors would 
work, and farmers needed to pay the required fees to make use of the services. In 
this context, some evaluation indices derived from this project, such as scale 
                                                     
37 East Tobacco, “Yitiao xinlu – xiandai yancao nongye jianshe huigu zhiyi” (One new road – 
part one of the review of establishing modern tobacco agriculture), accessed January 22, 
2013, http://www.eastobacco.com/ycny/yysc/201212/t20121226_285924.html. 
planting and collective tobacco seeding, were already listed on the duty contracts 
(see Table 6.4).  
In addition, the CNTC sought to transform individual, small-scale tobacco 
cultivation under the existing household contract system into the new forms of 
production organization including cooperatives, family farms, and professional 
tobacco growers so that it could continue to effect the shift to scale planting and then 
approach the project’s goals as indicated in Figure 6.3 below.
38
 In this context, a 
number of demonstration sites for restructuring production organizations were set up. 
For example, during my fieldwork in 2009, Mile County
39
 was designated as one 
such site in Yunnan Province. Its scheme for rearranging production organization is 
shown in Table 6.5 below.
40
 From this table, one can see that the transfer of 
farmland usage was fundamental in all kinds of new production organizations. In 
fact, the CNTC would also employ a subsidy provision for local infrastructures, 
including irrigation projects and road construction, as a means for compelling local 




                                                     
38 East Tobacco, “Ruhe zhenzheng shixian yanye shengchan jiangong jiangben” (How to 
truly reduce the workload and costs in tobacco growing?), accessed January 23, 2013, 
http://hangye.brandcn.com/yancao/080825_149569_2.html; East Tobacco, “Yimudi – 
xiandai yancao nongye jianshe huigu zhisan” (One-mu land – part three of the review of 
establishing modern tobacco agriculture), accessed January 22, 2013, 
http://www.eastobacco.com/ycny/yysc/201212/t20121231_286219.html; 
Zhang Fangyuan, “Tansuo, shijian, changxin – Dui xiandai yancao nongye shidian de 
zongjie yu sikao” (Exploration, action, and innovation: Summary and ideas on the trial 
scheme of modern tobacco agriculture), China Tobacco, December 1, 2008, accessed 
January 21, 2013, http://www.echinatobacco.com/101588/101728/101752/21956.html. 
39 Mile County has upgraded into Mile City since 2013. 
40 See the document issued by the Honghe Tobacco Corporation (2009): “Honghe zhou mile 
xian xinshao zhen xiandai yancao nongye shidian jianshe shishi fangan” (The trial scheme 
of modern tobacco agriculture in Xinshao Town of Mile County, Honghe State).  
41 Anonymous, “Jiang chengkang: yancao ‘fanbu’ ce” (Chengkang Jiang: The strategy of 
feeding back to tobacco agriculture), China Business, January 11, 2009, accessed on 
January 23, 2013, http://finance.jrj.com.cn/people/2009/01/1113563292251.shtml ; The 
Yunnan Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, “Yunnan sheng xiandai yancao nongye 
jianshe qingkuang” (The situation of establishing modern tobacco agriculture in Yunnan 
Province), accessed January 26, 2013, 
http://www.echinatobacco.com/101542/101576/102161/102162/23786.html; Interviewee 
No. 60. 
Figure 6.3 The Scheme of Major Tobacco Agriculture 
 
 
Source: Summarized by the author 




Family Farm - Village committees responsible for combining 
individual land in the same area 
- Village committees subcontracting the unification of 
farmland to capable contractors 
- Contractors employ mechanized and standardized 
methods of operation in areas where tobacco is 
cultivated 
- Contractors employ local farmers to handle any 
work which cannot be done by machines 
- Goal: Construction of two family farms, each with 
218 mu* of arable land in the trial site. 



























- Farmers become the cooperative shareholders via 
their land, one mu amounts to one share 
- The investment of labor force according to number 
of shares for each farmer household 
- All shareholders elect capable manager(s) or local 
cadre(s) as the contractor to conduct general 
management including allocation of production 
materials, coordination of work teams, etc.  
- Farmers share production income according to their 
shares 
- Contractors receive 20 percent of the income above 
2200 RMB 
- Goal: Construction of three cooperatives in the 




- Selecting capable farmers to form a “professional  
grower” and assigning 15-20 mu of arable land to 
them for growing tobacco 
- Providing subsidies/support to them for production 
materials, small agricultural machines, and training 
- Setting up a flue-curing barn for each professional 
grower in the collective 
- Goal: Construction of 225 professional tobacco 
growers, each with around 15 mu of arable land in 
the trial site 
* One mu (亩) amounts to 667 square meters. 
Source: The trial scheme of modern tobacco agriculture in Xinshao Town of Mile 
County, Honghe State), Honghe Tobacco Corporation, 2009. 
The CNTC’s scheme for production organization was actually consistent with 
the policy of farmland transfer, which was passed in the third Plenum of the 17
th
 
Communist Party of China Central Committee in 2008.
42
 According to that policy, 
farmers could transfer their land usage by lease, exchange, or shareholding 
cooperatives, and the transfer could only be effected with their consent. However, 
the complaint that local cadres forced farmers to rent out their lands to professional 
contractors began to appear, and this became yet another conflict between local 
                                                     
42 The Xinhua Agency, “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu nongcun gaige ruogan zhongda 
wentu jueding” (The decision on several big issues on rural reform made by the 
Communist Party of China Central Committee), accessed January 25, 2013, 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2008-10/19/content_1125094.htm. 
cadres and farmers during this period of time (more discussion of this point follows 
in the next section).
43
 The conflict also explained why there existed a higher 
percentage of “professional tobacco growers” in all forms of the new production 
organizations, since the obstacles to transferring farmland in this form were lower 
than others due to their relatively smaller scale.
44
 Even so, in 2012 the then head of 
the CNTC Jiang Chengkang (姜成康) confirmed that the project would proceed 
given that it had already demonstrated that overall expenditure could be reduced to a 
certain degree through the new production processes and method.
45
 
6.3.5  The Implication of Local Governance 
While “establishing modern tobacco agriculture” aimed to stabilize the 
provision of tobacco leaves, it sought to do this by creating a new group of 
contractors—in the form of collectives, family farms, and/or professional tobacco 
growers—to conduct scale planting in order to control the cost rather than by 
granting a large number of subsidies to individual households as appearing under the 
three-in-one system. This change demonstrated very clearly the situation that, when 
the local governments could no longer manipulate the CNTC’s local agents, they 
began to turn their back on the tobacco farmers when confronted with contradictory 
responsibilities: i.e., balancing their budgets versus protecting the livelihoods of the 
farmers. Under the circumstance, this caused some impacts on local governance 
since local governments had to handle an increased tension and conflict when 
dealing with tobacco-related matters. These conflicts, which I observed firsthand 
during my fieldwork and which served to show that the local authorities had already 
become de facto local agents of the CNTC, will be discussed in this section.  
As shown in table 6.6, incomes for tobacco farmers generally declined after 
the overproduction crisis of 1997, resulting in a greater reluctance to grow tobacco. 
                                                     
43 Zhao Junchen and Zhao Hailan, “Nongcun ‘fanzu daobao’ xianxiang yanjiou’’ (A study on 
renting out household contract farmland in rural areas), accessed January 28, 2013, 
http://www.aisixiang.com/data/detail.php?id=41678; Zhang Fanyuan, “Tudi liuzhuan: 
Guimohua zhongzhi poti zhi bi”(Land transfer: The key point of scale planting), China 
Tobacco, September 1, 2007, accessed January 29, 2013, 
http://www.echinatobacco.com/101542/101576/101938/101999/102000/15930.html.    
44 Liu Haiwen, “Tudi Liuzhuan: xiao shanban quxiang da jiandui” (Land transfer: a small 
boat turning into a huge fleet), China Tobacco, November 15, 2009, accessed January 30, 
2013, http://www.echinatobacco.com/101588/101727/101769/21197.html.  
45 Anonymous, “Jiang chengkang: yancao ‘fanbu’ ce.” 
The profit-to-cost ratio per mu of tobacco cultivation was 64.3 percent in 1996. This 
figure fell dramatically to 21.9 percent in the following year and then plummeted to 
2.5 percent in 2007 (see Figure 6.6). Part of the reason for the substantial drop was 
the abolition of subsidies from cigarette enterprises. While the cigarette enterprises’ 
autonomy for granting subsidies was also eliminated in the centralized regulatory 
framework, the CNTC did not raise purchase prices accordingly. Hence, while the 
income of tobacco farmers declined in this phase, local governments were 
increasingly dependent on the revenues generated by tobacco cultivation. The 
tension between the two parties arose in this context. A local cadre in JC town of 
Yunnan described the reduction of the tobacco farmers’ revenues: 
The purchase price is indeed too low. Let me give you an example 
that most tobacco farmers would give you in our town. In the past, 
the same quantity of tobacco leaves farmers sold could buy pork of 
two or three jin (斤, one jin amounts to 500 kilograms), but now 
this is only one jin. Even though the official purchase prices have 
risen this year, they cannot catch up with the rising cost of living. 
This makes it difficult for us to implement the tobacco work.
46
 
Growing tobacco, then, became a focal point of contention from the outset 
since the declining profitability of tobacco leaves made farmers lose interest. In 
addition, while the purchase prices could not match the rise in living expenses, at the 
same time the benefit-cost ratio of growing tobacco was also lower than that of other 
major agricultural products such as grapes, soybeans, and fruits.
47
 The speech 
delivered at a national meeting of the tobacco industry in 2005 by the vice-director 
of the STMB He Zehua (何泽华) already confirmed this trend, which increased the 
pressure on local cadres who were responsible for organizing the tobacco planting, 
particularly in the economically developed areas.
48
 Yet local authorities still had 
strong incentives to maintain tobacco cultivation for the fiscal reasons; thus local 
cadres could and did persuade and compel farmers to grow tobacco.  
                                                     
46 Interviewee No. 13. 
47 Teh-wei Hu et al, “The Role of Government in Tobacco Leaf Production in China,” in 
Tobacco Control Policy Analysis in China, 202. 
48 Xu, “Zhongguo yancao hungye,” 290. 
Figure 6.5 The Profit-to-Cost Ratio of Tobacco per mu (1996-2007) 
 
Source: Adopted from “Yanye shougou zhengce yu yannong liyi fenxi ji jiani” (An 
analysis and suggestion on the tobacco procurement policy and tobacco interests), by 
Wang Mingru, 2006, Rural Finance and Financial Affair 12, p. 30; Quanguo nongchanpin 
chengben shouyi ziliao huibian (National collection of agriculture products on 
cost-to-benefit data) (p. 197), by the Price Office of the National Development and Reform 
Committee, 2009, Beijing, China: China Statistics Press. 
In principle, tobacco contract farming was based on an agreement signed by 
mutual consent. In practice, however, farmers had little choice but to grow tobacco if 
their farmlands were included in the tobacco zone as formulated by local 
governments.
49
 Otherwise they might be asked to rent out their farmland, as a local 
cadre in QF town of Liaoning Province explained: 
If farmers don’t want to grow tobacco, we would still continue to 
exercise influence on them in any way possible. For example, we 
could exchange farmland so that they would be able to grow the 
other products on another piece of land. Or we could convince 




                                                     
49 After receiving the decision on planting size, local officials would begin to formulate the 
tobacco zone in December and then inform farmers. (Interviewee No. 13) 
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Another source of conflict arose when local governments and farmers clashed 
over the practice of intercropping in the process of cultivating tobacco. 
Intercropping refers to the growing of two or more crops simultaneously on the 
same field. This was a common practice in many rural areas in China. Intercropping 
could produce a greater yield on a given piece of land and hence would increase 
farmers’ incomes. Moreover, it took tobacco farmers at least seven months to 
complete the cycle from seeding to sale, so they often had good reasons for 
intercropping other vegetables that had shorter growing periods. This allowed them 
to continue to earn while waiting for the income from their tobacco crop.  
Such a practice, however, was usually prohibited by local governments 
because it would affect both the quantity and quality of the leaves of the 
intercropped tobacco.
51
 Such prohibitions then not only limited the farmers’ 
freedom to plant what they wanted but also adversely hit their incomes. Given that 
the majority of tobacco farmers would prefer to augment their incomes by planting 
other crops alongside tobacco, the ban on intercropping aroused serious opposition 
among them. To ease the discontent, some local governments were pushed to find a 
balance. They tried allowing tobacco farmers to practice intercropping, but only in 
the late harvest season so that the quality and quantity of the tobacco leaves would 
be kept at certain levels.
52
 
Tensions could also arise in the procurement process when tobacco farmers 
were dissatisfied with the grading results. After flue-curing, the tobacco farmers 
would bring their tobacco leaves to the local tobacco station, where they sold their 
products according to the grading criteria issued by the STMB. However, the 
problem of “tobacco patronage” (renqingyan 人情烟) caused by unfair grading was 
widespread. That is, some farmers’ tobacco leaves might be graded higher if they 
had a good personal relationship with the grader and vice versa. A common saying 
in tobacco-growing areas maintained that one had to “squat down to grow tobacco 
but kneel down to sell it.”
53
 This seeking of patronage grew even more competitive 
under the centralized regulatory framework because the CNTC began to set 
                                                     
51 Interviewee No. 13. 
52 Interviewee No. 54. 
53 China Youth Online, “Yunnan yannong shengcun zhuangkuang diaocha: Dun zhe zaiyan, 
gui zhe maiyan” (The investigation of Yunnan tobacco farmers: Squatting down to grow 
tobacco and kneeling down to sell it), 21 May, 2009, accessed June 20, 2009, 
http://www.chinanews.com/sh/news/2009/05-21/1701614.shtml.  
maximum limits for the top grade proportion in order to control the general costs.
54
 
A tobacco farmer in FW town of Yunnan complained: 
The selling price of different tobaccos of exactly the same quality 
may have a price difference of around 5 or 6 yuan per kilogram. 
This depends on your personal relationship with the grader. The 
employees who are responsible for purchasing tobacco leaves at 
the station are the most powerful officials here. They even lower 
the grade [when buying] and deliver the product to their superiors 
with a higher grade to take advantage of the price difference.
55
 
Some farmers responded to such unfair practices by secretly selling their 
tobacco to smugglers or to another station. This invited intervention from the local 
authorities as the local cadres were concerned that such illegal sales would impact 
their production quotas. A local official in DJ town of Yunnan pointed out: 
Meeting the tobacco purchase procurement quotas is the most 
important target we have to achieve. Otherwise we would be 
punished. We would try every means to reach the assigned quotas, 




Ironically, although selling tobacco leaves illegally was officially prohibited, it 
did offer local governments a certain degree of flexibility when enforcing the 
tobacco monopsony. Given that agricultural yields anywhere can be subject to a high 
degree of uncertainty due to environmental fluctuations, obtaining tobacco leaves 
from smugglers became a simple solution for local governments when they were 
unable to meet their quotas. Also, when production output rose and went beyond the 
contracted requirements, the extra leaves could be disposed of by having smugglers 
buy the surplus. In this sense, such illegal transactions helped to maintain social 
                                                     
54 The Information Website of Yunnan Tobacco, “Shangdeng yan bili shifou yui kao yui hao?” 
(Is it better to have a higher proportion of the top tobacco leaves?), accessed April 20, 2012, 
http://www.tobacco.gov.cn/html/21/2106/210602/21060205/2106020503/69481_n.html.   
55 Interviewee No. 49. 
56 Interviewee No. 60. 
stability in tobacco-growing regions during this phase. The “black market” in 
tobacco was thus a necessary evil.
57
 
In general, tobacco corporations were responsible for enforcing and 
monitoring the production contracts signed by the farmers. If a farmer failed to meet 
his/her obligations according to the contract, the tobacco corporation would in 
principle not renew the contract the following year. In practice, however, the tobacco 
corporations had already shifted the responsibility for fulfilling the procurement 
contracts to local governments. Taking advantage of the local fiscal predicament in 
this phase, tobacco corporations institutionalized their leverage and manipulated 
local governments to work for them. In this context, as the tensions and conflict 
revolving around tobacco cultivation and procurement increased in local governance, 
a situation arose whereby the CNTC increasingly pushed local governments to 
finalize the restructuring of the production process. Consequently, the interactions 
between local governments and the CNTC’s local agents further consolidated the 
CNTC’s controlling capacity with regard to tobacco provision, which in turn led to 
another kind of incremental change: the strengthening of the central-led competitive 
monopoly.  
6.4  The Formation of Large Cigarette Conglomerations 
Under the central-led competitive monopoly, large cigarette conglomerates 
based on “substantial” mergers began to form in this phase. In contrast to the 
“nominal” mergers of the last phase, the mergers occurring here would generally 
lead to a united production plan where all the production materials were coordinated 
and all the production quotas were combined for the purpose of cultivating specific 
big brands. In this section, I discuss how these substantial mergers could occur under 
the current governance pattern and how, as the substantial mergers and 
inter-province restructuring process continued, a type of competition known as 
“quasi-oligopoly” came to appear. 
6.4.1  Substantial Mergers within the Provinces 
In contrast to mergers in the previous phase, the mergers in this phase among 
separate cigarette companies within individual provinces proceeded differently. For 
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one, provincial governments were transformed from actors with a passive role that 
had shaped groups through “welding” into aggressive actors that promoted complete 
integration. Where previous mergers were created from several cigarette 
manufacturers that retained independent legal status within the group, now the 
mergers effectively meant that cigarette companies were incorporated into a 
conglomeration that canceled their previous legal status, thereby turning them into 
mere production branches or factories without any decision-making power. 
The industrial policy of making big brands also helped to trigger this 
transformation. Once a local cigarette brand made it into the catalog and more policy 
resources were devoted to it, both the cigarette companies as well as the provincial 
governments benefitted via the growing profits and tax revenue. Given that the 
number of top core brands continued to atrophy under the STMB’s catalog 
management, provincial governments under the fiscal pressure of the tax-sharing 
system were driven to facilitate mergers within their provinces in order to 
concentrate resources and make specific brands more competitive. In this context, 
provincial governments began actively promoting substantial mergers within their 
provinces so that all of the production materials and quota assignments would be 
better coordinated for greater efficiency under the concentrated management. They 
became active mediators continually looking for ways of to make up for the fiscal 
loss suffered by their sub-provincial governments in jurisdictions where merged 
cigarette enterprises were located. 
This stage also saw cases of “strong and strong” mergers within the same 
province, which had previously been uncommon.
58
 For example, when the Yunnan 
Province Government promoted the merging of the Qujing Cigarette Company with 
the Kunming Cigarette Company in 2004, both of them were seen as large-scale 
companies, each producing cigarettes more than a million cases of cigarettes per 
year. In order to persuade these two large companies to agree to the merger, the 
provincial government worked out a formula to divide the taxation. By this 
calculation, the Qujing City Government would continue to receive tax returns 
according to the formula, even though the tax would be collected in Kunming after 
the merger.
59
 This method guaranteed that the municipal governments would not 
                                                     
58 East Tobacco, “Zouxiang lianhe – zhongguo yancao gaige fazhan pingshu zier” (Toward 
conglomeration – part two of China’s tobacco reform development), accessed January 10, 
2013, http://www.eastobacco.com/dfycb/201207/t20120710_242848.html.  
59 Anonymous, “Qujing ruku shuishou liangnian zengjia 17.7 yi” (The tobacco tax revenue of 
Qujing increased 1770 million RMB after the merger in the past two years), Yunnan Daily, 
lose their fiscal revenues from tobacco, and therefore the merger was accepted. This 
success also meant that the approach was applied to later mergers. In Yunnan, 
mergers made the number of cigarette companies drop from nine in 2003 to two in 
2008. 
The accelerating pace of such mergers did not occur only in Yunnan. Most 
cigarette companies were integrated into provincial tobacco industrial corporations, 
such that a two-level, parent-subsidiary framework in cigarette manufacturing 
gradually began to take shape across the country.
60
 Under these new circumstances, 
the merged cigarette companies turned into production branches under the command 
of provincial industrial tobacco corporations. Overall, the number of cigarette 
enterprises nationwide had decreased to 30 by 2009, down from 151 in 2001 when 
China entered the WTO.
61
 
Wang’s study ignores entirely this industrial policy of making big brands, 
which therefore oversimplifies her analysis of state-business interactions in the 
tobacco sector after China’s WTO accession. This overly simplistic analysis led her 
to conclude, incorrectly, that the merger movement led by the central government 
rapidly reorganized the enterprise system in China’s tobacco sector and condensed 
China’s tobacco industrial body during this period of time.
62
 While it was indeed 
true that the STMB produced several documents from 2003 onward to restate its 
determination to close down cigarette manufacturers with an annual output lower 
than 100 thousand cases, while incorporating the cigarette manufacturers with an 
annual output between 100 to 300 thousand cases into large companies and 
supporting the large-scale cigarette manufacturers in the tobacco sector,
63
 in fact, 
similar policy guides had already been issued previously (as indicated in Chapter 
Five), but they had failed to take effect under the local protectionism then prevailing. 
By contrast, this phase’s substantial mergers within the provinces proceeded rapidly 
                                                                                                                            
March 13, 2008, accessed January 11, 2013, 
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61 Wang Jiannan, “Zhongguo yancao hangye gaige yu fazhan yanjiu” (Research on reform 
and development of tobacco industry in China) (PhD diss., Jiling University, 2011).  
62 Wang, State-market Interaction, 108. 
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with the support of provincial governments. Looking at just this comparison, Wang 
also did not analyze appropriately the ways by which local governments pursued 
their interests in different phases.  However, precisely this point explains why the 
“substantial” mergers within the provinces grew so significantly. Even though the 
central government had authored the merger policy, it could not be achieved 
efficiently until the local governments began to be converted into aggressive 
mediators within the context of dual centralization. In this sense, the emergence of 
substantial mergers arose not only as an accompanying result of the central-led 
competitive monopoly but also through the support of local governments.   
6.4.2  Inter-Provincial Restructuring 
In this phase, inter-provincial restructuring also appeared as an effect of 
making big brands. Compared to the relative ease of substantial mergers within the 
provinces, the current fiscal system made arranging fiscal transfers of tobacco 
revenues across provinces difficult. Therefore, “across-province” mergers did not 
happen on a large scale, but inter-provincial restructuring still moved forward in the 
form of sharing or holding certain equities. 
Distinct from how inter-provincial restructuring had occurred in previous 
phase, the emergent form of restructuring in this phase was driven by the joint 
production of specific top core brands during the past years. Some cigarette 
companies were motivated to produce the big brands for others mainly because they 
did not have the top core brands listed in the catalog. Lacking their own top core 
brands, they would likely face shrinking market shares. In this case, joint production 
of specific core brands for other manufacturers located outside the provinces became 
a feasible option for retaining existing quotas.  
As the market shares of the joint-production brands grew, they increasingly 
came to share common interests with the brand-owning companies. Thus, 
inter-province cooperation was further stimulated in the form of investment. For 
example, through joint-production of the Baisha (白沙) brand, the Hebei Baisha 
Corporation Limited, receiving investment from both the Hebei Industrial Tobacco 
Corporation and the Changsha Cigarette Enterprise in Hunan Province, was 
established in 2005. Inter-provincial restructuring also appeared in the industrial 
tobacco corporations of Guangdong and Guangxi through mutual equity 
participation in 2008. In the same year, the Gangshu Industrial Tobacco Corporation 
was restructured via equity investment from the Zhejiang Industrial Tobacco 
Corporation. In general, the method of jointly producing brands led to more equity 
participation inter-provincial restructuring in this phase. Though the developmental 
trend was shaped under the constraints of the current fiscal policy, it was expected to 
create more space for inter-provincial mergers in the future.
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6.4.3  The Rising Quasi-Oligopoly Competition 
As the total number of cigarette companies decreased due to the mergers 
within individual provinces, and the scale of inter-provincial investments constantly 
expanded, a number of giant cigarette conglomerations gradually took shape. Under 
these circumstances, a type of “quasi-oligopoly competition” appeared, seen in a 
higher market concentration ratio of those cigarette manufacturers (see Table 6.7). 
Table 6.6  Market Concentration Ratios of Cigarette Enterprises 
Year 
CR 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
CR4* 19.6 23.9 24 25 27.3 
CR8 31.4 39.9 41.4 44.8 49.6 
CR12 39.5 46.3 48.2 60.2 67.5 
*CR4: The concentration ratio of the largest four cigarette enterprises in relation 
to production amount; likewise in CR8 and CR12. 
Source: Adopted from “Zhuanmai tizhi xia juanyan gongye shichang jiegou yu jixiao 
shizheng yanjiu” (An empirical study of the market structure and performance of 
cigarette enterprises), by Chen Baosen, 2010, ACTA Tabacaria Sinica 16, p. 100. 
The emergence of quasi-oligopolies in the tobacco industry also 
demonstrated the reversal of the relationship between “tiao” and “kuai”—the 
local governments (kuai) again became de facto agents serving the CNTC 
system (tiao) in merger deals. This reversal did not mean that the central state 
was abandoning its market-oriented reform from the late 1970s or that the 
tobacco sector would completely go back to planned-economy fashion as before. 
Instead, it implied a fortification of the CNTC’s steering capacity in the 
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nationally integrated market. In this situation, intense competition among 
emerging national cigarette champions further stimulated the boost of profits 
and taxation derived from this industry as seen in Figure 6.4 below. As a result, 
more and more capital has accumulated in the CNTC and its subsidiaries such 
that they have since been more capable of making overseas investments, 









Source: Adopted from China Tobacco, 392, p. 42, accessed October 15, 2012, 
http://health.people.com.cn/GB/14740/22121/17311892.html 
6.5  Conclusion 
In the globalization-state debate, the so-called “globalization-as-constraint” 
school argues that the policy choices of nation-states are straitjacketed by the twin 
pressures of the growth of capital mobility and the rules of multilateralism. As such, 
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nation-states are virtually reduced to the role of adjusting national economies to the 
dynamics of the global economy.
66
 Seen from the point of view of the development 
of China’s tobacco sector after its accession to the WTO, however, this presents 
another different trajectory. Despite being under the pressures of globalization, the 
Chinese government took advantage of its entry to the WTO to set up a centralized 
regulatory framework in the CNTC via a form of “corporatization.” This 
developmental trajectory was also different from what Wang described as “more 
global, deeper local.” By this, she meant that the formation of national cigarette 
champions in the tobacco sector amounted to a “deeper economic decentralization” 
since local governments could continue to enjoy “decentralized economic power” 
only when they demonstrated their ability to make cigarette SOEs under their 
jurisdiction survive or thrive within the competition of the domestic market. That is 
to say, she claimed that the central government’s ambition for having bigger and 
better SOEs after the WTO accession was consistent with that of the “winning” 
those local governments that wanted to expand the scale of economy of the SOEs, 




This study shows how the “more global, deeper local” argument errs, since 
Wang did not adequately take account of the effects of the centralized governance of 
the SOE reform in this phase. Through the corporatization reform, local 
governments could not intervene into the tobacco business taking place within their 
jurisdictions as before. In this sense, their power of manipulation was largely 
constrained in the tobacco sector, but this did not mean that the leverage of the 
central authorities was constrained as well. On the contrary, this reform provided 
more favorable conditions for the central state to carry out its industrial policy of 
making big brands when the synthesis of the CNTC and the STMB remained in this 
sector.  
Under these circumstances, the central-led competitive monopoly arose and 
was constantly reinforced through the support of local governments. As a 
consequence, trades between cigarette manufacturers and wholesalers were directed 
by state control in the form of industrial policy. In this context, the quasi-oligopolies 
gradually took shape with increasing mergers and restructurings, but it was difficult 
for them to collude with each other in divvying up the domestic market because the 
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rules of the game were dictated by the central authorities. More specifically, when 
the central state exerted its bureaucratic domination over the SOEs by setting the 
game rules, the existing cigarette enterprises were further pushed to compete with 
one another for survival in the central-led game, trying to stay in the catalog into the 
next round. As such, state control and competition have been equally strengthened in 







































In neoliberal discourse, SOEs are seen as economically inefficient and 
incapable of generating the necessary dynamic for economic development since only 
the private property right can assure that market economics function properly. From 
this perspective, SOEs are a barrier to China’s transformation from a planned 
economy to a truly Occidental-style market economy. According to neoliberal 
propositions, then, China must thoroughly privatize the existing SOEs so that 
resource distribution is fully optimized. However, against this hegemonic neoliberal 
ideology, China’s SOEs have continued to evolve since the late 1970s and 
experience dramatic growth particularly after China’s WTO accession. As the 
Economist noted in 2011, “as the economy grows at double-digit rates year after 
year [in China], vast state-owned enterprises are climbing the world’s league tables 
in every industry from oil to banking.”
1
 Currently China has, after the United States 
and Japan, the third largest concentration of Global Fortune 500 companies, and 
more than two-thirds of the Chinese firms on the list are SOEs.
2
 Most of these are 
central SOEs, which typically take the form of an oligopoly within the 
state-monopolized sectors. They are the major drivers of economic growth in China 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 
In this context, China’s developmental model, frequently labeled “state 
capitalism,” has triggered a heated debate in recent years. In the debate, China is 
viewed as the leading proponent of state capitalism nowadays, where decisions on 
how to distribute resources are made by state officials according to set political goals. 
Some argue that the rise of this form of capitalism in China presents a challenge to 
the free market economies in the developed world.
3
 Accordingly, a new term has 
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arisen for this model of relatively steady economic growth in China, particularly 
after the breakout of the global financial crises in 2008: the “Beijing Consensus” 
(sometimes used interchangeably with the “China Model”) is characterized by 
state-led economic sectors, state-constructed markets, and an authoritarian political 
regime.
4
 Unlike the “Washington Consensus,” which used to be the standard 
formula employed by developing countries for establishing functioning economies 
through the espousal of the virtues of free markets, private property rights, and 
political democracy, the Beijing Consensus replaces trust in the free market with 
growth through “a more muscular state hand on the levers of capitalism.”
5
 Other 
similar ideas characterize China’s developmental mode. For example, Nan Lin 
proposed “centrally managed capitalism” (CMC), under which the party-state 
commands the economy by controlling personnel, organizations, and capital in both 
the political and economic arenas and also delegating administrative authorities to 
diversely formed corporations to compete in the marketplace at the same time.
6
 
In the growing rhetoric about the Beijing Consensus, the most striking contrast 
with the core assumption in the neoliberal doctrine lies in the state ownership of 
enterprises, through which the state is engaged in the economy. While 
state-monopolized industries, composed of several central SOEs, present a more 
comprehensive involvement of the state in the current economy, we still know very 
little about the substance of state monopolies in China; how they were constructed 
within China’s market-oriented reform and how they have developed over the past 
three decades remain open questions. By studying the state monopolies in China, the 
biggest question remaining to be answered is: how have the state and the market 
combined and engaged with one another under an authoritarian regime? How, in 
China’s context specifically, have they done this? 
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Adopting the approach of historical institutionalism, this thesis selects the 
tobacco industry as a single case study to explore the abovementioned questions by 
answering why competition would happen in the tobacco state monopoly from the 
outset and how it has evolved in China. Seen as a form of monopoly controlled by 
fiat, most monopoly literatures criticize state monopolies as eradicating competition. 
However, fierce competition exists within China’s state-monopolized industries. 
Given that competition is regarded as the essence of “normal” market economics, 
this paradoxical phenomenon—the coexistence of state monopoly and 
competition—would be a critical ingredient in any discussion on the dynamic 
state-market relationship in China.  
Moreover, while competition has also occurred in other state-monopolized 
sectors, the tobacco industry is an ideal case for studying the correlation between 
state monopoly and competition because it has, of all the state monopolies, clearly 
exemplified a type of central state control that is the most comprehensive. Led by 
their theoretical biases, neoliberals would normally not bother to research this topic, 
but the insights provided by this study help to understand not only the complexity of 
China’s state-market relationship—that there have existed many ways of organizing 
the state monopolies—but also the legitimacy crisis that the Chinese authorities now 
face today.  
In the following, I first summarize and then conclude the theoretical 
implications derived from this research. Although it may be too early to tell what 
direction the existing tobacco state monopoly is taking or when the next critical 
juncture will happen, some critical problems are already surfacing under the current 
governance pattern. These will be explored in the final section.   
7.1  Summary 
In this study, I argue that the emergence of competition in the tobacco state 
monopoly resulted from a certain industrial governance pattern, which emerged 
incrementally and was strengthened through interactions between local governments 
and the local agents of China’s National Tobacco Corporation. As the institutional 
settings where local governments and the CNTC’s local agents were embedded 
changed, the governance pattern and the resulting competition type transformed as 
well over three distinctive phases—quasi-free competition under the two-track 
system in the first phase (1982-1993), restrained competition under prevalent local 
protectionism in the second phase (1994-2004), and quasi-oligopoly competition 
under the central-led competitive monopoly in the third phase (2005-2012).  
The consequences of competition in each phase would then trigger a 
regulatory change in the tobacco state monopoly at critical junctures, which would 
constitute the new premise for the following stage where another governance pattern 
would emerge. By tracing the development of these three temporal phases, we see 
that not only have the local governments already become the de facto agents for 
serving the CNTC while indirectly strengthening its control capacity, but also that 
the state control and the competition alike would both be reinforced and intensify. At 
the same time, the current central-led competitive monopoly prevents collusion 
between emergent oligopolies. In contrast to the typical dualist dichotomy of 
mutually exclusive state control and competition, “state monopoly, Chinese style” 
has been formed in this context. 
7.2  Theoretical Implications 
A single case study based on one state monopoly in China makes generalizing 
about the characteristics of all state-monopolized industries in China challenging, 
since the nature of the regulation varies from sector to sector. However, the tobacco 
industry, in light of its most comprehensive and strict regulation, may provide an 
ideal benchmark for comparing the features of other state-monopolized industries. 
From this research, then, theoretical implications in the field of China’s 
contemporary political economy, along with the state-market relationship in general, 
may be summarized as follows. 
7.2.1 The Changing Tiao-Kuai Matrix in China’s Central-Local 
Relationship 
Local governments’ involvement in the state tobacco monopoly is the crucial 
factor for explaining the coexistence of state monopoly and competition and their 
evolution. On the surface, the state tobacco monopoly was formulated as a vertical 
management system (tiao), but local governments (kuai) had their own forms of 
leverage in this system from the beginning. Therefore, the developmental history of 
the tiao-kuai relationship reflects the developmental trajectory of the tobacco 
industry. 
From phases one to three, the tiao-kuai relationship has experienced 
cooperation, usurpation, and reversal. At the outset, the tiao could not have been set 
up without cooperation from the kuai. However, exchange and compromise were 
involved in this “cooperation” such that the kuai could influence the operation of the 
tiao within their own geographical jurisdictions. This participation gradually 
prompted the tiao to deviate from its original design of total state-monopoly such 
that the authority of kuai came to dominate locally more than the tiao. Given that the 
state monopoly had already deteriorated into local monopolies, the central state 
sought to rebuild the authority of the tiao in order to block further manipulation by 
the kuai. In addition to restoring the domination of the tiao in this sectoral 
governance, the kuai in fact were compelled to serve the tiao to further consolidate 
its steering capacity. In this context, the tiao-kuai relationship has been completely 
reversed. 
This reversal provides an insight to better understand the prevailing notion of 
“fragmented authoritarianism,” which argues that authority below the top of China’s 
bureaucratic system is disjointed, with the fragmentation intensified by the course of 
market-oriented reform. Since this idea first appeared, the argument has remained 
one of the most frequently mentioned frameworks for describing the inner workings 
of the Chinese bureaucracy; the importance of bureaucratic bargaining is 
emphasized in this vein.
7
 Many studies have continued to flesh out this concept, and 
the fragmented market in the tobacco sector during the 1990s would bear it out as 
well. However, this study demonstrates that the fragmentation state of China’s 
authoritarian regime has not always been static. On the contrary, it has evolved, 
continuing to change and moving into a more integrative situation by transforming 
the tiao-kuai matrix. In this sense, this study offers a theoretical reframing for the 
now-current argument for China’s fragmented authoritarianism.  
The reversal of tiao-kuai relationship also makes clear one of the major 
features of China’s state capitalism that is rarely recognized in the extant debates, 
including Wang’s. One of the most remarkable changes of the market-oriented 
reform was to give the horizontal line of authority priority over its vertical 
counterpart in a range of spheres by introducing a series of decentralization 
measures. Consequently, the function of tiao was largely eroded under those 
circumstances. Starting in the mid-1990s, however, the situation changed when the 
central state created a vertical chain of command for collecting taxes under the 
tax-sharing system. Such rebuilding of the tiao also occurred in a number of key 
regulatory departments to discipline local governments in their economic 
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management. For example, in Mertha’s study, he recognized that the Administration 
for Industry and Commerce and the Quality Technology Supervision Bureau were 
ordered to alter their relationship with regard to authority, changing from a 
decentralized (kuai-based) structure to a centralized (tiao-based) one in the late 
1990s in order to counter local protectionism and establish standardization in policy 
enforcement. In the new “vertical management” system (chuizhi guanli 垂直管理), 
these bureaucracies were directly controlled by their functional administrative 
superiors (tiao) rather than by the local governments (kuai) so that the central 
policies were more likely to get implemented.
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As indicated in this study, the tiao also reappeared in state monopolies in the 
past decade. One could, however, distinguish this from the recentralization measures 
in other regulatory departments. In fact, the departments of the state monopoly 
formed the pivotal tiao during the time of planned economy but have since 
experienced a dramatic transformation under the SOEs reform once market-oriented 
reform was initiated.  
Viewed from the standpoint of tobacco, a first difference may be found in the 
method of recentralization. Rather than reallocating administrative authorities, here 
the tiao was rebuilt through corporatization reform, which created centralized 
governance within the parent-subsidiary corporate framework and formally removed 
the leverage of local governments. The second difference was that, after the tiao was 
set up, the tiao-kuai relationship was reversed. This has rarely been the case in other 
administrative departments where the tiao have been reshaped. As analyzed in 
Chapter Six, the CNTC would go on to take advantage of the fiscal predicaments of 
local governments in order to force them to act as its de facto agents for the purposes 
of accelerating capital accumulation.  
This reversal was not only caused by the straightforward process of 
redistributing authority; it was also propelled by the fiscal plight of local 
governments under the tax-sharing system. In fact, this converted tiao-kuai 
relationship has grown increasingly obvious, especially after the global financial 
crisis in 2008. Taking the place of foreign direct investment, the central SOEs of 
state monopolies have grown to become the most desirable source of investment for 
many local governments. This situation is even called “the central SOEs buying their 
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local maid” by China’s media.
9
 Moreover, given that the personnel appointments of 
central SOEs in the state monopolies are controlled by the central state, the reversed 
tiao-kuai relationship actually implies another determinant by which the central state 
could further exercise its influence over localities.
10
  
The rebuilding of a vertical line of command in the tobacco state monopoly 
has also further pushed the central SOEs of state monopolies to become 
profit-seeking entities in the market rather than executors of planned economy. 
Therefore, the reversed tiao-kuai relationship here is not a return to the old 
planned-economy regime where market mechanisms were eliminated; rather, it 
represents a move toward a type of capitalism led by the central state where state 
control and market mechanism are combined and engaged with one another. In this 
vein, this study further expands our understanding of the “Beijing Consensus.” 
Lastly, this changing tiao-kuai relationship also provides a testing ground for 
existing state-rescaling literatures, which emerged to decipher how inherited global, 
national, regional, and local relations were being recalibrated through capitalist 
restructuring and state retrenchment in the 1990s.
11
 While the economic 
restructuring from a Keynesian welfare regime to a neoliberal competition state 
appeared in Western Europe, a parallel transformation from planned economy to 
market economy appeared in China’s context. From the late-1970s, China underwent 
a process of state rescaling similar to what was identified in the post-Fordist 
Occidental countries as decentralization. However, after that, China’s state rescaling 
has followed a different route compared to Occidental countries, even though they 
all have been under the pressure of economic globalization. What is more, the 
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Chinese government took advantage of its entry to the WTO to strengthen its state 
monopolies and made a central-led competitive monopoly. 
Where many state-rescaling literatures based on Occidental experiences have 
tended to accept the premise of the neoliberal capitalist state, where state practices 
are significantly minimized under globalization, we cannot simply apply it to 
China’s development.
12
 The changing tiao-kuai relationship, moreover, further 
demonstrates that state rescaling in such a huge transitional post-socialist economy 
like China is a complicated process and involves the combinations of institutional 
interaction in both the horizontal and vertical domains at different stages. Namely, 
the changing path of tiao-kuai matrix in China’s context provides unique insights 
into the extant state-rescaling literatures: the decentralized powers are not simply 
“fixed” at lower levels of state administration but may be reshaped by interactive 
relations between vertical and horizontal bureaucratic systems. This may even push 
in the opposite direction of state rescaling, as the reversed tiao-kuai relationship 
demonstrates from this study. 
7.2.2  The State-Market Relationship under the State Monopoly 
This study argues that competition, rather than merely existing, has evolved 
within the state tobacco monopoly. By exploring its developmental trajectory along 
three temporal phases, this study demonstrates that the state/market interaction has 
been dynamic under the state monopoly framework; a point rarely discussed in most 
monopoly literatures. This demonstrates there exist many ways to organize a state 
monopoly, not just one, but this variety too has been ignored or overlooked in 
general. 
Conversely, this study could illuminate those literatures on the developmental 
state that hold states may intervene into markets strategically and aggressively to 
help the nation’s economic growth. But China’s development, compared with that of 
other East Asian countries, is more complex where the state-market relationship is 
concerned. Firstly, one core feature of the developmental state is its close 
public-private cooperation (or the so-called state-business alliance), which 
constitutes an institutional foundation for effective state intervention in private 
business. Nonetheless, unlike the dominance of private ownership in other East 
Asian countries, China has preserved a certain proportion of SOEs in its national 
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economy. This feature of state ownership even extends to cover entire sectors, i.e., 
state-monopolized industries as exemplified by the tobacco industry. Without the 
private-public link, this study indicates that in spite of the state monopoly, the 
Chinese government could create competitive mechanisms via its industrial policy 
such that national teams could be forged and then further go abroad under such 
circumstances. This state capacity, however, results from a constant, dialectic 
evolution and is based on the multi-level state-market interactions of the previous 
three decades. 
Unlike other East Asian countries, these multi-level state-market interactions 
reflect yet another distinctive feature of China: a transitional economy with a 
massive bureaucratic system. As a post-socialist state, China had to create market 
circumstances from its planned economy, and the method it chose for this was not 
direct privatization of the SOEs but the granting of greater autonomy to its local 
governments and SOEs by means of a series of decentralization measures. Taking 
the tobacco industry as a point of reference, one can see that there have been two 
main threads in the state-market relationship: 1) market/local government, and 2) 
market/central government. All of the players have, through their interactions, 
experienced great change and undergone change themselves. 
At first, when the central state initiated the market-oriented reform via 
decentralization in its fiscal policy and SOE governance, the interaction between 
local governments and the CNTC’s local agents led to the expansion of markets 
under the two-track system. In this, local governments acted both as promoters of 
the market and participants in it; without their involvement, the market track might 
not have grown so fast in this phase. Accordingly, quasi-free competition began to 
arise in the enlarging market. However, after moving into the second phase, local 
governments pressured by the tax-sharing system sought to manipulate the CNTC’s 
local agents by placing trade barriers to protect the market shares of cigarette 
manufacturers in their geographical jurisdictions. Under such circumstances, local 
protectionism arose and led to constricted competition in this sector.  
From this perspective, local governments became the initiators of market 
fragmentation so that few if any large cigarette conglomerations were established 
during this period. However, after China’s accession to the WTO, the central state 
was further motivated to build a national team for the Chinese tobacco industry. In 
the third phase, then, the central state centralized authority through its 
corporatization reform so that the barriers to trade would largely be removed. By 
this, the domestic market began to transform, moving from fragmentation to 
unification, while interactions between local governments and the CNTC’s local 
agents would trigger the formation of large cigarette manufacturers in the market, 
thus bringing about a quasi-oligopoly competition across the industry.  
From this developmental trajectory, it can be seen that local governments have 
evolved first from market promoters to market dividers to facilitators of market 
competition. Following the incremental changes caused by interactions between the 
local governments and the CNTC’s local agents, the central state-market relationship 
has also continued to develop along with the temporal phases. For example, when 
quasi-free competition gradually led to the chaos of gluts, the central state became a 
market regulator by introducing controls on overall quantity. Also, when the market 
was fragmented by local protectionism, the central state turned into an initiator of 
market integration by introducing the corporatization reform. 
In discussing these three phases, the state/market interaction in the state 
monopoly does not emerge in a simple one-to-one relationship. In light of the 
multi-tier governmental system and the gradual market-oriented reform, state/market 
interaction in China’s context has found itself in dialectically dynamic situations, 
even under the framework of state monopoly. Not only were local 
government-market relationships able to change incrementally with interactions 
between the local governments and the CNTC’s local agents, it also could also be 
dramatically transformed by the central state-market relationship. Without an 
elaborate investigation and analysis of the multi-tier state-market relationship, it 
would be difficult to grasp why state control and market competition reinforce and 
intensify each other simultaneously as presented in the regime of central-led 
competitive monopoly nowadays.     
7.3 The Crises of the Existing State Tobacco Monopoly System 
By analyzing how state and market have combined in a typical 
state-monopolized sector like the tobacco industry, this study attempts to flesh out 
China’s developmental model rather than attempting to determine whether the 
Beijing or Washington Consensus is superior. In fact, although the central-led 
competitive monopoly in the tobacco sector goes against the neoliberal doctrine, the 
two seemingly opposite approaches actually produce a similar consequence in the 
form of increasing economic inequality. Thus, a legitimacy crisis now looms in 
China’s state tobacco monopoly. 
7.3.1 Increasing Economic Inequality and Distributive Injustice 
As the profits and taxation of the tobacco industry grew under the central-led 
competitive monopoly, disputes regarding economic inequality and distributive 
injustice continued to rise. For one, economic inequality has been revealed as a 
feature of this sector; as mentioned in Chapter Six, tobacco procurement prices were 
not adjusted upwards to match the growth of profits and tax revenues. Instead, the 
STMB decided to restructure the tobacco-producing process and related 
organizations through the “modern tobacco agriculture” project in order to lower 
tobacco production costs rather than raising the procurement prices. As a result, the 
income distribution gap between the agricultural department and the 
industrial/commerce departments in this industry has widened. Accordingly, the real 
income of tobacco farmers has actually declined compared to the period of the 
three-in-one system. Moreover, given that the size of scale planting has not 
increased significantly, local governments have continued to push to implement the 
restructuring project in rural areas. Under the circumstances, it can be predicted that 
the procurement prices for tobacco leaves will not rise greatly since this will not 
move forward the land transfer needed for the modern tobacco agriculture project.  
Accordingly, whenever local governments for the fiscal reasons have assumed 
the duty of ensuring tobacco procurements, tension between local governments and 
tobacco farmers becomes exacerbated, further endangering local governance. In fact, 
this developmental trend reveals that the “statist approach” practiced here is not 
necessary for guaranteeing a more equal economic distribution. In other words, the 
state capacity presented in a state-led market is bolstered by a certain set of 
state/society relationships whereby local governments, especially those at the 
grassroots level, have to confront the discontents and protests from individual 
farmers directly. In this context, when economic inequality becomes a predicament 
for local governance, it implies also that the crisis has already arisen in the state 
tobacco monopoly since local governments act as the CNTC’s de facto agents.  
Moreover, distributive injustice revolves around the dividends submitted from 
the SOEs to the state and the resulting allocation. In fact, the distributive dispute has 
occurred not only in the tobacco industry but also in other state monopolies. When 
the tax-sharing system was initiated in 1994, the SOEs were exempted from paying 
dividends to the state coffer since most were in dire straits at the time.
13
 In this 
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context, payment of taxes was the only obligation SOEs had to the state. The 
situation did not change until the Interim Management Measures of Collecting 
Capital Gains from Central SOEs was promulgated in 2007.
14
 Given that many 
previous loss-makers had already been turned into profit-makers over the past 
decade, with some in strategic sectors that are even highly profitable, the Interim 
Management Measures was issued and three different rates of dividend—zero, five, 
and ten percent—were formulated to apply to a variety of central SOEs. 
In light of the lavish profits, the dividend rates of central SOEs have been 
criticized as too low, and a high level of profit retention has been blamed for 
exacerbating economic inequality. According to the statistics released by China’s 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security in 2009, the average salaries of 
employees in central SOEs of state monopolies—including electricity, banking, 
tobacco, telecommunications—were two to three times higher than the average in 
other industries. If non-salary income, such as housing funds and a range of other 
benefits, is included, then the income gap balloons to five to ten times higher.
15
  
Even within state monopoly industries, the income gap between senior SOE 
executives and other employees has continually widened, increasing to 17 times the 
average salary of the companies’ regular employees in 2011 from 8.68 times in 
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 Consequently, the question of how to deal with the distributive controversy 
of central SOEs has been placed on the political agenda and discussed heatedly in 
the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference in recent years.
17
 
Against this background of rising discontent, the highest dividend rates for 
central SOEs rose to five, ten, and fifteen percent in 2011, while the rate for the 
tobacco sector increased to twenty percent in 2012—the highest of all industries, 
with the CNTC producing the highest profits for the state coffer.
18
 Even so, the 
raising dividend rates have not solved the problem of worsening economic inequality, 
as most of the submitted profits have actually been returned in order to nurture the 
existing central SOEs (see Table 7.1 below).  
One sees clearly that the general public has rarely benefited from the profit 
contribution of the central SOEs. Apart from the seven percent used for social 
security, the rest more or less went back to the SOEs themselves.
19
 Thus, even 
though the dividends they have submitted to the state appear to grow, their usage 
allocation does not contribute to the public welfare. Instead, this allocation method 
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provides more capital to the central SOEs, with some even turning to speculative 
business. For example, the CNTC emerged as the “new king of land” in Beijing real 
estate speculation in 2010, further fostering the public’s discontent with around 
unaffordable housing.
20
 In this sense, the existence of central SOEs in the state 
monopolies seems to lead to a further deterioration with respect to economic 
inequality. 
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Total  1083.11 100 
Source: Adapted from China’s Ministry of Finance, accessed April 6, 2013, 
http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2013zyczys/201303/t20130322_784806.html 
 
In this light, state monopolies are becoming increasingly suspect, even without 
the ever-emerging corruption scandals. More and more often, questions are being 
asked about them: With such unprecedented profitability, where should the profits of 
the central SOEs go? And apart from their increasing power and influence, what is 
most important about the central SOEs of state monopolies in today’s China?
21
 
7.3.2  The Rising Medical Costs 
Along with the abovementioned inequality and distributive injustice, 
controversy surrounding the state tobacco monopoly becomes even more serious in 
light of harm caused by tobacco products. With the largest population of smokers in 
the world, China suffers significantly from tobacco-related diseases, annually 
resulting in more than 1.2 million fatalities, or 12 percent of all mortality. China also 
has the largest population of lung cancer patients in the world; smoking has already 
become the main cause of death for Chinese people. The Ministry of Health 
announced in 2008 that the tobacco-related death toll in China will reach 100 
million by the middle of the twenty-first century if smoking levels do not drop in the 
coming decades. Smoking and its harmful effects have been clearly identified as one 
of the greatest challenges confronting China’s public health system.
22
 
Given that the tobacco industry is such a major contributor of tax revenue, it is 
not hard to understand the Chinese government’s resistance to reducing cigarette 
production, despite its having already signed the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) in 2003, the core of which aims 
to lessen the production and consumption of tobacco products. In fact, the Chinese 
government has been continually urged by the international public health 
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community to take initiatives on tobacco control, as it is impossible to have a 
breakthrough in the international anti-smoking campaign without a success in China.  
Under this international pressure, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan finally adopted a 
resolution calling for “the overall implementation of a smoking ban in public places” 
at the meeting of National People’s Congress in 2011.
23
 However, the gap between 
the regulation itself and the reality of its enforcement has not closed, particularly 
when tax revenue from the tobacco industry remains steady at more than seven 
percent of the total annual central government revenue. This is why the Minister of 
Industry and Information Technology (the supervising authority of the STMB), Li 
Yizhong (李毅中), would tell the media bluntly in 2010 that China’s tobacco 




However, it has been shown that the medical expense of treating those with 
smoking-related illnesses had already begun to surpass the tax revenue and profits 
generated from the tobacco industry after 2000.
25
 What is worse, the share of 
medical expenditure paid by individuals is much higher than what is covered by the 
state so that the poor suffer the most, hardly being able to afford the necessary 
healthcare in today’s China. In other words, while individuals and their families are 
largely responsible for the cost of care for problems related to cigarette consumption, 
the government and enterprises benefit through tax revenues and the profits from 
cigarette production. Furthermore, the study conducted by Hu’s research team 
proves that medical expenses resulting from smoking have increased the poverty 
level in China.
26
 It is no exaggeration to say that the disparity between costs and 
benefits where ordinary people and the government are concerned may lead to even 
greater economic inequality and increasing political tension in years to come.
27
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From the case of the tobacco industry, one can see that, although the Chinese 
government has demonstrated that it is capable of shaping competitive 
circumstances in the state monopoly to make the central SOEs more powerful and 
influential, doing this does not alleviate the existing economic inequalities and 
distributive injustice and may in fact exacerbate them. The problems illustrated 
above, all of which may be found in the current state tobacco monopoly, do not 
imply that privatization would be a better option, but they are issues with which the 
Chinese government must contend. Otherwise, the legitimacy of state monopolies in 

















































Appendix A: The Corruption Case of Chu Shijian 
Chu Shijian was famous throughout China in the 1980s, not only as the first 
figure amongst multiple leaders under the three-in-one system in the tobacco 
industry, but also for being accused of corruption in 1998. His verdict caused a 
sensation, as he had enjoyed a great reputation as the “tobacco king” after the Yuxi 
Cigarette Enterprise grew into the largest Asian cigarette enterprise in the 1990s 
under his leadership. He was even named the entrepreneur of the year in 1990.  
During his 17-year tenure, the Yuxi Cigarette Enterprise contributed at least 
800 billion RMB in profits and taxes to the state. But Chu's criminal activities 
exposed non-plan-specific production and the resulting chaotic situation of the 
cigarette market in the 1980s. When Yuxi products first became popular, especially 
in the coastal regions, most tobacco corporations and illicit wholesalers tried to 
obtain more cigarettes from Yuxi by any means possible. And so, even though Yuxi 
already produced more cigarettes than permitted under the state plan, its well-known 
brands could still not meet the market demand and the market prices were much 
higher than the official production prices as set by the CNTC before price reform 
was initiated. So even though Yuxi charged more than the official prices for its 
products so that the surplus poured into a secret coffer—which was used in part as a 
private source of funds by Chu—the wholesalers could still make huge profits even 
when they paid in excess of the official prices.  
Using personal connections, some relations of high-ranking officials in the 
Yunnan Province Government thus made a fortune through their involvement in the 
Yuxi cigarette trades. Their collusion drew the attention of the Central Commission 
for Discipline Inspection Commission in 1994, which in the following years 
collected evidence of bribes paid to Chu and his family in exchange for his consent 
(pitiao 批条 ) to supply Yuxi products. In 1999, Chu was sentenced to life 




Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
1. Former Researcher, HT Group, Yunnan, November 6, 2008 
2. Researcher, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, November 7, 2008 
3. Employee, HH Group, Yunnan, November 9, 2008 
4. Government official, Yunnan Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, November 
11, 2008 
5. Researcher, Yunnan University, November 12, 2008 
6. Counselor of Promoting New Rural Area, JC County, Yunnan, November 15, 
2008 
7. Government official, Yunnan Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, November 
17, 2008 
8. Employee, HH Group, Yunnan, November 21, 2008 
9. Retired employee, HT Group, Yunnan, November 24, 2008 
10. Employee, HT Group, Yunnan, November 25, 2008 
11. Employee, HT Group, Yunnan, November 25, 2008 
12. Government official, Yunnan Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, November 
25, 2008 
13. Government official, JC County, Yunnan, November 26, 2008 
14. Government official, JC County, Yunnan, November 27, 2008 
15. Government official, JC County, Yunnan, November 28, 2008 
16. Government official, YX Municipal Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Yunnan, 
November 30, 2008 
17. Government official, ES County, Yunnan, December 2, 2008 
18. Director of Tobacco Procurement Station, ES County, Yunnan, December 2, 
2008 
19. Government official, ES County, Yunnan, December 2, 2008 
20. Employee, HH Group, Yunnan, December 12, 2008 
21. Local Correspondent, Yunnan, December 13, 2008 
22. Director of Tobacco Procurement Station, ZW County, Liaoning, May 27,2009 
23. Government official, ZW County, Liaoning, May 28, 2009 




25. Government official, ZW County Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Liaoning, May 28, 
2009 
26. Government official, the STMB/ CNTC, Beijing, May 30, 2009 
27. Government official, the STMB/ CNTC, Beijing, May 30, 2009 
28. Researcher, Yunnan Provincial Academy of Social Sciences Institute, June 30, 
2009 
29. Researcher, Kunming Institute of Botany, June 30, 2009 
30. Government official, YX Municipal Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Yunnan, July 1, 
2009 
31. Researcher, Yunnan University, July 6, 2009 
32. Government official, the STMB of Yunnan, July 7, 2009 
33. Employee, ZY Cigarette Factory, Guizhou, July 15, 2009 
34. Employee, ZY Cigarette Factory, Guizhou, July 15, 2009 
35. Government official, ZY Municipal Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Guizhou, July 
15, 2009 
36. Government official, ZY Municipal Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Guizhou, July 
15, 2009 
37. Government official, MT County Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Guizhou, July 15, 
2009 
38. Government official, MT County Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Guizhou, July 16, 
2009 
39. Government official, MT County Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Guizhou, July 16, 
2009 
40. Government official, Guizhou Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, July 19, 
2009 
41. Government official, Guizhou Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, July 19, 
2009 
42. Government official, Guizhou Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, July 19, 
2009 
43. Government official, Yunnan Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, August 3, 
2009 
44. Researcher, Anti-smoking Ngo, Yunnan, August 5, 2009 
45. Researcher, Consultancy Company, Yunnan, August 5, 2009 
46. Former employee, KM Cigarette Factory, Yunnan, August 10, 2009 
 
 
47. Former Legal Consultant, HT Group, Yunnan, August 14, 2009 
48. Tobacco Farmer, LL County, Yunnan, August 21, 2009 
49. Tobacco Farmer, LL County, Yunnan, August 22, 2009  
50. Tobacco Farmer, LL County, Yunnan, August 22, 2009 
51. Tobacco Farmer, LL County, Yunnan, August 22, 2009 
52. Tobacco Farmer, LL County, Yunnan, August 22, 2009 
53. Tobacco Smuggler, LL County, Yunnan, August 22, 2009 
54. Tobacco Farmer, LL County, Yunnan, August 23, 2009 
55. Tobacco Farmer, LL County, Yunnan, August 23, 2009 
56. Tobacco Farmer, LL County, Yunnan, August 23, 2009 
57. Retired Vice-Director, HT Group, Yunnan, September 7, 2009 
58. Retired Vice-Director, HT Group, Yunnan, September 8, 2009 
59. Retired Vice-Director, HT Group, Yunnan, September 9, 2009 
60. Government official, JC County, Yunnan, September 9, 2009 
61. Employee, HT Group, Yunnan, September 10, 2009 
62. Employee, HT Group, Yunnan, September 10, 2009 
63. Employee, HH Group, Yunnan, September 11, 2009 
64. Employee, HH Group, Yunnan, September 13, 2009 
65. Employee, HH Group, Yunnan, September 13, 2009 
66. Retired official, Yunnan Provincial Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, September 15, 
2009 
67. Former Staff, KM Cigarette Factory, Yunnan, August 10, 2009 
68. Staff, HH Cigarette Factory, Yunnan, September 23, 2009 
69. Staff, HH Cigarette Factory, Yunnan, September 23, 2009 
70. Government official, ML City, Yunnan, September 24, 2009 
71. Government official, ML Municipal Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Yunnan, 
September 24, 2009 
72. Government official, ML County Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Yunnan, 
September 24, 2009 
73. Government official, ML County Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Yunnan, 
September 24, 2009 
74. Government official, ML County Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Yunnan, 
September 24, 2009 
75. Retired researcher, Chinese Academy of Social Science, Beijing, March 4, 2010 
 
 
76. Former Government official, SX Municipal Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, 
Zhejiang, January 10, 2011 
77. Government official, SX Municipal Tobacco Monopoly Bureau, Zhejiang, 
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State Monopoly, Chinese Style: A Case Study of the Tobacco Industry 
examines how state and market elements have combined and engaged with one 
another in China’s state-monopoly industry over the past three decades. While the 
number of private companies in China has grown substantially, state control—in the 
form of central state-owned enterprises (SOEs)—has not declined much in certain 
monopolized industries following the initiation of market-oriented reform within the 
economy. Although a number of other market-economy countries continued to 
maintain state monopolies—i.e., monopolies created, promoted, and sustained by the 
political authorities in various industries for the sake of public interest or greater 
economy of scale—with the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s, decreasing faith in 
the ability of public authorities to manage these ventures has largely yielded to 
market ideologies and solutions, i.e. privatization. In China, however, 
state-monopolized industries have become more formidable, despite the country’s 
membership in the WTO for more than a decade now. Even more confusing than 
their noticeable presence is how fierce the competition is within China’s 
state-monopolized industries with regard to price, production differentiation, sales 
management, advertising, and so on. 
Adopting a historical institutionalist approach, this study focuses on the 
tobacco industry as a single case study to explore why competition would happen in 
this state-monopoly regime from its outset and how it evolved in China. Given that 
competition is usually regarded as the essence of “normal” market economics and 
that state monopolies, seen as a form of monopoly controlled by fiat, have been 
criticized for eradicating competition, this paradoxical phenomenon—the 
coexistence of state monopoly and competition—forms a critical ingredient in any 
discussion on the dynamic state/market relationship in China. With their attention 
directed elsewhere by theoretical biases, neoliberal researchers have little studied 
this topic, but the insights drawn from this study illuminate not only the complexity 
of China’s state/market relationship—there have existed many ways of organizing a 
state monopoly—but also the legitimacy crisis that the Chinese authorities now face. 
I argue that the emergence of competition in the tobacco state monopoly 
resulted from a particular industrial governance pattern, which formed up 
incrementally and became strengthened via interactions between local governments 
and the local agents of China’s National Tobacco Corporation (CNTC). As the 
institutional settings where local governments and the CNTC’s local agents were 
 
 
embedded changed, the governance pattern and the resulting competition type 
continually transformed over three distinctive phases: quasi-free competition under 
the two-track system (1982-1993), restrained competition under prevalent local 
protectionism (1994-2004), and quasi-oligopoly competition under the central-led 
competitive monopoly (2005-2012). The consequences of this competition in each 
phase then triggered regulatory changes in the tobacco state monopoly at the critical 
junctures where new premises for the next phase formed to generate the next 
governance pattern. 
Tracing the development of these three phases discloses not only how local 
governments have already become the de facto agents for serving the CNTC but also 
how this circumstance has indirectly strengthened the control capacity of the 
monopoly, thus reinforcing and intensifying state control and the competition alike. 
From these dynamics, China not only avoided that familiar collusion between 
emerging oligopolies characteristic under the “central-led competitive monopoly” 
but also that dualist antithesis of state control versus competition. It was in this 

















Staatsmonopolie in Chinese stijl: een gevalsstudie van de tabaksindustrie 
bestudeert hoe staats- en marktelementen met elkaar verbonden kwamen en op 
elkaar hebben ingewerkt in China’s staatsmonopolistische industrie gedurende de 
laatste drie decennia.Hoewel het aantal privé-bedrijven in China substantieel is 
gegroeid, is staatscontrole – in de vorm van ondernemingen in eigendom van de 
centrale staat (SOE’s) – niet veel afgenomen in bepaalde gemonopoliseerde 
industrieën na de invoering van marktgeoriënteerde hervormingen in de 
economie.Hoewel een aantal andere landen met een markteconomie 
staatsmonopolies bleef houden – d.w.z. monopolies gecreëerd, bevorderd, en 
ondersteund door de politieke autoriteiten in diverse industrieën ten behoeve van 
openbaar belang of grotere schaalvoordelen – met de opkomst van het 
neoliberalisme in de zeventiger jaren, heeft afnemend geloof in het vermogen van 
overheden om deze ondernemingen te beheren grotendeels terrein verloren aan 
marktideologieën en –oplossingen, d.w.z. privatisering.In China zijn 
staatsmonopolistische industrieën echter belangwekkender geworden, ondanks het 
WTO-lidmaatschap van het land gedurende inmiddels meer dan een decennium. 
Nog verwarrender dan hun opmerkelijke aanwezigheid is hoe krachtig de competitie 
is tussen China’s staatsmonopolistische industrieën betreffende prijs, 
productiedifferentiatie, verkoopmanagement, reclame, enzovoort. 
Deze studie gaat uit van een historisch-institutionalistische benadering en 
concentreert zich op de tabaksindustrie als een aparte gevalsstudie om te 
onderzoeken waarom er in dit regime van staatsmonopolie vanaf het begin 
competitie bestond en hoe zich dit ontwikkelde in China. Gezien het feit dat 
competitie meestal wordt opgevat als de essentie van “normale” markteconomieën 
en dat staatsmonopolies, beschouwd als een vorm van monopolie gecontroleerd bij 
decreet, zijn bekritiseerd als fnuikend  voor competitie, vormt dit paradoxale 
verschijnsel – het tegelijkertijd bestaan van staatsmonopolie en competitie – een 
cruciaal bestanddeel in elke discussie over de dynamiek staat/markt in China.Met 
hun aandacht elders gericht door theoretische vooringenomenheden hebben 
neoliberale onderzoekers dit onderwerp weinig bestudeerd, maar de inzichten 
afkomstig uit deze studie werpen niet alleen licht op de complexiteit van China’s 
staat/markt relatie – er hebben veel manieren bestaan om een staatsmonopolie te 
organiseren – maar ook op de legitimiteitscrisis waar de Chinese autoriteiten nu mee 
te maken hebben.  
 
 
Ik beargumenteer dat de opkomst van competitie in het staatsmonopolie op 
tabak voortkwam uit een bepaald industrieel bestuurspatroon, dat incrementeel vorm 
kreeg en versterkt werd via interacties tussen lokale overheden en de lokale 
vertegenwoordigers van de Chinese Nationale Tabak Corporatie (CNTC). 
Toen de institutionele omgevingen waarin lokale overheden en de lokale 
vertegenwoordigers van de CNTC gesitueerd waren veranderden, transformeerden 
het bestuurspatroon en het resulterende competitietype zich continu gedurende drie 
verschillende fasen: quasi-vrije competitie onder het tweesporensysteem 
(1982-1993), beperkte competitie onder onderheersende lokale protectie 
(1994-2004), en quasi-oligopolische competitie onder het centraal geleide 
competitieve monopolie (2005-2012). De consequenties van deze competitie in elke 
fase nu brachten veranderingen in regelgeving teweeg in de staatsmonopolie op 
tabak op de cruciale punten waar nieuwe grondslagen voor de volgende fase tot 
stand kwamen om het volgende beheerspatroon te genereren. 
Het traceren van de ontwikkeling van deze drie fasen onthult niet alleen hoe 
lokale overheden al de facto vertegenwoordigers zijn geworden ten dienste van de 
CNTC maar ook hoe deze omstandigheid indirect de controlecapaciteit van het 
monopolie versterkte, en zodoende zowel staatscontrole en competitie verstevigde 
en intensiveerde. Door deze dynamieken vermeed China niet alleen de gebruikelijke 
samenspanning tussen opkomende oligopolies kenmerkend onder het 
“centraal-geleide competitieve monopolie”, maar ook de dualistische antithese van 
staatscontrole versus competitie. Het was in deze context dat het “staatsmonopolie 
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